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in the beginning, all the World was America'
The Constitution begins with "We the People." Where does it end?
Throughout its two-hundred-year history, insiders have repeatedly argued that
various outsiders were beyond its reach. The unsuccessful assertion of Fourth
Amendment claims by lawyers defending General Noriega in the wake of the
invasion of Panama was only a spectacular recent example of the exploration
along the Constitution's borders.
Defining the domain of American constitutionalism not only probes its
foundations and tests moral commitments, but may also generate major practical
consequences for immigration policy, the conduct of foreign affairs, military
action, and the participation of American citizens in an increasingly global
society. Looking only to the 1980's, claims of constitutional protection have
been raised by English women living near American overseas missile sites,2
United States investors dispossessed by American-influenced takings for
Salvadoran land reform3 and for training Nicaraguan Contras,4 and both Amer-
ican and foreign organizations tied by financial strings to restrictions on over-
1. J. LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 343 (P. Laslett
ed. 1965).
2. See Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985).
3. See Langenegger v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 229 (1984).
4. See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded
as moot, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
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seas abortion counseling.5 Similar issues arise routinely in transnational civil
litigation and criminal prosecution, especially in this age of massive narcotics
smuggling.
The domain of constitutionalism has always been contested, and it has
grown as the nation has grown. Some scholars have suggested that its rising
trajectory points to a universal conferral of constitutional identity.6 The courts
have not reached that goal yet, and some scholars argue that they never
should.7 The current debate primarily concerns the rights of persons harmed
by United States government action abroad, especially aliens but also United
States citizens, yet even the constitutional status of island territories like Puerto
Rico remains unsettled.' Within the borders of the United States, every person
is protected by the Constitution, and it has long been established that "person"
includes aliens who are unlawfully present,9 though recent dicta justify the fear
that intensified concerns over both drugs and migrants penetrating the border
may put pressure on that commitment.10 Outside United States borders, the
American Law Institute's latest Restatement of Foreign Relations Law was able
to conclude only that the issue of aliens' rights had "not been authoritatively
adjudicated," while suggesting that "at least some actions by the United States
in respect of foreign nationals outside the country are also subject to con-
stitutional limitations." 1
5. See DKT Memorial Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 838 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1988).
6. See, e.g., Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11
(1985); Lobel, The Constitution Abroad, 83 AM. 3. INT'L L. 871 (1989); McCauliff, The Reach of the
Constitution: American Peace-time Court in West Berlin, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 682 (1980); Mansfield,
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and Foreign Relations, 36 DE PAUL L. REV. 1 (1986); Paust,
Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. 697, 721-35 (1987); Ragosta,
Aliens Abroad: Principles for the Application of Constitutional Limitations to Federal Action, 17 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 287 (1985); Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of
the United States, 20 VA. 3. INT'L L. 741 (1980); Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitu-
tion-Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV.
587, 644-45 (1949); Stephan, Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA.
J. INT'L L. 777 (1980) [hereinafter International Rendition]; Stephan, Constitutional Limits on the Struggle
Against International Terrorism: Revisiting the Rights of Overseas Aliens, 19 CONN. L. REV. 831 (1987)
[hereinafter Terrorism]; Lowenfeld, Book Review, Hijacking, Freedom, and the "American Way," 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1000, 1009-11 (1985) (reviewing H. STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN (1984)). And, from an alien point
of view, see Forch, Mitwirkung deutscher Geschworener an der Ausfibung amerikanischer
Besatzungsgerichtsbarkeit in Berlin, 40 ZElTsCHRIFr FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 760 (1980).
8. See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651,653-54 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez
Andino, 831 F.2d 1164 (Ist Cir. 1987); 3. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
10. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1064-65 (1990).
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 722 com-
ment m (1987). Even this tentative statement found support in only a limited set of lower court opinions.
See id. reporters' note 16.
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From its inception, the very text of the Constitution has suggested inconsis-
tent readings of its intended scope. The Preamble arguably speaks the language
of social contract, perhaps even narrowing what follows by emphasizing that
"We the People of the United States, in Order to ... secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America." On the other hand, the supremacy clause
gives a different characterization of the document--''This Constitution... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land"--and Article III appears to "establish
Justice" for foreign citizens, subjects, and even ambassadors by designing
tribunals that will decide their cases impartially. I shall explain later that social
contract and law-of-the-land interpretations can be easily reconciled,12 but the
contrast illustrates the Constitution's susceptibility to diverse conceptualizations.
Chief Justice Rehnquist recently invoked a restrictive version of the social
contract tradition in his Opinion of the Court in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez.13 The Court there held that the warrant clause of the Fourth
Amendment had no application to American drug enforcement agents' search
of the Mexican home of an alleged Mexican drug lord and brutal murderer who
had been seized by Mexican police and delivered into custody in California.14
Rehnquist argued that the defendant had no Fourth Amendment rights in his
Mexican home because he was not one of "the people" to whom that amend-
ment guaranteed rights. 5
Rehnquist also cited "history and case law" as tending to show that nonresi-
dent aliens have no constitutional rights against agents of the United States
acting outside its borders. 6 His discussion assumed that examples drawn from
two centuries of American constitutional history could all be reconciled, and
that the governing principles had not changed over this period. As I shall show
here, that assumption is badly mistaken. The principles determining the
Constitution's coverage have been sharply controverted during those two
hundred years, and different approaches have been dominant at different times.
The authors of the Bill of Rights almost certainly viewed everyone's constitu-
tional rights as territorially restricted by the national boundaries; that view is
utterly discredited today, and the question whether nonresident aliens' rights
should continue to be so restricted cannot be answered by direct recourse to
eighteenth-century practice.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 57-63 (explaining fundamental law as element of social contract
account).
13. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
14. Id. at 1059. Seven Justices in four opinions agreed on this proposition, counting Justice Blackmun,
who nonetheless dissented. Justices Brennan and Marshall disagreed. See infra text accompanying notes
378-402.
15. 110 S. Ct. at 1060-61. Although it is denominated an opinion of the Court, only four Justices joined
fully in its reasoning, and Justice Kennedy specifically disassociated himself from this text-based portion
of the argument. Id. at 1066-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 1065.
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To understand the course that American constitutionalism has taken since
1789, it is necessary to consider not only the rules that have been adopted at
various historical periods, but also the normative visions underlying those rules
and the choices faced by the decisionmakers. In this Article I shall explore, in
both historical and contemporary terms, the principles that could be utilized to
determine the personal and geographical scope of constitutional fights. Distinc-
tions of person and place raise questions regarding the function of constitutional
rights, and the responses these questions have provoked must be examined in
tandem.
Closer examination of American constitutional history reveals a prominent
rival to the "members only" version of the social contract tradition. This is not,
as some might expect, the notion of the Constitution as directly embodying
universal natural law, which turns out to have played a minor role. Rather, it
is the concept of the Constitution as a fundamental municipal law, taking its
scope from its character as law and the nature of legal obligation. This "munic-
ipal law" tradition has weathered a series of shifts in jurisprudential back-
ground, and has survived independently of belief in natural rights. It has
rendered irrelevant the observation that, even if natural rights exist, some
American constitutional rights are not plausibly among them. I shall associate
the municipal law tradition with, among others, James Madison, John Marshall,
John C. Calhoun, Roger Taney, the first Justice Harlan, and Hugo Black.
Justice Blackmun invoked municipal law arguments in his Verdugo-Urquidez
dissent, and I shall defend this approach myself.
I shall also show how, in this century, the tradition emphasizing member-
ship as a precondition for having constitutional rights at all was transformed
into a more flexible, discretionary approach that might best be named "global
due process." Although this approach could be applied to aliens, history reveals
that it has served as a doctrine of legal geography, not one of personal status.
Its primary exponents, Chief Justice Edward White, Felix Frankfurter, and the
second Justice Harlan, treated it as equally available against citizens. In reject-
ing the text of the Constitution as a basis for recognizing rights, this doctrine
may even claim an unwelcome parentage in the eighteenth century: those
Federalists who defended the Alien Act of 1798 by relegating aliens to their
rights under international law. That infamous statute lies at the root of the
historical debate over aliens' rights in this country, and the controversy that it
engendered deserves close attention.
This Article begins in Part I by briefly sketching some ways of thinking
about a constitution's scope as regards persons and places, including the models
that have been most influential in American constitutional history. It then more
fully explores the normative framework of social contract and natural law that
initially set the terms of the debate.
Part II addresses the question of aliens' rights within United States territory,
beginning with the formative debate on the Alien Act, in which the Jeffersoni-
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ans maintained the orthodox municipal law approach to aliens' rights, and then
tracing the dominance of that approach through the nineteenth century into the
twentieth. Part III turns to the question of the Constitution's geographical scope;
Part III.A examines the recurrence of unsuccessful challenges to the municipal
law approach's nineteenth-century insistence that constitutional rights neces-
sarily followed the nation's expansion across the continent, while Part I1.B
discusses how a geographical membership approach triumphed at the turn of
the century in order to promote colonialism, even at the expense of individual
American citizens.
Part IV employs the understandings derived from this history to explain the
abandonment of territorial restriction of the Constitution in the 1950's, and then
rejoins the strands of alienage and geography in analyzing the Verdugo-
Urquidez case. Finally, Part V argues that a modern version of the municipal
law approach still represents the best account of the scope of American
constitutionalism.
I. FRAMING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
To put the historical debates over the Constitution's reach in their proper
context, I shall briefly sketch the current, incomplete state of the law and some
basic models for addressing the questions they raise. It will later appear that
all of these models can be regarded to some extent as workings out of a social
contract theory of constitutionalism.17 Social contract thinking played an
important role both in the origins of the American Constitution and in the his-
torical debates that this Article will address. Moreover, contractarian political
theory has enjoyed a significant revival in this century. It will therefore be
worthwhile to recall, in subpart B below, certain aspects of the social contract
tradition as the authors of the Constitution received it in the eighteenth century.
I should also emphasize at the outset that the subject of inquiry in this
Article is United States constitutional rights. An individual's constitutional
rights do not always coincide with her subconstitutional statutory or common
law rights available at a given time within the United States' domestic legal
system, her human rights recognized under international treaties or customary
international law, or her moral rights independent of any legal system.' In
particular situations, someone who lacks a constitutional right may nonetheless
be sufficiently protected by an enforceable nonconstitutional norm; even if no
legal machinery for enforcement of a norm protects the individual, nonconstitu-
tional norms may provide reasons why government should not engage in certain
action. This Article does not make any claims about the proper scope of such
17. This is most explicitly summarized for all four models in Part V below, but various points will
be made earlier.
18. I do not intend the latter observation as a commitment to legal positivism, but rather as a denial
that constitutional rights and moral rights can always be equated.
[Vol. 100: 909
Whose Constitution?
nonconstitutional protection, but assumes that constitutional law is one among
a plurality of normative systems.
Moreover, I will not assume that United States constitutional rights must
always be judicially enforceable. It can be meaningful to ask whether the
legislature and the executive should consider themselves constitutionally
prohibited from certain action, even where no judicial resolution of the question
is possible.
A. Some Basic Models
It may be well to remind the reader of some of the most important data
points that the Supreme Court's current body of precedent supplies for builders
of models. First, United States citizens within the borders of the states possess
the full complement of constitutional rights-that is the core situation for which
constitutional rights were created. Second, the Supreme Court has expressly
held for over a century that aliens within the United States are also persons
entitled to constitutional protection.19 Moreover, the Court has held that aliens
not present in the United States are entitled to constitutional protection with
regard to actions taken within the United States against their property rights."
The situation becomes more complicated with regard to government action
outside the borders of the states. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
generally maintained that government action outside the borders of the nation
was not constrained by constitutional rights.21 In the notorious Insular Cases,
the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not even "follow the flag,"
that is, the United States may acquire sovereignty of "unincorporated" posses-
sions where it will be bound only by those provisions of the Constitution that
the Court deems "fundamental;"' these cases have never been expressly over-
ruled. However, in its 1957 decision in Reid v. Covert,'3 the Supreme Court
held that, even in foreign countries, the requirements of trial by jury and
indictment by grand jury must be afforded when United States authorities
prosecute United States citizen civilians for capital crimes. Since Reid v. Covert,
it has generally been recognized that the Constitution as such "applies" wherev-
er the government of the United States may act, and provides the source of the
federal government's authority to act there-the disputable question is whether
19. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
The Court had never suggested a contrary holding before that time. See infra text accompanying notes 166-
79.
20. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Russian Volunteer Fleet
v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931); see also Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106, 111 (2d
Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.).
21. The classic holding is In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (no constitutional rights in trial of capital
offense by American consul in Japan), discussed infra text accompanying notes 279-84.
22. It is important to emphasize that this goes for citizens as well as aliens under the Insular Cases.
23. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The Court extended this holding to noncapital crimes in Kinsellav. United States
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
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a particular constitutional limitation on the government's authority to act should
be regarded as including within its prohibitions unusual categories of places
or persons. Verdugo-Urquidez now tells us that the Fourth Amendment's
warrant clause places no restrictions on searches of nonresident aliens' property
located in a foreign country.'
What understanding of constitutionalism would assist a court in deciding
these problems? Four kinds of approaches have emerged in the course of
American constitutional history, and indeed all four are represented in the
various opinions written by the Justices in Verdugo-Urquidez:
1. Universalism
Universalist approaches require that constitutional provisions that create
rights with no express limitations as to the persons or places covered should
be interpreted as applicable to every person and at every place. The precise
commands of the provisions, especially of those creating rights subject to
balancing tests, may vary from place to place, but one can never simply dismiss
the provisions as inapplicable. As we shall see, the universalist approach ap-
pears in portions of Justice Brennan's dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez,2S but
played almost no role in American constitutionalism until recent years.
The argument for universal application may rely upon the natural rights
background of the American constitutional tradition, possibly reinforced by
contemporary conceptions of human rights.2 6 Or it may proceed simply by
literalism, observing that some portions of the constitutional text limit their
protections expressly to certain places or persons,27 while others do not.'
Some have argued for universalism by replacing its natural law foundation
with the argument that, because the Constitution is an "organic" act giving
"life" to the federal government and providing its only powers, the federal
government cannot exercise powers withheld by the Constitution anywhere, or
with respect to any person.29 This organic argument has force when offered
in response to claims of inherent extra-constitutional power free of all constitu-
tional restriction.30 But when offered as a rule for determining the personal
or geographical scope of constitutional restrictions, the argument frequently
24. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
25. See infra notes 397-99 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 6.
27. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government .. ") (emphasis added); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); id. art. I, § 8,
cI. 1 ("[Alll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States .... "); id. amends.
XV, XIX, XXIV, and XXVI (citizens of the United States).
28. See, e.g., id. amend. V.
29. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 6.
30. See Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55
YALE LJ. 467 (1946).
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becomes circular.3 Application of the organic principle presupposes an inter-




Social contract rhetoric has played a significant role in American
constitutionalism. Social contract theory seeks to legitimate government through
the idea of an actual or hypothetical agreement embodying the consent of the
governed who have established the state and empowered it to govern. Some
accounts of social contract theory identify a limited class of "members" as the
proper beneficiaries of the contract. The beneficiaries have rights based in the
contract; nonbeneficiaries are relegated to whatever rights they may have
independent of the contract. A skeptic who did not ascribe normative force to
social contract arguments still could invoke the idea of a social contract as a
historically-grounded tool for interpreting American constitutionalism. 33 This
sort of reasoning is evident in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-
Urquidez.4
If the restriction of constitutional rights to members is to be justified by
characterizing the Constitution as a social contract, then it becomes necessary
to identify the set of parties to the contract. As we shall see, advocates of
restrictive membership approaches have argued for widely varying descriptions
of the parties: they may include all the citizens of the nation "the United
States," the subset consisting of those who are citizens of the various states,
or some intermediate group including citizens of some, but not all, territories.
During certain periods of American history, it has been claimed that the parties
to the Constitution were not individual citizens, but rather the several states.3
Moreover, even if individuals are parties to the Constitution, that document
reserves sovereign political power to the people of the states alone,3" and only
they have given their consent to it at the time of each state's accession to the
union. Accordingly, some supporters of a membership model have argued that
31. For example, understanding the Constitution as an organic act establishing the federal government
is wholly uninformative as to whether the freedom of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment includes the political activity of Nicaraguans in Nicaragua, cf. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,
770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissing, inter alia, constitutional claims brought by Nicaraguan citizens
against support of Contras), or even the political activity of Americans in Mexico, cf. Perez v. Brownell,
356 U.S. 44 (1958) (upholding involuntary expatriation of Mexican-American dual national who voted in
Mexican election), overruled, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
32. See Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 VA. L. REV. 483, 487 (1987) ("The
proposition that the Constitution applies to all exercises of governmental power, even foreign relations, is
only a starting point.") (footnote omitted). The discussion in this Article relates only to the rights of
individual aliens, and not to the juristic persons discussed by Damrosch.
33. See, e.g., International Rendition, supra note 7.
34. See infra notes 378-88 and accompanying text.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 161-64, 228-30.
36. The Twenty-Third Amendment muddies this argument slightly. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
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constitutional protections should be available within the geographical limits of
the states (plus or minus the District of Columbia, which was formerly part of
Maryland), but not in the territories. 7
3. Municipal Law, including Strict Territoriality
Under a strictly territorial model, the Constitution constrains the United
States government only when it acts within the borders of the United States.
Strict territoriality prevailed as dogma for most of American constitutional
history, until its overthrow in Reid v. Covert.3s During that period, courts
rarely saw any need to justify it. For nineteenth-century American law, this
model operated as a reflection of the territorial sovereignty of the nation-
state.39 Chief Justice Marshall asserted as a basic principle, "The jurisdiction
of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute."'
Through the lens of conflict of laws, this way of thinking grew more rigid over
the course of that century, from the comity approach of Joseph Story to the
vested rights doctrine of Joseph Beale.41 To a territorialist, a law is binding
of its own force only within the territory of the nation-state that promulgates
it. If the Constitution is viewed as itself a "law" or legal norm, then the
territorialist would conclude that the Constitution has power to bind only within
the nation's borders. Extending the Constitution over the entire territory then
gives it the fullest possible effect that it can have of its own force.
Strict territoriality should be seen as a special case of a more general
approach that focuses on a sphere in which American municipal law oper-
ates.42 Rather than define that sphere solely in terms of geography, one may
define it in terms of a broad range of factors. The Constitution, as fundamental
municipal law---"the supreme Law of the Land" 43 -also operates within that
sphere, and constrains the actions of government. When the government acts
outside the sphere of municipal law, it enters a field where its actions do not
impose obligations. There individuals are not bound by the United States
37. This argument has serious problems, but it was quite important historically. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 243-52, 305.
38. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). See supra text accompanying note 23.
39. This appears most clearly in In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453,464-65 (1891) (Field, J.), as discussed infra
text accompanying notes 279-83.
40. Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
41. See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (Holmes, J.); 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 (1916); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19-38
(1834); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361
(1945).
42. I use the term "municipal law" in its meaning as a synonym for the domestic law of a given state,
in opposition to international or natural law. My use of the term to describe a model of constitutionalism
derives from the Jeffersonians' use of the term in the debates on the Alien Act. See infra notes 143-53 and
accompanying text.
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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government, nor does the Constitution bind the government to respect what
would otherwise be the individuals' constitutional rights.
As I shall demonstrate, strict territoriality and broader municipal law models
can be derived from a social contract understanding of constitutionalism, in
which a constitution may take on the character of both law and contract. These
models differ from membership models in their explanation of how one be-
comes a beneficiary of a social contract. They find rights to be prerequisites
for justifying political or legal obligation-or, in other words, sovereignty.
Justice Brennan has recently described the municipal law approach as one of
"mutuality." 4 This linkage of obligations and rights does not necessarily
guarantee the full package of constitutional rights, however-just as the univer-
salist model concedes that a proper reading of the constitutional text may limit
certain rights to citizens or domestic territory, so municipal law approaches
recognize that certain rights may have been reserved to particular categories
of persons or places.
To apply a municipal law model, one must specify the sphere of municipal
law. The nineteenth century equated this sphere with the territory of the United
States, but over time, expanded concepts of United States lawmaking power
have led to an expansion in the reach of the municipal law approach. The
modern form of this approach presumes the applicability of constitutional rights
in three contexts: (i) within United States territory, to all persons, (ii) to citizens
of the United States everywhere in the world, and (iii) to aliens outside United
States territory only in those circumstances in which the United States seeks
to impose obligations upon them under United States law.45 An approach of
this kind may be seen in Justice Blackmun's brief dissenting opinion in Ver-
dugo-Urquidez,6 and at the conclusion of this Article, I shall argue that it
represents the best account of American constitutionalism.
4. Balancing Approaches, or "Global Due Process"
Extending to an individual abroad the full complement of constitutional
rights that she would enjoy within United States territory may seem too gener-
ous a compensation for subjecting the individual to only some of our laws. If
one views a constitution as a contract designed to create a balance of power
between the governors and the governable, then the government's reduced right
to obedience and reduced means of enforcement may call for a reciprocal
reduction in individual rights. Universalism is often criticized for the danger
44. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. CL 1056, 1071 (1990).
45. See also infra Part V. One might say that aliens outside the United States enjoy constitutional rights
pro hac vice in circumstances where the United States seeks to impose legal obligations upon them; this
transactional metaphor should not, however, be misunderstood as limiting the availability of rights to "cases"
before courts or other formal tribunals.
46. See infra notes 400-02 and accompanying text.
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that would be posed to the United States if it unilaterally renounced powers that
other nations freely exercise.4 7
This emphasis on the countervailing necessities of overseas action may
suggest that all of these models can be collapsed into a brand of harmless
universalism: recognize constitutional fights as potentially applicable worldwide,
and then balance them away. One might engage in ad hoc balancing in the
individual case, or balance more categorically; the balancing process may be
intrusive or highly deferential. The concurrences of Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan in Reid v. Covert offer an example of this approach as regards citizens'
rights abroad,48 and Justice Kennedy in Verdugo-Urquidez located himself
within the tradition of Harlan's concurring opinion.49 This approach suggests
that, ultimately, extraterritorial constitutional rights boil down to a single right:
the right to "global due process."
B. Vattel and the Eighteenth-Century Normative Framework
The linked traditions of social contract theory and naturalist international
law played an important role in both the creation of the United States Constitu-
tion and the early debates over its applicability to noncitizens and to govern-
ment action outside the states.50 One representative of both traditions,
Emmerich de Vattel's Law of Nations, requires particular notice because of its
great prestige in post-Revolutionary America, also reflected in these debates. 5'
Since these debates framed the issues for future reconsideration, it is essential
to give closer attention to these traditions if we wish to understand the ideas
that the debaters were invoking, as well as to gain insight into what a serious
commitment to a social contract view of constitutional rights might entail. I
47. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 7; Terrorism, supra note 7.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 358-63.
49. See infra text accompanying note 392.
50. See, e.g., G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-87, at 273-91 (1969); infra
text accompanying notes 103-54, 196-202, 236-51.
51. 3 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW (1916) (C. Fenwick
trans. ed. 1758); on Vattel's prestige, see, e.g., J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 37-40 (6th ed. 1963); 1 L.
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW * 18; F. RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ENLIGHI-TMENT
281-310 (1975). But see Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 14041 (1814) (Story, J.,
dissenting).
Conversely Rousseau, who stood outside the natural rights tradition, will receive less attention here
than his place in the history of political philosophy might suggest, for three principal reasons. First, for a
Swiss living in France, he had little to say on the subject of aliens and their rights. See J. ROUSSEAU,
DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATIONS OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN, reprinted in THE FIRST AND
SECOND DISCOURSES 77, 160-61 (R. & L Masters trans. ed. 1964); J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT,
reprinted in POLITICAL WRITINGS 117, 155 (F. Watkins trans. ed. 1986) [hereinafter J. ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT]; L ROUSSEAU, THE CONFESSIONS 377-78, 394-95 (J. Cohen trans. ed. 1953). Second,
the distinctive features of Rousseau's political thought appear not to have been influential in 18th-century
America and his reputation there suffered as a result of the French Revolution. See P. SPURLIN, ROUSSEAU
IN AMERICA 1760-1809, at 63-70, 101-13 (1969). Third, the crucial debate occurred in the United States
at the time of the Alien and Sedition Acts, which embodied a reaction against the French Revolution, so
that neither side had any incentive to invoke Rousseau. See infra text accompanying note 96.
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shall show that the traditions contained serious ambiguities concerning the
personal and geographical scope of a social contract, ambiguities that provided
alternative orientations for American constitutionalism.
The central problem that the social contract tradition sought to address was
the legitimacy of government-how the duty of subjects or citizens to obey
laws could arise, and what limits there might be, the trangression of which
would release them from obedience. The theory has ancient roots, but one
medieval form particularly deserves mention here: the idea of a contract of
government, articulated in an oath or charter at the time of accession, between
the monarch and the people.52 This description, however, presupposes the
people as a unity capable of making an agreement that binds its members. Later
thinkers explored the relationship between individuals and society that could
support such a binding agreement.
The social contract analysis was motivated by the view that an individual
obligation to obey must be grounded in individual consent, either actual or
justly presumed. The authors imagined individuals in a "state of nature,"
without the protections of a common earthly authority. Whether solely from
a desire for greater security, for cooperation toward material improvement, or
out of an inherent sociability, they came together and agreed to form a poli-
ty.53 This collective agreement may be called the social contract proper, in
contrast to the contract of government between the ruler and the ruled.
The number and content of the agreements varied from author to author.
These variations were crucial because they determined who was bound and to
what. Hobbes, for example, eliminated the contract of government. In his
vision, competitive, self-interested individuals, rationally seeking escape from
the universal warfare that characterized his state of nature, agreed to join
together and to submit to whatever particular individual or group the majority
would select as an absolute sovereign. No contractual limitations or conditions
on sovereignty existed, and the sovereign could not be accused of breach,
although sovereign failings might lead to the commonwealth's dissolution
through external conquest or other social breakdown.'
Most later writers in the social contract tradition sought to restore the
limitations on the sovereign. Pufendorf included both the social contract proper
and the contract of government in a multi-stage description of the origin of the
state.55 For Pufendorf, the power of government was limited by the explicit
terms of the agreements, the ends for which government was instituted, and the
52. J. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACr 27-35 (2d ed. 1956).
53. For most writers, the contract extended itself to descendants of the original members by means
of tacit consent deduced from their acceptance of its benefits. See, e.g., 2J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES
OF NATURAL AND PoLmc LAW 30-31 (E. Nugent trans. 1823); L LOCKE, supra note 1, at 390-94; 3 E.
DE VATrEL, supra note 51, at 88-89. But see T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 255 (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1985).
54. T. HOBBES, supra note 53, at 272, 375-76.
55. 2 S. PUFENDORF, DEJURENATURAE Er GENTiuM LiaR! Ocro 974-75 (Oldfather & Oldfather trans.
1934) (2d ed. 1688).
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laws of nature.56 Locke followed Pufendorf in subjecting government power
to natural law but, for reasons of his own, replaced the contract of government
by a "fundamental positive Law" establishing the government.5 7 The powers
of government were held in trust, and breach of this trust justified the people
in resuming their natural liberty.5" The trust analogy "fitted Locke's intention
admirably, for unlike the contract of government, in which rights and duties
were reciprocal, it left the duties on the side of the government, and the rights
on the side of the people." 59
The idea of a "fundamental law" establishing the form of government held
greater prominence in later writings, including Vattel's Law of Nations.60
Vattel was a disciple of Christian Wolff, who agreed with Pufendorf in viewing
humans as naturally sociable. 61 Vattel explained the creation of the state as
the product of an act of association, or social contract,62 followed by a funda-
mental regulation or constitution, which set forth "the organization by means
of which the Nation acts as a political body; how and by whom the people are
to be governed, and what are the rights and duties of those who govern." 63
The notion of a written and binding fundamental law, of course, became
the great vehicle for American constitutionalism. 64 Because the notion had
previously existed more in theory than in practice, the authors did not fully
anticipate the questions that would arise in its implementation. Two points on
which they were susceptible to opposing interpretations were the rights of aliens
under the fundamental law and the extension of the fundamental law to newly
acquired territory.
56. E.g., id. at 1068-72, 1077-78.
57. J. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 401-02.
58. Id. at 460-64, 476-77.
59. J. GOUGH, supra note 52, at 143.
60. 3 E. DE VATrEL, supra note 51; see also 2 J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 53, at 26-27, 45-46; J.
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 51, at 57, 108-09. Rutherforth defined a "civil constitution"
as a contract between the people and their government, but noted that it could be called a law. T.
RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW; BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON
GROTIUS DE JURE BELLI ET PACtS, READ IN ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 291-93 (1832 ed.) (first
published 1754-1756). Edward Dumbauld notes Marshall's reliance on Rutherforth. Dumbauld, John Mar-
shall and the Law of Nations, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 38, 40 (1955).
61. 3 E. DE VATIEL, supra note 51, at 5, 114; see 2 C. WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA
PERTRACTATUM, 12-13 (3. Drake trans. 1934). On Vattel's relationship to Wolff, see, e.g., 3 E. DE VATrEL,
supra note 51, at 6a-9a; F. RUDDY, supra note 51.
62. 3 E. DE VATrEL, supra note 51, at 13-14.
63. id. at 17. However, in discussing the Lockean right of revolution, Vattel slips back into the locution
that a prince's attack on the constitution of the state "breaks the contract which bound the people to him."
Id. at 23.
64. See Stourzh, Constitution: Changing Meanings of the Term From the Early Seventeenth to the Late
Eighteenth Century, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 45-48 (T. Bell & J. Pocock eds.
1988) (emphasizing Vattel's role in this process).
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1. Aliens and the Social Contract
The social contract analysis places primary emphasis on the relationship
between a state and its subjects or citizens. What then does it tell us about the
rights of aliens? By definition, aliens began as outsiders to a particular social
contract; they were either isolated individuals or members of another polity.
The members of a given society remained in a state of nature as to outsiders.
The consequences depended on one's understanding of a state of nature.
For Hobbes, continuing in the state of nature left outsiders in the condition
of war. Thereafter, any outsider who sought to enter the country must submit
to the sovereign and become a subject, unless the outsider or his own sovereign
had managed to gain a contrary promise from the local sovereign.65 In the
latter case, the outsider's security rode on the terms of the promise, for "the
Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it
be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without violation of any former
Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature. '66
The notion of an alien's entering the country requires a shift of attention
from the society as a union of individuals to the occupation of territory by a
society. For Hobbes, the territory of a commonwealth simply consisted of those
places where the commonwealth succeeded in exercising power. No property
rights existed in a state of nature, and property was distributed by the sovereign
after the institution of government. 67 Hobbes had no scruples about con-
quest,68 so the territory could be consolidated into the sort of country an alien
might think of entering. But those who ascribed a fuller set of duties to the Law
of Nature, identifying a natural right in the possessor of the soil, should have
had more difficulty explaining why nations do not interpenetrate one another,
like the weave of a cloth, or a checkerboard, or at least like "a slice of Swiss
cheese. '69 Instead, they simply assumed a domain or a country voluntarily
asszmbled.70
The assumption of a non-Hobbesian universal natural law also made an
alien's life less cheap. A sovereign sometimes had a natural obligation to permit
aliens to enter the territory, particularly when the alien's need was great or the
65. T. HOBBES, supra note 53, at 273. Becoming a subject in a Hobbesian commonwealth, of course,
does not guarantee much in the way of rights.
66. Id. at 360. We shall find a brand of neo-Hobbism in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 378-81.
67. T. HOBBES, supra note 53, at 189-90, 234, 295-97.
68. Id. at 251-53, 255-57, 360.
69. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 54-55 (1974); see also Brilmayer, Consent, Contract
and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1989).
70. See, e.g., J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 51, at 21-22; T. RUTHERFORTH, supra
note 60, at 496; 3 E. DE VArrEL, supra note 51, at 84; 2 C. WOLFF, supra note 61, at 50-51, 140. But see
R. NOZICK, supra note 69.
1991]
The Yale Law Journal
entrance could be permitted without significant disadvantage.7 The natural
law school also limited the conditions the sovereign could justly attach to an
alien's entrance." They agreed that a sovereign had the right to insist on the
alien's subjection to its laws as a condition for permission to enter the territo-
ry.73 Thus, entrance by an alien entailed tacit consent to the laws, restoring
the consensual basis of obligation. This led some to the semantic question
Whether the alien became a subject, or a temporary subject, or even a temporary
citizen, though it was clear that an alien's admission and submission to the laws
did not empower the alien as a full member of the body politic.74
The strength of natural obligations, however, should not be overestimated.
For Vattel, as for Wolff, most natural obligations bound only "internally," in
the sovereign's conscience, and were not "perfect" obligations. That is, they
had not been recognized by the nations as rules whose violation justifies use
of force.75 Except in cases of absolute "necessity,"76 Vattel and Wolff regard-
ed the sovereign's obligation to admit aliens as internal and imperfect. The
sovereign had the "external" right to decide for itself whom its interests enabled
it to admit, and under what conditions. 77
What does it mean to say that an alien is subject to "the laws?" That
became the crucial question in the debates on aliens' rights.78 Wolff and his
disciple Vattel discussed at length the character of the laws to which aliens
must submit, but they were ultimately unenlightening. Vattel maintained that
"[b]eing thus subject to the laws, foreigners who violate them should be
71. See, e.g., 2 S. PUFENDORF, supra note 55, at 363-66; T. RUTHERFORTH, supra note 60, at 489; 3
E. DE VATrEL, supra note 51, at 92, 154; 2 C. WOLFF, supra note 61, at 80-81, 176-78; Nafziger, The
General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 810-15 (1983).
72. 2 S. PUFENDORF, supra note 55, at 354-55; 3 E. DE VATrEL, supra note 51, at 144; 2 C. WOLFF,
supra note 61, at 150-51.
73. 2. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 53, at 31; 2 S. PUFENDORF, supra note 55, at 994; T. RUTHERFORTH,
supra note 60, at 265; 3 E. DE VArrEL, supra note 51, at 144; 2 C. WOLFF, supra note 61, at 151-52; see
also J. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 392.
74. See 2J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 53, at3l; J. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 394; 2 S. PUFENDORF, supra
note 55, at 995; 3 E. DE VATrEL, supra note 51, at 87, 146; 2 C. WOLFF, supra note 61, at 152-53. At
common law, aliens within the realm were regarded as local, temporary subjects. See Calvin's Case, 7 Coke
Rep. la, 6a (1608); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *359; Blackstone even listed them as one of the
divisions of the people. Id. at *354.
75. 3 E. DE VATTEL, supra note 51, at 7; cf. 2 C. WOLFF, supra note 61, at 10-11, 19, 84-86 (distin-
guishing between positive law of nations and natural law, which confers only imperfect rights). Contra, 2
S. PuFENDORF, supra note 55, at 221-29 (fully equating law of nations with theologically grounded natural
law). Vattel also described an intermediate category of obligations that were external, but imperfect; that
is, they were created as positive international law, but they included an element of discretion that made it
inappropriate to compel compliance. 3 E. DE VATrEL, supra note 51, at 7. Purely internal obligations were
always imperfect.
76. 3 E. DE VATTEL, supra note 51, at 149-51; 2 C. WOLFF, supra note 61, at 174.
77. E.g., 3 E. DE VATTEL, supra note 51, at 92, 154; 2 C. WOLFF, supra note 61, at 81; accord, T.
RUTHERFORTH, supra note 60, at 489. The distinction between the sovereign's external right to exclude,
and its unenforceable natural obligation to admit, made Vattel's work ammunition for both sides in debates
over immigration and its consequences. See infra text accompanying notes 105-08, 143, 150-53, 155-56;
see also Nafziger, supra note 71, at 812 (discussing this susceptibility of Vattel).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 102-58.
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punished accordingly,"79 and that the sovereign "agrees to protect them as his
own subjects.""0 These were only natural obligations, but the foreign state was
entitled to intervene
in cases where justice has been denied or the decision is clearly and
palpably unjust, or the proper procedure has not been observed, or
finally, in cases where his subjects, or foreigners in general, have been
discriminated against.81
Nonetheless, Vattel stated that resident aliens "have only certain privileges
which the law, or custom, gives them,"8 2 and Wolff explicitly mentioned the
sovereign's right to "pass laws which hold foreigners alone. 8s3 Vattel excepted
them from certain laws that were "operative only in the case of citizens or
subjects."'" Vattel and Wolff criticized as unjust the confiscation of aliens'
moveable property on their death, but neither saw cause for complaint in
uniform laws denying aliens the right to possess immoveable property or to
marry local women.85
Thus, the natural law tradition supported the notion that the externally
binding law of nations required at least some minimal level of justice to
aliens.86 At the same time, it suggested that many legal discriminations against
aliens were consistent not only with externally binding law, but also with inter-
nally binding natural obligations. Not even Wolff, who labelled them "tempo-
rary citizens," thought aliens were naturally entitled to national treatment in all
things. The tradition provided no unambiguous criteria for deciding which
discriminations were permissible, either internally or externally. Vattel and
Wolff said nothing about whether fundamental laws were included among those
to which aliens were entitled.
2. Territorial Expansion and the Social Contract
Vattel and the naturalist school of international law discussed not only
aliens who entered a sovereign's territory, but also the extension of sovereignty
over new territory. The naturalists generally argued that acquisition of inhabited
79. 3 E. DE VATTEL, supra note 51, at 145.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 139.
82. Id. at 87.
83. 2 C. WOLFF, supra note 61, at 152; see also id. at 153 ("they are bound only to do and not to do
the things which must be done or not done by citizens at the time under the same circumstances, except
in so far as particular laws introduce something else concerning foreigners").
84. 3 E. DE VATTEL, supra note 51, at 144; see also id. at 146.
85. Id. at 146-48; 2 C. WOLFF supra note 61, at 166-73; see also 2 S. PUFENDORF, supra note 55, at
371-72 (on restriction of intermarriage).
86. In later development, this becomes the contention for an "international minimum standard of
justice," as opposed to merely requiring "national treatment." See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 711, 712 (1987).
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territory must be founded in consent. European practice led them to recognize
a category of "patrimonial" monarchy subject to the monarch's disposition, but
the naturalists sought to limit this doctrine.' The social contract was a bond
of unity, and a nonpatrimonial state could not alienate a portion of its members
without their consent, at least not without compelling necessity.88 Some of the
naturalists, however, presumed the tacit consent of those defeated in a just war
to the government of the conqueror.89
The naturalists did not contend that a state must extend its own fundamental
laws over new territory. They assumed that natural rights should be respected
in any constitution, but there were many different ways of achieving this.
Several of them, including Vattel, wrote approvingly of a conqueror in a just
war who rules the conquered territory under its prior form of government.'
They did not view monarchy as necessarily inconsistent with natural law,9
nor rule of one territory by another, so long as it was grounded in original con-
sent.92 On the other hand, Vattel briefly observed that when the political laws
of a nation do not draw express distinctions, they also extend to its colonies.93
Thus, as in the case of aliens, the lessons of the natural law school for the
scope of the Constitution were equivocal: The sovereign should conform to
positive fundamental laws in all of its territory. But Vattel and the other
naturalists did not require that the fundamental laws of a state be uniform
throughout its territory, and they did not discuss which departures from unifor-
mity were appropriate. Presumably, a sovereign whose fundamental law placed
restrictions on the conditions of acquisition was bound by those restrictions,
but their content was a local and not a universal question. Some basis for
universal principles, however, may be seen in the requirement that any funda-
mental laws adopted must respect natural rights, and in the alternative means
of legitimation provided by giving the acquired territory the fundamental laws
that its own population prefers. It should be noted for future reference that
nothing in this tradition makes the convenience of the acquiring power a
87. 2 . BURLAMAQUI, supra note 53, at 50-51; 2 S. PUFENDoRF, supra note 55, at 1274-75; T.
RUTHERFORTH, supra note 60, at 569-72; 3 E. DE VATEL, supra note 51, at 33-34; cf. 2 C. WOLFF, supra
note 61, at 447-48 ("in a doubtful case it may not be assumed that the kingdom is patrimonial").
88. 2 J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 53, at 152-54; 2 S. PUFENDORF, supra note 55, at 1288-90; T.
RUTHERFORTH, supra note 60, at 569; 3 E. DE VATITEL, supra note 51, at 14, 100-01; 2 C. WOLFF, supra
note 61, at 510-11.
89. 2 J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 53, at 211-12; T. RUTHERFORTH, supra note 60, at 594; 2 C. WOLFF,
supra note 61, at 444-46.
90. 2 J. BURLAMAQULT supra note 53, at 214; 3 F. DE VATFEL, supra note 51, at 309-12; cf. 2 C.
WOLFF, supra note 61, at 446-48 (victor acquires absolute sovereignty over vanquished, not limited by laws
of either, unless surrender is conditional).
91. 2 3. BuRLAMAQuI, supra note 53, at 70-71; 2 S. PUFENDOIRF, supra note 55, at 1032-33; T.
RUTHERFORTH, supra note 60, at 299-316; 3 E. DE VATrEL, supra note 55, at 20-21.
92. 2 J. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 53, at212-15; 3 E. DE VATrL, supra note 51, at 80-81; 2 C. WOLFF,
supra note 61, at 47.




sufficient justification for the content of fundamental laws imposed on the new
territory.
H. RESPECING PERSONS
The ambiguities of the social contract tradition regarding aliens' rights were
not resolved in the drafting of the United States Constitution. Unlike their
contemporaries in France, who produced a Declaration of the Rights of Man
and of the Citizen, the drafters of the federal Bill of Rights did not take care
to distinguish between the respective rights of citizens and persons. James
Madison and his political allies were forced to address this postponed issue only
a decade later, in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. 4 The
resulting debate over aliens' rights was the first of the major confrontations
over the scope of American constitutionalism.
This Part will begin with an examination of the debate itself,95 paying
close attention to the political theory lying behind the claims of the debaters.
Then it will show how the Madisonian position on the right-bearing capacity
of aliens, which was the mainstream position of his time, was later confirmed
in the judicial exposition of American constitutional law.
A. The Alien Act Debates
The notion of restricting the Constitution's reach to citizens was vigorously
debated in the polemics over the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition
Acts. These statutes embodied the extreme Federalists' reaction to the importa-
tion of dangerous revolutionary ideas from France, which they saw being spread
by French agents, Irish immigrants, and Jeffersonian Republicans. The Alien
Act of 1798 posed in stark form the question whether aliens had constitutional
rights, since it subjected them to expulsion on mere suspicion through orders
issued ex parte by the President.96 The importance of this controversy as a test
94. See generally D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 380-424 (1962); J. MILLER,
CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACMs (1951); J. SMrrH, FREEDOM'S FEITERS: THE ALIEN
AND SEDMON LAWS AND AbfERcAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956). There were eventually four relevant statutes.
The Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Star. 577 (1798), applies only in time of war, it is still in force. 50 U.S.C.
§§ 21-23 (1982). The Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798), extended the period of residence re-
quired before naturalization to fourteen years; it reflected the tendency of immigrants in the 1790's to
become Jeffersonian Republicans, see J. SiffTH, supra, at 23-25, and was repealed by the Act of Apr. 14,
1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153. The Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, and the Alien Act (or Alien Friends Act),
ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798), were by their terms temporary and expired on March 3, 1801, and June 25, 1800,
respectively.
95. Detailed examination here is necessitated by the fact that historians of the period have devoted
primary attention to the Sedition Act.
96. The Alien Act authorized the President "at any time during the continuance of this act, to order
all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have
reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the govern-
ment thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States, within such time as shall be expressed in
such order .... Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798).
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of principle, however, was magnified by its incorporation into Jefferson's
political strategy, and by the subsequent prestige of the Jeffersonian defense
of individual and states' rights.
The Jeffersonian Republicans viewed the passage of the Alien and Sedition
Acts as an effort to destroy their party. Nonetheless, the Acts also offered an
opportunity: although they would be used to punish criticism of the administra-
tion, public revulsion against them could prove to be a springboard to electoral
victory. The Alien Act served as a useful exemplar of Federalist tyranny, and
it continued to play a substantial role in Republican publicity. It allegedly ex-
ceeded the delegated powers of Congress, violated the separation of powers,
and transgressed the explicit constitutional rights to trial by jury and due
process of law.
The right-bearing capacity of aliens was, of course, not the sole or even the
major focus of the struggle-the Sedition Act and the developing concept of
states' rights took center stage. But, in systematically attacking or defending
all portions of the Alien-and-Sedition package, this contentious generation laid
the foundation for future thought on the place of aliens in American
constitutionalism. These arguments were refined in three stages: during the
original opposition to the bill, during the passage of the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions protesting against the Acts, and in James Madison's 1800 Report
for the Virginia legislature in defense of the Resolutions.
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were Jefferson's great vehicles for
denunciation of the Alien and Sedition Acts. Concealing their own participation,
he and Madison enlisted the aid of local allies to shepherd resolutions through
the state legislatures, asserting the unconstitutionality of the statutes and the
urgency of taking measures against them.97 These resolutions expounded the
Constitution as a compact among the states. The rights of the states as parties
included the right to identify violations of the compact by the federal govern-
ment. Accordingly, the resolutions declared the unconstitutionality of the Alien
and Sedition Acts.
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions evoked critical counter-resolutions
from a majority of the other states.98 The Federalists had some success in
shifting the focus from the merits of the Alien and Sedition Acts to the
disunionist tendencies of the Resolutions. They also continued to excite public
fear of sanguinary French agents.
97. See R. BEEMAN, THE OLD DOMINION AND THE NEW NATION, 1788-1801, at 186-88 (1972); Koch
& Ammon, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson's and Madison's Defense of
Civil Liberties, 5 WM. & MARY Q. (3d Series) 145 (1948).
98. D. MALONE, supra note 94, at 413; Anderson, Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions (Parts 1 & 2), 5 AM. HisT. REV. 45, 225 (1899-1900). The Kentucky legislature renewed its
protest in a Resolution of 1799, but did not repeat or refine its analysis of the defects of the Alien Act at
that time. Resolution of Nov. 22, 1799, reprinted in 4 DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS,




The Virginian Republicans prevailed upon Madison to enter the Virginia
House of Delegates in order to lend his prestige openly to this struggle.9 9
Madison then drafted a Report, which the legislature adopted in January, 1800,
restating the case for the Virginia Resolutions. In later years, this Report was
extravagantly praised as a summation of Jeffersonian doctrine and the "princi-
ples of '9 8 ."I° Reprinted at various dates, and incorporated verbatim in
Elliot's Debates,'' it kept accessible for further use (or distortion) a fuller
account of those principles than the Resolutions themselves.
1. Federalists and the Membership Approach
The existing reports of the debates in the House of Representatives on the
passage of the Alien Act show that the major themes had already emerged." 2
Albert Gallatin, the foreign-born leader of the Jeffersonian forces in the House,
argued that the generality of the Constitution's language, particularly its refer-
ences to "persons" rather than "citizens," made its protection available to
aliens. 10 3 The Federalists not only countered these arguments clause by clause,
but also made a more fundamental response: aliens were not parties to the
Constitution; it was not made for their benefit; and they had no rights under
it. Harrison Gray Otis, for example, sneeringly noted "that 'we, the people of
the United States,' were the only parties concerned in making that instrument.
He found nothing in it which bound us to fraternize with the whole world." 1"
The Federalists thus gave a nativist twist to the social contract background
of American constitutionalism. Citizens, as parties to the contract, could assert
constitutional rights. But aliens were not parties and had to look elsewhere for
their rights-for example, to the law of nations, which recognized the power
of a nation to expel aliens at will.
In the debates on the Virginia Resolutions, the Federalists in the House of
Delegates made fundamental arguments as well as clause-specific ones. They
reiterated that aliens were not "parties" to the Constitution, and therefore had
99. R. BEEMAN, supra note 97, at 210; Koch & Ammon, supra note 97, at 163-64.
100. See Fong Yue 'ing v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 747-48 (1893) (Field, L, dissenting); Hunter
v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 29 (1814) (Roane, I.); South Carolina Exposition, reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
C. CALHOUN 442 (1977) [hereinafter CALHOUN PAPERS]; Speech, reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN C.
CALHOUN 37-38 (R. Crall6 ed. 1853) [hereinafter CALHOUN WORKS] (Senate speech of Feb. 20, 1837, on
resolution to purchase Madison's papers); see also Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 926-27 & n.223 (1985).
101. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 98, at 546.
102. See J. SMITH, supra note 94, at 57-93. The bill had already passed the Senate, but the debates
there are not reported. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 548-75 (1798).
103. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1981 (1798) ("Or will gentlemen say that the Constitution affords a security
to citizens which it does not extend to aliens? ... The trial by jury does not speak of citizens, but of
persons."). Actually, Article IMI speaks of "[t]he trial of all Crimes," and the Sixth Amendment speaks of
"the accused," but let that pass.
104. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2018 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Otis); see also id. at 1984-85 (remarks of Rep.
William Gordon) (aliens not among those for whose use and benefit Constitution was formed).
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no rights under it.1 5 The rights of citizens were determined by the Constitu-
tion, but the rights of aliens by the law of nations.106 References to Vattel
showed that aliens could be expelled at will under the law of nations, which
afforded no trial by jury.107
The argument of George Keith Taylor, who led the Federalist attack on the
Resolutions, shifted repeatedly between two versions of this argument. One
form, which today we would say was based on the right/privilege distinction,
started with the proposition that, under the law of nations (as also under
American domestic law), the alien has no right to remain. Expulsion therefore
does not deprive the alien of liberty or any other right, and procedural rights
do not attach. The second version of the argument went further, insisting that
"aliens not being a party to the compact, were not bound by it to the perfor-
mance of any particular duty, nor did it confer upon them any rights."'' 8
After Republicans supplemented the Virginia Resolutions with an Address
of the General Assembly to the People of the Commonwealth of Virginia,0 9
the Federalists issued an Address of the Minority.110 The evidence indicates
that George Keith Taylor's brother-in-law, John Marshall, took a hand in
writing this Address, along with General Henry Lee.' For whatever reason,
the claim that aliens had no rights disappeared from the minority's argu-
ment-they defended the constitutionality of the Alien Act on narrower
grounds, including the right/privilege argument:
Certainly a vested right is to be taken from no individual without a
solemn trial, but the right of remaining in our country is vested in no
105. Debate on Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800, TOUCHING
THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS; TOGETHER WITH THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21, 1798,
THE DEBATE AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, AND SEVERAL OTHER
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE REPORT AND RESOLUTIONS 34 (1850) [hereinafter Virginia Debates]
(statement of George K. Taylor); id. at 73 (statement of Archibald Magill); id. at 102 (statement of William
Cowan); see also id. at 105 (statement of Henry Lee) ("It was wonderfully kind, he said, in our fathers to
devote their time and money to the care of the Turk, Gaul, and Indian, when the proper object was that
of their children.").
106. Id. at 35 (statement of George K. Taylor); id. at 100 (statement of W'illiam Cowan).
107. Id. at 34-35 (statement of George K. Taylor); id. at 102 (statement of William Cowan).
108. Id. at 34.
109. Address of the General Assembly to the People of the Commonwealth of Virgina, reprinted in
6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 332 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) [hereinafter Address of the General Assem-
bly].
110. Address of the Minority in the Virginia Legislature to the People of that State; containing a
Vindication of the Constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Laws (1799) [hereinafter Address of the
Minority], in AMERICAN ANTIQUARIAN SOCIET, EARLY AMERICAN IMPRINTS 1639-1800 (microfiche)
(Evans No. 36635).
111. See R. BEEMAN, supra note 97, at 196; Editorial Note, in 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL
498-99 & n.1 (1979). Marshall was the only major Federalist who publicly criticized the Alien and Sedition
Acts, though he called them ill-advised, not unconstitutional. To a Freeholder, Sept. 20, 1798, reprinted
in 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL at 505-06; see R. BEEMAN, supra note 97, at 196 n.34, 205; 2 A.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 388-91, 451-52 (1916).
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alien; he enters and remains by the courtesy of the sovereign power, and
that courtesy may at pleasure be withdrawn."'
Lee also omitted the nativist claim from his succeeding series of essays, Plain
Truth, although he vigorously maintained that only the people of the United
States, and not the states, formed the Constitution."'
More extreme Federalists, however, continued to employ the membership
argument. A House select committee repeated it in the Report to the House of
Representatives on the inexpediency of repealing the Alien and Sedition Acts:
It is answered in the first place, that the Constitution was made for
citizens, not for aliens, who of consequence have no rights under it, but
remain in the country and enjoy the benefit of the laws, not as matter
of right, but merely as matter of favor and permission, which favor and
permission may be withdrawn whenever the Government charged with
the general welfare shall judge their further continuance dangerous. 4
The legislatures of Massachusetts and Vermont incorporated it in their official
replies to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, respectively.
1 15
In Pennsylvania, an aggressive state court judge named Alexander Addison,
who had already played a role in putting down the Whiskey Rebellion, also
devoted his energies to these polemics.116 He included A Defence of the Alien
Act'1 7 among his published grand jury charges. He maintained that "aliens
112. Address of the Minority, supra note 110, at 9-10. See also Justice Iredell's defense of the Alien
Act, in his charge to the grand jury in the notorious treason prosecution of John Fries:
The clause in the constitution, declaring that the trial of all crimes, except by impeachment, shall
be by jury, can never in reason be extended to amount to a permission of perpetual residence of
all sorts of foreigners, unless convicted of some crime, but is evidently calculated for the security
of any citizen, a party to the instrument, or even of a foreigner if resident in the country, who,
when charged with the commission of a crime against the municipal laws for which he is liable
to punishment, can be tried for it in no other manner.
Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 834 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126).
113. H. Lee, Plain Truth: Addressed to the People of Virginia, Written in February 1799-By a Citizen
of Westmoreland County, (Virg.) 19-21 (1799) in AMERICAN ANrIQUARIAN SOCIETY, EARLY AMERICAN
IMPRINTS 1639-1800 (microfiche) (Evans No. 35723); see also Editorial Note, in 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL, supra note I11, at 499-500 & 500 n.4 (discussing Lee's publication of the essays).
114. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2987 (1799).
115. Answer of the Commonwealth ofMassachusetts to the VirginiaLegislature, Feb. 9, 1799, reprinted
in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 98, at 533, 534 (the Alien Act "respects a description of persons whose
rights were not particularly contemplated in the Constitution of the United States"); Answer to the Resolu-
tions of the state of Kentucky, OCL 29, 1799, 4 RECORDs OF THE GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF THE STATE
OF VERMONT 525, 528 (1876) ("We ever considered that the Constitution of the United States was made
for the benefit of our own citizens; we never conjectured that aliens were any party to the federal compact;
we never knew that aliens had any rights among us, except what they derived from the law of nations, and
rights of hospitality .... ).
116. See R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 164
(1971); J. MILLER, supra note 94, at 139-41. On Addison generally, see THE WHISKEY REBELLION: PAST
AND PRESENT PERSPECTIVES 49-60, 165-82 (S. Boyd ed. 1985); Rowe, Alexander Addison: The Disillusion-
ment of a "Republican Schoolmaster", 62 W. PA. HIST. MAG. 221 (1979).
117. Charges to Grand Juries of the Counties of the Fifth Circuit in the State of Pennsylvania, No.
26, in 1 ADDISON'S REPORTS 590 (A. Addison 2d ed. 1883) [hereinafter Charges]. Political speeches to
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are not parties to [the Constitution], and therefore can claim no benefit under
it, unless they are expressly named."118 Addison further elaborated his argu-
ment in a pamphlet attacking Madison's 1800 Report for the Virginia Assem-
bly.119 He emphasized that the people of the United States were one people,
raised to nationhood by the Declaration of Independence. 20 The foreign af-
fairs powers, including power over aliens, were extraconstitutional:
The restrictions of the constitution are not restrictions of external and
national right, but of internal and municipal right. And power over
aliens is to be measured, not by internal and municipal law, but by ex-
ternal and national law. It affects not the people of the United States,
parties and subjects to the constitution; but foreign governments, whose
subjects the aliens are."'
Naturalization changed an alien's status by conferring a vested right, but
admission of an alien to reside in the United States did not." "As aliens are
not entitled to the privileges of citizens, any farther than the constitution and
laws direct, and as the constitution says nothing of them, the legislature has a
right to prescribe in what manner they shall be dealt with."'"
Thus, the repertoire of Federalist defenses of the Alien Act included a
portrayal of the Constitution as a contract among the American people, for their
sole benefit. Even resident aliens had no rights against Congress under such
a Constitution, but rather were remitted to a background source of law, the law
of nations, for whatever protection it afforded them.
The Federalists' social contract argument against aliens' rights may be most
strongly articulated through a combination of solidaristic republicanismI24 and
textual interpretation. The republican argument for withholding constitutional
grand juries were quite common at this period. See G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER:
JOHN MARSHALL 1801-1815, at 221-23 (1981) (HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY Vol. 2) (discussing impeachment
of Justice Chase, which rested in part on his grand jury charges). Addison himself was ultimately impeached
(and convicted) by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1803, due in part to his interference with a Republican
associate judge's attempt to refute one of Addison's grand jury charges. See R. ELLIS, supra note 116, at
164-65; TRIAL OF ALEXANDER ADDISON, ESQ ... TAKEN IN SHORT HAND BY THOMAS LLOYD (2d ed.
1803).
118. Charges, supra note 117, at 597. Congress could suspend the writ of habeas corpus with respect
to aliens whenever it pleased, and could convict them of crimes without jury trial. Id. at 591, 599.
119. Addison, Analysis of the Report of the Committee of the Virginia Assembly (1800), reprinted
in 2 C. HYNEMAN & D. LUTZ, AMERICAN POLrTICAL WRING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805,
at 1055 (1983).
120. Id. at 1070. On the notion of preconstitutional sovereignty vested in the United States, see United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936); Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
54 (1795). But see Levitan, supra note 30 (classic critique of notion).
121. Addison, supra note 119, at 1070.
122. Id. at 1073; see also Charges, supra note 117, at597-98. It may be remarked that Addison himself
was born in Scotland, and emigrated in 1785. See Rowe, supra note 116, at 229. On Addison's xenophobia
in the late 1790's, see id. at 245-46.
123. Addison, supra note 119, at 1073.




rights from aliens rests on behavioral assumptions differing from those of both
Hobbess and Vattel. In a republic,
each man must somehow be persuaded to submerge his personal wants
into the greater good of the whole. This willingness of the individual
to sacrifice his private interests for the good of the community-such
patriotism or love of country-the eighteenth century termed "public
virtue." A republic was such a delicate polity precisely because it
demanded an extraordinary moral character in the people. 26
A constitutional structure designed in the hope of maintaining this delicate
polity might confer rights that could not be safely entrusted to outsiders. When
defining qualifications for citizenship, political rights, and officeholding, many
in the new nation expressed concern that foreign immigrants were insufficiently
attached to the good of the country or to republican principles.27 Nonimmi-
grant visitors could pose an even greater threat, especially if they were loyal
citizens of another republic. As the French Revolution turned radical, some
Federalists feared that its propagandists would also corrupt the American
people."2 "Aliens having the least interest in the prosperity of this country,"
charged Judge Addison, "and owing the least duty (only a temporary duty) to
it, were the most likely to yield themselves the readiest agents of France." '129
Presuming that the limited electorate, a majority of which ratified the
Constitution, had authority, the Preamble to the Constitution indicates that this
ratifying electorate represented, and acted on behalf of, the entire People.
Recalling that the Constitution sets forth the mutual agreements of the People
might give some reason for interpreting its provisions as relating only to citi-
zens except where the context obviously dictates otherwise.30 Thus, the
solidaristic strain in republicanism could exert its exclusionary force on the
125. Hobbes' antisocial assumptions are so extreme that citizens have no greater reason to trust one
another than to trust aliens. Correspondingly, an alien who enters the territory without the protection of a
treaty becomes a fellow subject. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. No constitutional rights protect
the (former) alien, because there are none.
126. G. WOOD, supra 50, at 68. This is where Rousseau would have become relevant. But it was
obviously impossible for the extreme Federalist opponents of French revolutionary sedition to invoke
Rousseau in opposition to the Jeffersonians, and they did not. See supra note 51.
127. See L KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CrIzENsHIP, 1608-1870, at 214-19, 225-30,
236-38 (1978). The Constitution sets both citizenship and residence requirements for Senators, Representa-
tives and the President; indeed the latter must be a "natural born Citizen." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2;
id. at § 3, cI. 3; id. at art. I, § 1, cl. 5.
128. See, e.g., R. BEEMAN, supra note 97, at 134-35, 196-97; L SMITH, supra note 94, at 11-17, 96-104
(1956).
129. Charges, supra note 117, at 601; see id. at 529-39, 574-75, 581, 586-87, 592-93, 602-05; Rowe,
supra note 116, at 246-48.
130. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative"); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1
("The Migration or Importation of Such Persons"); id. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8 ("[No Person holding any Office");
id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects"); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to
Service").
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entire Constitution through a membership-oriented interpretation of the social
contract.
2. Jeffersonians and the "Municipal Law" Approach
The opposition party, in the course of refuting the Federalists' membership
argument, developed a different statement of the Constitution's character. When
the membership argument surfaced in the House debates on the Alien bill,
Edward Livingston made a two-fold response. Like Gallatin,131 he emphasized
that the relevant clauses of the Constitution used general language, and that an
alien surely was a "person." '32 But he also invoked the traditional doctrine
linking allegiance to protection:
It is an acknowledged principle of the common law, the authority of
which is established here, that alien friends... residing among us, are
entitled to the protection of our laws, and that during their residence
they owe a temporary allegiance to our Government. If they are accused
of violating this allegiance, the same laws which interpose in the case
of a citizen must determine the truth of the accusation, and if found
guilty they are liable to the same punishment."'
With further development, this argument eventually provided a normative basis
for freeing constitutional guarantees from the restrictive implications of the
Preamble.
In presenting the Resolutions to the Virginia House of Delegates, John
Taylor of Caroline 1 distinguished between the Alien Act's violation of the
Constitution and its denial of human or natural rights. 35 The constitutional
defects he identified were deprivation of common law rights without due
process, denial of trial by jury, and exercise of judicial power by the Presi-
dent. 136 The natural rights were "freedom of speech, freedom of person, a
right to justice, and to a fair trial."137
Taylor supported aliens' entitlement to constitutional rights with three
arguments. First, he relied on the generality of the text: the due process clause
131. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
132. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2012-13 (1798).
133. Id. at 2012.
134. John Taylor "of Caroline [County, Virginia]," a figure better known to historians than to lawyers,
was an agrarian republican whose career included episodes of political activity and episodes of dense writing
in political theory. He professed belief in immutable natural rights and viewed the Constitution as a mutable
"political law" designed to distribute power so as to protect them. See, e.g., J. TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO
THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIrED STATES 159-61,413-15,422-25 (1814).
See generally C.W. HILL, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF JOHN TAYLOR OF CAROLINE (1977); E. MUDGE, THE
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN TAYLOR OF CAROLINE: A STUDY IN JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY (1939); R.
SHALHOPE, JOHN TAYLOR OF CAROLINE: PASTORAL REPUBLICAN (1980).
135. Virginia Debates, supra note 105, at 24.
136. Id. at 25, 116.
137. Id. at 27.
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"literally reached aliens, by using in all places the term 'persons,' not 'na-
tives;"' 1 38 Article III extended the judicial power to "all cases," and required
the trial of "all crimes" by jury. 139 Second, he gave a strong republican argu-
ment that favored the literal interpretation. The Alien Act transgressed funda-
mental republican principles by creating a class of persons wholly dependent
on the President.14 Grave dangers to the liberty of citizens would result from
"making a President in fact a king of the aliens." 141 Moreover, accepting this
distortion would serve as a precedent for future usurpations in the construction
of the Constitution.1 42 Third, even under the law of nations, aliens "were enti-
tled and subjected to the sanctions of municipal law," and "the Constitution was
a sacred portion of municipal law."'143 In rejecting the claim that aliens' rights
were defined by international law rather than by the Constitution, Taylor
invoked the orthodox Jeffersonian principle of construction: the federal govern-
ment had only enumerated powers, and could not "at pleasure dip their hands
into the inexhaustible treasuries of the common law and law of nations." 144
Madison incorporated similar arguments in his 1800 Report. Of course, in
defending the Virginia Resolutions, he could not deny that the Constitution was
a compact; nor did he claim that aliens were parties to it. But he pointed out
that the parties, for reasons of their own, might nonetheless have limited federal
power over aliens:
[I]t is said, that aliens not being parties to the Constitution, the rights
and privileges which it secures cannot be at all claimed by them.
To this reasoning, also, it might be answered that, although aliens
are not parties to the Constitution, it does not follow that the Constitu-
tion has vested in Congress an absolute power over them. The parties
to the Constitution may have granted, or retained, or modified, the
power over aliens, without regard to that particular consideration. 145
He emphasized the extreme to which the Federalists had taken the argument:
"If aliens had no rights under the Constitution, they might not only be banished,
138. Id. at 25.
139. Id. at 116.
140. Id. at 25. He coupled this danger with the standard republican terrors of corruption, patronage,
and standing armies. Id.; see F. MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 77-78 (1985). Taylor retained the emphasis on patronage and corruption throughout his
writings. See J. TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 69 (1820 & reprint
of 1970); C.W. HILL, supra note 134, at 266-67; R. SHALHOPE, supra note 134, at 204-05, 213-15.
141. Virginia Debates, supra note 105, at 116.
142. Id. at 25.
143. Id. at 116; see also id. at 68-69 (statement of James Barbour, citing Vattel); id. at 88 (statement
of William Daniel, Jr.).
144. Id. at 115-16; see J. TAYLOR, supra note 140, at 279-89.
145. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 98,
at 556.
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but even capitally punished, without a jury or the other incidents to a fair
trial. ' 146 He did not spell out in the Report why the parties to the Constitution
would have taken the trouble to erect so high a barrier against such a result,
although he did observe that the practices of "barbarous countries, under
undefined prerogatives, or amid revolutionary dangers,. . . will not be deemed
fit precedents for the government of the United States."147
The Report continued:
But a more direct reply is, that it does not follow, because aliens
are not parties to the Constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that
whilst they actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection.
Aliens are not more parties to the laws than they are parties to the
Constitution; yet it will not be disputed that, as they owe, on one hand,
a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their protection
and advantage.1 48
Madison viewed as fundamental the distinction between alien enemies and alien
friends.1 49 As to alien enemies, the Constitution's grant of the war power gave
Congress the usual authority under the law of nations. 150 The legal relations
of alien friends, however, are not so defined:
146. Id. To the contrary, the traditional practice of the municipal law in criminal cases was considerably
more generous: "But so far has a contrary principle teen carried, in every part of the United States, that,
except on charges of treason, an alien has, besides all the common privileges, the special one of being tried
by a jury, of which one-half may be also aliens." Id. Here he was alluding to the institution of the jury de
medietate linguae, see, e.g., LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 847-66 (1976).
He may have overstated its omnipresence, although it was still the law in Virginia. See United States v.
Cartacho, 25 F. Cas. 312 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 14,738) (Marshall, CJ. & St. George Tucker, J.). But see
United States v. McMahon, 26 F. Cas. 1131 (C.C.D.C. 1835) (No. 15,699) (citing Maryland Act of 1789,
ch. 22, § 5 (abolishing mixed juries)).
Madison was under no illusion that jury trial was a natural right; in presenting what would become
the Sixth Amendment to the House of Representatives, he had commented:
Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but rather a right resulting from a social
compact, which regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty
of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (1789).
147. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 98, at 557. In an earlier treatment of the issue, Madison had
given the "undefined prerogatives" a fuller republican statement, asking, "will an accumulation of power
so extensive in the hands of the Executive, over aliens, secure to natives the blessings of republican
liberty?", and predicting that expansion of presidential power would lead to corruption of the people's
representatives, maintenance of standing armies, and a decay into monarchy. Address of the General
Assembly, supra note 109, at 338.
148. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 98, at 556.
149. "Alien enemies" are the subjects of an enemy nation in time of war, all others are "alien friends."
See, e.g., I W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *360-61.
150. This, of course, is a serious weakness in Madison's argument. Putting aside the federalism
question, he did not adequately explain how executive expulsion of alien enemies could be reconciled with
separation of powers, due process, or the jury trial guarantee, or why it need not be. Rationalization of
expulsion as a nonpunitive civil proceeding could carry over from alien enemies to alien friends, as it
ultimately did. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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Alien friends, except in the single case of public ministers, are under
the municipal law, and must be tried and punished according to that law
only.
.... the offence being committed by the individual, not by his nation,
and against the municipal law, not against the law of nations,-- the
individual only, and not the nation, is punishable; and the punishment
must be conducted according to the municipal law, not according to the
law of nations. 151
For all the usual reasons, the Alien Act was "repugnant to the constitutional
principles of municipal law."'152
Thus, even while reserving to the states the rights of a compact, Madison
asserted the character of the Constitution as law. Aliens, by exposing them-
selves to the burdens of the municipal law, were entitled to insist on the obser-
vance of the whole of the municipal law, including the "particular organization
and positive provision of the Federal Constitution."'153
The reconciliation of social contract theory with the actual, known constitu-
tional history of the young nation presented difficulties that would become more
urgent as sectionalism evolved toward disunionism. The origins of most societ-
ies were veiled by the mists of antiquity, but the history of Englishmen in
America was documented, and the federal Constitution had recently been estab-
lished in the name of the people to form a more perfect union. That Constitu-
tion was clearly not a contract between the people and the new government,
an artificial entity that did not yet exist.'5" "Only a social agreement among
the people, only such a Lockean contract, seemed to make sense of their rapidly
developing idea of a constitution as a fundamental law designed by the people
to be separate from and controlling of all the institutions of government."' 55
As Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78, "A constitution is, in fact, and
must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law."
Because Vattel had explicitly prefigured this conception of a constitution
as a fundamental law decreed by the people after their act of union, one may
regret his failure to address whether fundamental laws were included among
the laws to which aliens were entitled. But the Madisonian defense treated an
affirmative answer as following a fortiori. It may be restated as follows: Aliens,
being people, have the same natural rights as others. A constitution is a positive
municipal law, the purpose of which is to structure the institutions of the state
in ways that facilitate government while safeguarding natural rights (though
whose rights may be debated). Even from the citizens' point of view, protecting
the rights of aliens made sense. The rights (natural or otherwise) of aliens and
151. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 98, at 556-57.
152. Id. at 557.
153. Id. at 560.
154. G. WOOD, supra note 50, at 600-01.
155. Id. at 283; see id. at 282-91, 535-53; Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental
Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 859-65 (1978).
1991]
The Yale Law Journal
of citizens are intertwined, and oppression of aliens could indirectly harm
citizens. 156 Moreover, as the Jeffersonian federalism-based argument illus-
trates, elimination of aliens' negative liberty vis-4-vis the federal government
decreases the positive liberty of citizens acting within their states, because a
state power to admit aliens and an unbridled federal power to expel them
cannot coexist. And, in the paranoid vein beloved by republican thinkers, aliens
rendered dependent by unchecked government power would become tools for
subversion of the liberty of citizens.
More fundamental, however, was the argument grounded in obedience. By
entering the country, aliens subject themselves to the power of the government
and the requirements of municipal law in almost every respect just as citizens
do. 57 Their consent is no more tacit than that of most citizens, and their
natural rights share the risk of government abuses. 158 To the extent that the
constitution's language does not exclude aliens from its coverage, therefore,
its positive provisions should be applied so as to ensure respect for natural
obligation.
B. The Dominance of the Municipal Law Approach
The debates on the Alien Act produced no obvious immediate winner. In
retrospect, the outcome seems personified in the rise of John Marshall, one of
the moderate Federalists who defended the Act without denying the consti-
tutional rights of aliens. 59 John Adams never directly employed the powers
granted to him under the Alien Act. He did sign warrants for the arrest of
several outspoken foreigners, at the urging of his extremist Secretary of State,
156. Americans hoped to benefit from both commercial visits and immigration; binding the federal
government to ensure the extension of most constitutional rights to visitors and immigrants would encourage
such arrivals. See, e.g., Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 744, 749-50 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 13,785); 2
TUCKER'S BLACKSTONE APP. 99 (1803); cf. The Declaration of Independence ("He has endeavoured to
prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws of Naturalization of Foreigners;
refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither .... ").
157. It may be worth noting some exceptions. Depending on one's view about freedom of expa-
triation-which Vattel favored, but the common law opposed-the alien may have a stronger right than the
citizen to leave the country when she feels exploited. See 3 E. DE VA'rEL, supra note 51, at 146. There
may also be some legal obligations of citizens that the state cannot extend to aliens. Id. The possibility of
diplomatic intervention in case of a state's denial of justice to an alien may create an avenue of protection
different from those available to citizens. See S. LEGoMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND
PoLITICs IN BRITAIN AND AMtERICA 317-18 (1987). These factors may not be compelling, but they impair
the neatness of the syllogism if, like Wolff, you have a taste for syllogisms, and they may make a difference
at the margin if you have a taste for marginal thinking.
158. This understatement may roughly compensate for the factors in the preceding footnote.
159. See supra note Ill and accompanying text. Marshall had also taken a moderate stance-agreeing
with the Jeffersonians that federal power over aliens was subject to constitutional limits, but disagreeing
about what those limits were-in his most famous speech in Congress, his defense of Adams' extradition
of Jonathan Robbins to the British. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596-618 (1800); 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL, supra note 111, at 82-109; see 2 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 109, at 458-75; Cress, The Jonathan
Robbins Incident: Extradition and the Separation of Powers in the Adams Administration, Ill ESSEX
INSTITUTE HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 99 (1975); Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan
Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229 (1990).
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Timothy Pickering, but they either left voluntarily or evaded capture. 60 By
the time the Act expired in June 1800, Adams had dismissed Pickering, and
replaced him with Marshall. At the end of Adams' term, Marshall became Chief
Justice.
In his three-and-a-half decades as Chief Justice, John Marshall's Court
rendered decisions on numerous points that had figured in the debates on the
Alien and Sedition Acts and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.161 The
character of the Constitution as law or compact figured prominently in
Marshall's struggle with the emerging Southern states' rights school. In a
further metamorphosis of the Virginia Resolutions and Report, the states' rights
movement insisted that the states were the focus of the social contract(s), and
that, as separate sovereignties rather than as a united people, they had then
become parties to the Constitution as a compact. The law of nations provided
models for the remedial rights of confederated sovereigns, including self-help
and dissolution. This dispute also became significant in controversies over the
geographical scope of the Constitution, to which we will turn in Part IfI. But
as regards the rights of aliens, it should be emphasized that the polemics of
Spencer Roane, t62 John Taylor,6 ' and later the South Carolina Nullifi-
ers,164 created pressure for the Supreme Court and its supporters to emphasize
the character of the Constitution as what Marshall had called it in Marbury v.
Madison-a "fundamental and paramount law." 65 This emphasis on the Con-
stitution as law supported Madison's argument that aliens could claim its
benefits.
The Marshall Court repeatedly protected aliens against the states by vindi-
cating the authority of federal treaties, which the Constitution made "the
supreme Law of the Land."'166 The Taney Court continued this approach,
160. L SMITHr, supra note 94, at 159-76.
161. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
162. See Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 30-33, 52-53 (1815) (opinion of Roane, J.); Roane,
Hampden No. 4, in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, 146-47 (G. Gunther ed.
1969) [hereinafter DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH].
163. See, e.g., J. TAYLOR, supra note 140, at 142-48; J. TAYLOR, NEW VIEWS OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 171-73 (1823); R. SHALHOPE, supra note 134, at 208-09.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 220-23.
165. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,380-81,413-
15 (1821); 1 L STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 338-340 (1833);
Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution No. 9, in DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH, supra note 162, at 208; see also
E. BAUER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 1790-1860, at 276-87 (1952); Powell, supra note 100,
at 942-44 (relating rejection of compact theory to Court's interpretive methodology).
166. See, e.g., Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830); Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
in Foreign Parts v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 453 (1819); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271 (1817); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's
Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 627 (1813). All the foregoing cases involve property rights.
Marshall had a direct financial stake in this process because of his major investment in the Fairfax
estate. 2 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note I11, at 202; G.E. WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE 1815-35, at 165-73 (1988) (HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY, Vol. UI-IV).
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scrutinizing state measures against aliens for inconsistency with treaties, the
federal commerce power, and federal control of foreign affairs.167 Nonethe-
less, despite a variety of dicta in the Supreme Court and on circuit, 168 no case
before the Civil War gave the Court occasion to hold that aliens were possess-
ors of constitutional rights. One major factor contributing to this silence was
the fact that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government, 169
while the regulation of aliens was carried out largely by the states. This area
of the law did not escape the pervasive influence of slavery: 170 the distribution
of authority between the states and the federal government regarding admission
of aliens had explosive potential in antebellum society, because slave states
insisted on control over the entry of free persons of color.'
The notion that rights might be limited to parties to the social contract did
not disappear altogether. Although Taney did not address the rights of white
aliens in the Dred Scott decision, he did combine elements of social contract
reading of the Constitution with pseudo-historical positivistic analysis in order
to conclude that Blacks, whether slave or free, were permanently excluded from
the people of the United States, for whose sole benefit and protection the
Constitution was formed. 72 Even as to white aliens, the nativist Samuel F.
B. Morse argued in an anti-Catholic tract that the Preamble demonstrated the
framers' intent to limit the blessings of liberty to "ourselves and our posteri-
ty. ' 173
167. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (invalidating state taxes on transatlantic passengers);
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840) (majority of court views state's agreement to extradite
alien to foreign country as encroachment on federal power, but court divides on characterization of facts
of record, and dismisses for lack of jurisdiction; state court then concludes alien must be released). But see
Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490 (1850) (upholding discriminatory inheritance tax).
168. See In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 141 (1853) (Nelson, J., dissenting from dismissal of
petition for writ of habeas corpus on combined bases of jurisdiction and merits) ("[U]nder our system of
laws and principles of government, so far as respects personal security and personal freedom, I know of
no distinction between the citizen and the alien who has sought an asylum under them."); Taylor v. Car-
penter, 23 F. Cas. 742, 744 (C.C.D.Mass. 1844) (No. 13,784) ("[I]n the courts of the United States, under
the constitution and laws, they are entitled, being alien friends, to the same protection of their rights as
citizens."); Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No.
13,156); see also J. STORY, supra note 41, at § 541 (1834).
169. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
170. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 428 (1849) (opinion of Wayne, J.) (affirming state
power to exclude free Blacks); id. at 457 (opinion of Grier, J.) (same); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (affirming state police power over passengers detrimental to its welfare); C.
SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64 at 378-95 (1974) (HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY, Vol. V); cf. In re Ah
Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 216 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102) (Field, Circuit Justice) ('[W]e cannot shut our eyes
to the fact that much which was formerly said upon the power of the state in this respect, grew out of the
necessity which the southern states, in which the institution of slavery existed, felt of excluding free negroes
from their limits.").
171. See, e.g., Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822-1848, 1 J.
S. HIST. 1 (1935).
172. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (18 How.) 393, 406, 409-11, 416-17 (1857); see D. FEIHRENBACHER,
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 355 (1978); P. FINKELMAN,
AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND CoMrTY 279-82 (1981).
173. S. MORSE, IMMINENT DANGERS TO THE FREE INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES THROUGH
FOREIGN IMMIGRATION 23 (1835 & photo, reprint 1969) (emphasis in original). Morse was linked to the
Francophobia of the 1790's through his father, the Federalist clergyman Jedidiah Morse. See D. BENNETT,
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The decisive testing ground for the question of aliens' rights emerged with
the anti-Chinese movement on the West Coast. 74 Before 1868, the California
Supreme Court invalidated discriminatory state legislation on supremacy clause
and commerce clause grounds. 75 But the peculiar circumstances that had
paralyzed the federal government in matters of race were transformed by the
Civil War. The legislative history of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Four-
teenth Amendment reflected attention to mistreatment of the Chinese on the
Pacific coast. 76 Both the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment and the de-
bates call attention to the rights of aliens as "persons" within the due process
and equal protection clauses. 177 The 1870 Civil Rights Act supplemented
these clauses with a fuller listing of some relevant protections. t 8 Thus rein-
forced, the federal courts entered into a lengthy struggle with California. 79
The occasion thereby arose for the Supreme Court to declare unequivocally
that aliens were persons entitled to rights afforded in general terms by the
Constitution. Invalidating yet another persecution of the Chinese in California,
the Court unanimously stated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to
the protection of citizens. It says: "Nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within
the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge
of the protection of equal laws.180
THE PARTY OF FEAR 24-25, 40-41 (1990); J. PHILIPS, JEDIDIAH MORSE AND NEW ENGLAND CONGREGA-
TIONALISM 74-101, 220-21 (1983).
174. See generally, M. COOLIDGE, CHINESEIMMIGRArION55-82 (1968); R. DANIELS, ASIANAMERICA:
CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850 29-40 (1988); R. TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM
A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 81-115 (1989); McClain, The Chinese Struggle
for CivilRights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870,72 CALIF. L. REV. 529 (1984).
175. Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534 (1862); People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169 (1857).
176. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2891-92 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Conness); see also id.
at 497-98 (colloquy regarding exclusion and citizenship for Chinese); id. at 1757 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull
on Pres. Johnson's objection to conferral of citizenship on Chinese children); Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?,
24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 491-92 (1987).
177. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham); see Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214-15 (1982); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 215-20 (1977).
178. Act of May 31, 1870, §§ 16, 17, 16 Stat. 144; see McClain, supra note 174.
179. See In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (invalidating laundry licensing law, on treaty
and other grounds); hI re Ah Chong, 2 F. 733 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (invalidating statute forbidding Chinese
to fish, on treaty and equal protection grounds); In re Parrott, 1 F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (invalidating
statute forbidding employment of Chinese, on treaty and equal protection grounds); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,
12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546) (invalidating queue ordinance, on equal protection grounds);
In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102) (invalidating state immigration law, on treaty,
statute and equal protection grounds); cf. People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198 (1870) (purporting to hold that
refusing Chinese right to testify against whites does not deny them equal protection).
180. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
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Abolition removed the legal commitment to slavery that had inhibited judicial
affirmation of the Constitution's "universal" protection of persons within the
United States.
With this principle settled, other major issues of the Alien Act debate-the
substantive and procedural scope of the federal deportation power-were
refought over the next decade in the Supreme Court, in the context of the new
federal immigration laws. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States181 the Court
upheld the power of deportation without the protections of the criminal process.
Justice Field's dissent quoted at length from Madison's Report."8 2 The majori-
ty, in turn, invoked Vattel and later writers to show that every nation had the
power to expel aliens."l 3 Nonetheless, the majority agreed that aliens within
the territory were subject to the laws,"s and insisted that it was expounding,
not denying, the constitutional rights of aliens."8 Thus, the right/privilege
argument of the moderate Federalists such as John Marshall and Henry Lee186
became part of American constitutional law concerning immigration. It has per-
sisted to this day, making deportation an anomalous exception to the general
recognition of aliens' constitutional rights within United States territory. 7
The Court kept its promise three years later by unanimously striking down
a congressional act that, without indictment or trial by jury, subjected Chinese
unlawfully within the country to one year's imprisonment at hard labor before
their deportation:
Applying this reasoning to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must be
concluded that all persons within the territory of the United States are
entitled to the protection guaranteed by those amendments, and that
even aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.8
181. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
182. See id. at 748-50 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 740-41 (Brewer, J., dissenting). See also the earlier
invocations of Madison's Report in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 583 (1889) (argument
of counsel); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 513-14 (1849) (Daniel, 3., dissenting); id. at 527
(Woodbury, 3., dissenting), and Senator Walker's reliance on Madison's Report in the debates on the 1842
habeas corpus act, Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539, which authorized federal courts to intervene
in state court prosecution of nonresident aliens for actions taken under color of authority of a foreign
government. CoNG;. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 613, 616 (1842).
183. 149 U.S. at 707-09 (citing, inter alia, Vattel). The majority also invoked John Marshall's defense
of executive extradition in the Jonathan Robbins affair to demonstrate the inapplicability of criminal
procedure to deportation. Id. at 714; see supra note 159.
184. 149 U.S. at 724 (citing, inter alia, Vattel).
185. Id. at 724-25.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
187. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862
(1989).
188. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); id. at 242-43 (Field, J., concurring in
part) ("He owes obedience to the laws of the country in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he
is entitled to the equal protection of those laws .... The contention that persons within the territorial
jurisdiction of this republic might be beyond the protection of the law was heard with pain on the argument
at the bar .... ).
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Thus the Court held even Congress to the municipal law approach, and con-
firmed that nonmembership in the social contract does not deprive individuals
present within the United States and subject to its laws of the concomitant right
to the protection of the fundamental law of the land.
III. INVOLVING PLACES
The others also had wronged the Z'zus, to begin with, by calling
them "immigrants," on the pretext that, since the others had been
therefirst, the Z'zus had come later. This was mere unfounded preju-
dice--that seems obvious to me-because neither before nor after
existed, nor any place to immigrate from, but there were those who
insisted that the concept of "immigrant" could be understood in the
abstract, outside of space and time."89
The contrast between membership and municipal law approaches to the
constitutional rights of aliens within American territory has been mirrored by
opposing approaches to identifying the territory where constitutional rights
apply. The question of the Constitution's geographical scope has involved two
issues: the applicability of constitutional limitations to government action within
the territory of a foreign sovereign or on the high seas, and their applicability
to government action within territory of the United States that has not been
admitted to statehood. In a debate that still continues,"9° United States territo-
ries have been assimilated to both extremes-as firmly within the Constitution's
reach as any state, and as far beyond it as England or Japan.'91
Throughout most of American history, these issues arose primarily within
the context of expansion of the national territory. As the United States grew
beyond the original thirteen states, and turned from the framework of self-
government to a framework for governing others, the implications of distribut-
ing rights became more complex. Aside from the original sin against Native
Americans, the United States did not generally rely on permanent caste distinc-
tions to prevent linking constitutional rights of citizens of the states who
travelled or migrated to the territories and those of the preexisting population
they encountered there. The "extension"f or "nonextension" of constitutional
rights to new territory affected both state citizens and indigenous residents.
Doubts about the "fitness" of newly acquired French, Spanish, Mexican,
Hawaiian, Puerto Rican and Filipino subjects therefore conflicted with self-
interest in a debate over localizing the Constitution.
The two most common approaches to the Constitution's coverage rested on
an expansive use of the municipal law approach and a restrictive approach
189. L CALViNO, COsMIcOMics 44 (W. Weaver trans. 1968).
190. See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); J. TORRUELLA, supra note 8.
191. Ironically, an American citizen's right to jury trial may be more firmly protected on foreign soil
than in a territory of the United States. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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relying on a heightened form of membership requirement. The municipal law
analysis indicated that acquisition of sovereignty over a territory was sufficient
to extend the fundamental law there. In the turn-of-the-century phrase, constitu-
tional rights "followed the flag." In contrast, the membership approach to
geographical scope personified sectors of the globe, and extended constitutional
rights to new sectors only with the consent of certain of the prior sectors.
Citizens who moved to the wrong sector would find that they had alienated
their rights. One extreme form of this approach conceived of the Constitution
as created by the states and for the states. This version preserved the mutual
character of consent, since admission to statehood occurred at the request of
a new state with the consent of the old. In contrast, less extreme versions of
the membership approach affording some territories the benefits of membership
made the consent one-sided, since the consent of the territories was not sought.
The municipal law approach dominated in the courts in the nineteenth
century, but faced a resurgence of its membership rival in the wake of overseas
expansionism at the turn of the century. Membership theories facilitated colo-
nialism. Developments since that time have produced a mosaic of inconsistent
rules and rationales rather than a true synthesis, and both membership and
municipal law remain available resources of constitutional argument.
A. The Constitution and the Territories in the Era of Continental Expansion
The seeds of continuing disagreement were sown in 1787, when the political
leaders of the new nation took two steps visibly in tension with their republican
principles. First, in drafting the Constitution, they granted Congress full legisla-
tive power over the District of Columbia. 92 Second, in July of 1787, the
Congress of the Confederation adopted the Northwest Ordinance, a framework
for governing the territory north of the Ohio River ceded to Congress by the
states. The Ordinance contemplated an initial stage of territorial existence in
which the population would have no power of self-government. 193 Repeatedly
during the next century, advocates would draw paradoxical conclusions from
these denials of representation: they would reverse the logic of republicanism
in order to claim that regions excluded from political participation were neces-
sarily excluded from the scope of the Constitution altogether.
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The district chosen as the "Seat of Government" would not be within a
state and would therefore have no voice in choosing the legislators exercising that power. In The Federalist
No. 43, however, Madison predicted that "a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own
suffrages, will of course be allowed them."
193. See generally THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SYSTEM (J. Bloom ed. 1973); J. EBLEN, THE FIRST
AND SECOND UNITED STATES EMPIRES: GOVERNORS AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT, 1784-1912 (1968);
LAWS OF ILLINOIS TERRITORY 1809-1818 (F. Philbrick ed. 1950); J. SMURR, TERRITORIAL JURISPRUDENCE
(1970). The Constitution's only mention of the territory was the ambiguous provision in Article IV, section
3, granting Congress "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .... "
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These themes may already be detected in the surviving documentation of
the controversy resulting from the first great territorial expansion-the acquisi-
tion of Louisiana.1" This "magnificent purchase"195 redefined the United
States, and compromised many of the principles that Jefferson thought had been
vindicated in the election of 1800. Jefferson and his advisers stifled their doubts
about the constitutional authority of the national government to acquire foreign
territory, and to admit new states into the Union from later-acquired territory,
as the treaty with France seemed to require. 195 The latter problem especially
provoked the Federalist opposition, which insisted that the states' ratification
of the Constitution authorized Congress to admit new states-parties to the
constitutional compact only from the territory then existing.197 Some invoked
the Preamble as evidence that the Constitution was designed only for the
territory held or claimed by the original thirteen states. 9
From their assumptions regarding the social contract, most of these Federal-
ists argued towards a restrictive conclusion concerning the rights of the inhabit-
ants. 19 9 The Constitution did not contemplate the incorporation of the territory
as a state, and therefore Congress was entitled to govern it as a colonial
dependency.' ° Some Republicans adopted the Federalist conclusion that, as a
ceded country, Louisiana was subject only to the discretion of Congress;"1
a majority of the Republicans compromised their principles sufficiently to
assure Jefferson the broad powers he desired for himself and his territorial
governor.202 A few of the dissenting Republicans expressly founded their
constitutional objections on a municipal law approach, insisting that Congress
194. Only partial reports of the debates on the ratification and initial implementation of the Louisiana
treaty survive. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG., passim (1804); W. PLUMER, MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS
IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 1803-1807 (E. Brown ed. 1923); E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803-1812 (1920).
195. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823) (Marshall, C.J., no doubt savoring
the irony).
196. 1 C. ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 267 (1874) (conversation with Madison); E.
BROWN, supra note 194, at 22-29; D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at
311-21 (1970).
197. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 45 (1804) (remarks of Sen. Pickering); id. at 56 (remarks of Sen.
Tracy); id. at 433 (remarks of Rep. G. Griswold); id. at 454-55 (remarks of Rep. Thatcher); id. at 461-62
(remarks of Rep. R. Griswold); W. PLUMER, supra note 194, at 7-9 (remarks of Sen. Plumer).
198. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 461-62 (1804) (remarks of Rep. R. Griswold); W. PLUMER, supra note 194,
at 7 (remarks of Sen. Plumer).
199. Only John Quincy Adams followed a consistent natural law view, insisting that the consent of
the people of Louisiana to the change in government was required, and urging self-government for the
territory. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 66-67 (1804); 1 C. ADAMS, supra note 196, at 267-68, 288-90; W.
PLUMER, supra note 194, at 103-04, 143-46; see also supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
200. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 45 (1804) (remarks of Sen. Pickering); W. PLUMER, supra note 194, at
12 (remarks of Sen. Plumer); id. at 76 (remarks of Sen. White); id. at 107, 137 (remarks of Sen. Pickering);
id. at 114 (remarks of Sen. Hillhouse).
201. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 511-12 (1804) (remarks of Rep. Smilie); id. at 1058-59 (remarks of Rep.
Eustis); see also id. at 513-14 (remarks of Rep. Rodney, distinguishing between states and territories).
202. See E. BROWN, supra note 194, at 102-44; D. MALONE, supra note 196, at 348-50; Scanlon, A
Sudden Conceit: Jefferson and the Louisiana Government Bill of 1804, 9 LA. HIST. 139 (1968).
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could not acquire legislative power over the territory without being bound there
by constitutional prohibitions. 03
The Louisiana debates seem to resolve nothing, although they did set a
precedent for expediency in the initial stages of territorial governance. These
issues not only recurred in the course of routine administration of justice, but
became questions of great political moment when the constitutional status of
the territories seemed likely to determine the fate of slavery, and therefore of
the nation.
1. Marshall and Calhoun: Unlikely Allies
We have already seen how Chief Justice John Marshall's nationalist vision
of the Constitution as judicially enforceable law strengthened the municipal law
approach and benefited the position of aliens. His stance similarly favored the
District and the territories. Unexpectedly, Marshall's nationalist approach
aligned with differently motivated arguments of John C. Calhoun and Roger
Taney, leading to a dominance of the municipal law approach in the nineteenth
century.
Although Marshall gladly passed up the Court's first opportunity to decide
whether constitutional limitations constrained Congress in the District of
Columbia,2" he returned to this issue in 1820 in Loughborough v. Blake, 5
a case challenging Congress's power to impose a direct tax on the District of
Columbia. Marshall found the requisite power in the first clause of Article I,
section 8,206 which authorizes Congress to collect "Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises," but requires the last three to be "uniform throughout the United
States."
He went on to ask:
203. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1129 (1804) (remarks of Rep. G.W. Campbell); id. at 510-11 (remarks of
Rep. Jackson); W. PLUMER, supra note 194, at 136 (remarks of Sen. Anderson).
204. United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805). In an odd sequel to Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the circuit court dismissed an indictment against a Federalist justice of the
peace for the District of Columbia for levying fees that had been abolished by the new Republican Congress.
The circuit court held that the diminution of the judge's revenues violated Article II. The prosecution
claimed that the Constitution was inapplicable in the District: "The constitution is a compact between the
people of the United States in their individual capacity, and the states in their political capacity. Unfor-
tunately for the citizens of Columbia, they are not in either of these capacities." 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 167.
The case was argued in the Supreme Court in February 1805, in the midst of the impeachment trial of
Justice Samuel Chase. Chief Justice Marshall, however, managed once more to avoid resolving the
constitutionality of Jefferson's judiciary policy by finding a dispositive jurisdictional issue. Id. at 173.
205. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820). The arguments are not reported and can only be inferred from
Marshall's opinion.
206. Id. at 318. Marshall rejected the claim that the "great principle" of no taxation without representa-
tion deprived Congress of the power to tax the District of Columbia. Id. at 324. He admitted that "in theory
it might be more congenial to.the spirit of our institutions to admit a representative from the district," but
the Constitution clearly did not authorize such a representative. Id. at 324-25.
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Does this term designate the whole, or any particular portion of the
American empire? Certainly this question can admit of but one answer.
It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of States
and territories. The district of Columbia, or the territory west of the
Missouri, is not less within the United States, than Maryland or Penn-
sylvania; and it is not less necessary, on the principles of our constitu-
tion, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties and excises,
should be observed in the one, than in the other.'
Somewhat overconfidently, this passage expresses Marshall's theme of national
unification, and echoes a sentence of the previous year in McCulloch v. Mary-
land.08 In that opinion, Marshall had insisted on considering the Constitution
as "emanating from the people, [and not] as the act of sovereign and indepen-
dent states."2°9 But by 1820, the rancor of sectional division had made itself
manifest in the debates leading to the Missouri Compromise, and the limits of
congressional power over the territories were becoming a hotly disputed
issue.210
Marshall directly addressed the Constitution's force in a territory in the
well-known but perplexing case of American Insurance Co. v. Canter.211 The
insurance company attacked a judgment of a court, created by the Florida
territorial legislature, that purported to exercise admiralty jurisdiction. The
insurance company argued that the territory of Florida lacked the power to vest
jurisdiction in the court, because admiralty jurisdiction is reserved to federal
courts under Article I1.212 On circuit, Justice Johnson rejected this claim,
finding that the allocation of jurisdiction to federal courts under Article III was
inapplicable because Florida was an after-acquired territory. He maintained that
the Constitution did not apply to Florida, and that Congress was bound only
by the law of nations in governing it.21 3 In the Supreme Court, Canter's at-
torneys reiterated this membership approach, insisting on the phrasing of the
Preamble: "The constitution was established by the people of the United States,
207. Id. at 319. Direct taxes, however, were to be apportioned by a different rule, which, after some
textual straining, Marshall construed as flexible enough to permit Congress to include or exclude, at its
option, the District and territories in direct taxation. Id. at 319-24.
208. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819) ("Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the
Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be collected and expended, armies are to
be marched and supported."); see also Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution No. 4, in DEFENSE OF
MCCULLOCH, supra note 162, at 185.
209. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat), at 402-05; see G.F. WHrrE, supra note 166, at 485-87, 544-45;
A Friend of the Constitution, Nos. 6 & 8, in DEFENSE OF McCI.LLOCH, supra note 162.
210. See, e.g., D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 172, at 100-13; W. WIEcEK, THE SOURCES OF ANI-
SLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 114-16 (1977); see also infra text accompanying
note 243 (noting Daniel Webster's early involvement in this debate).
211. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828).
212. Id. at 546.
213. Id. at 515-22. Johnson's opinion is set out as a footnote to the case.
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for the United States." '214 Florida was not one of those states. "If the constitu-
tion is in force in Florida, why is [Florida] not represented in Congress?"2 5
These arguments forced Marshall to address questions of acquisition and
governance of territory. In reply, Marshall asserted that (in accordance with the
usage of nations) once a territory is ceded to another nation, the political laws
that govern the relationship between the inhabitants and their sovereign neces-
sarily change.216 The treaty of cession covering Florida stipulated that its
inhabitants be "admitted to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights and immu-
nities of the citizens of the United States."21 7 Therefore, "[i]t is unnecessary
to inquire whether this is not their condition independent of stipulation. They
do not, however, participate in political power, they do not share in govern-
ment, till Florida shall become a state." ' 8 Thus, Marshall rejected once more
the fallacy that constitutional limitations can attach only upon admission to the
Union as a self-governing state, although he left ambiguous what would have
happened absent the treaty.
Turning to the particular constitutional issue at hand, Marshall held that the
power to govern the territories, whether implied from the war power and the
treaty power or expressly granted by Article IV, gave Congress the authority
to establish courts in addition to those contemplated by Article III of the
Constitution, and to vest them with admiralty jurisdiction.219 Canter therefore
prevailed, though not on the broadest grounds that his counsel advanced. The
Constitution was in force in Florida.
By the late 1820's, John C. Calhoun's conception of the nature of the Union
was diametrically opposed to Marshall's,2 - and yet he reached similar conclu-
214. Id. at 533.
215. Id. (argument of Whipple). Daniel Webster also argued on Canter's behalf, to similar effect; I
shall discuss his argument later. See infra text accompanying notes 244-46.
216. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 542; see also Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 225
(1845) ("Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the constitution
and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it.") (citing Vattel);
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 (1885) (Field, J.) ("As a matter of course, all laws,
ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new
government are at once displaced.").
217. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 542.
218. Id.
219. "In legislating for [the territories], congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and
of a state government." Id. at 546. Marshall may have disserved the cause of civil liberties in the territories
by legitimating the creation of courts with judges lacking Article IlI tenure protections. See McAllister v.
United States, 141 U.S. 174, 193-95 (1891) (Field, i., dissenting); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389,
410-22 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But this issue was not directly before him; the American Insurance
Company had not complained about the tenure of judges in the territorial court, but had argued that the
Florida legislature lacked the power to create a court with admiralty jurisdiction at all. As Marshall had
previously recognized, however, there was a need for courts in the territories beyond those described in
Article IlI, because Article III created only courts of limited jurisdiction. See Sera v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 332, 336-38 (1810). Marshall aggravated this need by holding that citizens of the District and the
territories were not citizens of a state for diversity purposes. Corporation of New-Orleans v. Winter, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 91 (1816); Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 452-53 (1805).
220. See generally F. BANcRoFr, CALHOUN AND THE SOUTH CAROLINA NULLIFICATION MOVEMENT
(1928); W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
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sions regarding the extension of the Constitution to the District and the territo-
ries, conclusions that were ultimately affirmed by the Taney Court in the
1850's. 1 In the wake of the so-called Tariff of Abominations of 1828,
Calhoun was asked to draft an essay to guide the South Carolina legislature in
responding to the tariff.' After study of the prior states' rights literature,
including the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and Madison's Report, he
produced the South Carolina Exposition and Protest on nullification.' Once
the nullification crisis had passed, Calhoun developed his theories further, for
the purpose of denying congressional power over slavery in the District of
Columbia and the territories. He developed two arguments that enabled him to
reach this conclusion. One subjected the federal government to implied constitu-
tional obligations as agent or trustee for the sovereign states. The other treated
express provisions of the Constitution as directly applicable in the District and
the territories.
Calhoun rejected the natural rights tradition from which the abolitionists
drew their arguments,' 4 as well as the idea of a state of nature or an original
social contract subjecting a people to government.' According to Calhoun,
government was a social institution that arose naturally. Constitutions were
artificial contrivances adopted by a people for the purpose of governing their
government.226 This was true of both the state and federal constitutions. 27
He viewed the United States Constitution in particular as a "written, positive
compact," embodying a contract or treaty among previously existing sover-
eign states; that is, among the peoples of the several states as distinct political
1816-1836 (1968); J. NivEN, JOHN C. CALHOUN AND THE PRICE OF UNION 134-78 (1988) ; M. PETERSON,
THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND CALHOUN 168-69 (1987); Capers, A Reconsideration of
John C. Calhoun's Transition from Nationalism to Nullification, in JOHN C. CALHOUN: A PROFILE 74 (J.
Thomas ed. 1968); see also D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 172, at 139 (on timing of Calhoun's evolution).
221. See infra text accompanying notes 253-67.
222. W. FREEHLING, supra note 220, at 158; 10 CALHOUN PAPERS, supra note 100, at 431-33 (Letter
to Villiam C. Preston).
223. 10 CALHOUN PAPERS, supra note 100, at 442; see 1. NIVEN, supra note 220, at 136-37, 158-59.
Like Jefferson, he concealed his authorship of this attack on the government in which he was serving as
Vice President at the time.
224. A Disquisition on Government, in 1 CALHOUN WORKS, supra note 100, at 58-59 [hereinafter
Disquisition]. Not surprisingly, this was typical of the proslavery theorists. See D. FAUST, THE IDEOLOGY
OF SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH, 1830-1860, at 8-9, 12 (1981); W.
FREEHLING, supra note 220, at 328-33.
Calhoun's fullest elaboration of his views appeared in the posthumously published Disquisition and
A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, in I CALHOUN WORKS, supra note
100, at 109 [hereinafter Discourse]. On their composition, see I. NIVEN, supra note 220, at 328-29, 333-37;
M. PETERSON, supra note 220, at 409. The major elements of the argument are also contained in his Senate
speeches and addresses at various stages of the abolition controversy.
225. Disquisition, supra note 224, at 58; A. SPAIN, THE POLmcAL THEORY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN
84-92, 172-73 (1951); McLaughlin, Social Compact and Constitutional Construction, 5 AM. HIST. REV.
467, 484-85 (1900).
226. Disquisition, supra note 224, at 7-8.
227. Discourse, supra note 224, at 111.
228. 4 CALHOUN WORKS, supra note 100, at 80 (Senate speech of Feb. 28, 1842).
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bodies, not merely among their respective governments. 29 This agreement
formed them into a "federal" union, a hybrid form that was neither a nation
nor a mere confederacy or league of separate states? 0 Calhoun purported to
rely on positive historical evidence, including the published journals of the
Convention and the ratification proceedings, to reconstruct the actual bargain
that underlay the Constitution." Not surprisingly, he found both explicit and
structurally implied protections for Southern slavery, which he regarded as
essential to the preservation of Southern institutions.
Unlike the Louisiana Territory, which included a port city with a substantial
non-English colonial population, later territorial acquisitions on the continent
involved underpopulated tracts considered ripe for settlement by citizens of
existing states. This made it easy for both sides to view conditions in the
territories as implicating the rights of citizens of the states. 2 It may also
have made it easy for Calhoun to accept the extension of positive constitutional
protections, the traditional rights of Englishmen, to the future territorial popula-
tion. And Calhoun argued that such extension was expressly required by the
supremacy clause.233 Vis-h-vis the several states, the Constitution was a com-
pact, but vis-,h-vis the federal government it was a governing law. The suprem-
acy clause made it clear that the Constitution was "the supreme law of the
land," including "the territorial possessions of the United States; or, as far as
their authority might otherwise extend."'  Thus, beginning with a contractual
theory of the Constitution as an agreement among the states for their own
benefit, Calhoun deduced that constitutional prohibitions were positive legal
norms geographically coextensive with the legislative powers of Congress.
2. Webster and the State Membership Counter-Tradition
The tradition restricting constitutional limitations to the states as members
of the Union was most influentially articulated by Calhoun's great antagonist,
Daniel Webster. Unlike Calhoun, Webster was not a systematic thinker-he
was a lawyer, an orator, and a politician. Nonetheless, he was viewed as the
229. Discourse, supra note 224, at 119, 131. This was the meaning of the Preamble's phraseology "We
the People of the United States of America"-the "United States" were the "States united." Similarly, in
declaring that the Constitution was "for the United States of America," they identified the intended
beneficiaries as the peoples of the several states. Id. at 128-29, 132-34.
230. Id. at 112-13, 162-68; A. SPAIN, supra note 225, at 184-88; see also Speech in Reply to Mr.
Webster, in 2 CALHOUN WORKS, supra note 100, at 262 (Feb. 26, 1833).
231. See, e.g., The South Carolina Exposition and Protest, in 10 CALHOUN PAPERS, supra note 100,
at 446-47; Discourse, supra note 224, at 244-49, 256-57; 4 CALHOUN WORKS, supra note 100, at 353-54;
see also Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1986) (describing publication history); Powell, supra note 100, at 945-46 (discussing increased
use of original materials as states' rights controversy deepened).
232. See E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 54-58 (1970).
233. Discourse, supra note 224, at 256-57; 4 CALHOUN WORKS, supra note 100, at 536 (debate with
Webster in the Senate, Feb. 24, 1849).
234. Discourse, supra note 224, at 256-57 (emphasis in original).
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principal constitutional advocate of his day, and he often took up the gauntlet
on behalf of New England and the Union. He agreed with Calhoun in viewing
the Constitution in positivist terms and in reading it as a compromise with
slavery. Political exigencies therefore pushed him to insist on a position he had
developed in the course of his legal practice, that the Constitution was legally
binding only within the boundaries of the states.
Webster's celebrity as a defender of the Union arose from two Senate
speeches refuting Calhoun and the Nullifiers: his famous Reply to Hayne in
183 013s and his response to Calhoun on the Force Bill in 1833.6 He reject-
ed the Nullifiers' view of the Constitution as an agreement among sovereign
states, insisting that the national government was the creation of a single
supreme power, the people of the United States:137
[Tihe Constitution of the United States, founded in or on the consent
of the people, may be said to rest on compact or consent; but it is not
itself the compact, but its resultP 8
This consent of the people has been called, by European writers, the so-
cial compact; and, in conformity to this common mode of expression,
these conventions speak of that assent, on which the new Constitution
was to rest, as an explicit and solemn compact, not which the States had
entered into with each other, but which the people of the United States
had entered into. 9
The Constitution was "not a league, compact, or confederacy, but a fundamental
law." ' The people had made the Constitution a supreme law and had created
a national judiciary to resolve disputes about its meaning. 41 Webster thus
reformulated the nature of the Union in terms derived from Marshall Court
cases, some of which Webster had argued himself. 2
Despite Webster's nationalism and his insistence on the Constitution as a
fundamental law, he viewed the Constitution's geographical scope as narrower
than the American nation. Webster had become involved in territorial questions
back in 1819, joining the public debate on the Missouri Compromise.? 3 As
235. 6 THE WRTINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 3 (1903) [hereinafter WEBSTER SPEECHES]
(speech of Jan. 26-27, 1830). The Reply, actually the Second Reply, formed part of a running debate
between the two in January 1830. CONG. DEB. 31-93 (1830).
236. 6 WEBSTER SPEECHES, supra note 235, at 181.
237. Id. at 54.
238. Id. at 201.
239. Id. at 210.
240. Id. at 198-99.
241. Id. at 67-68.
242. See R. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 222 (1984); M. PETERSON, supra
note 220, at 177-88; G.E. WHrE, supra note 166, at 281-89, 491-93.
243. Webster served as chairman of the committee that produced the Boston Memorial to Congress
on restraining the Increase of Slavery, Dec. 15, 1819, reprinted in 15 WEBSTER SPEECHES, supra note 235,
at 55. See M. PETERSON, supra note 220, at 59-60. Whether Webster drafted the Memorial is disputed. See
15 WEBSTER SPEECHES, supra note 235, at 73. Be that as it may, the Memorial sets forth Webster's future
1991]
The Yale Law Journal
co-counsel on the prevailing side in American Insurance Co. v. Canter,'
Webster argued that the Constitution had no application to an acquired territory.
Like Justice Johnson on circuit, Webster derived the status of the American
territories from general principles of public law, and not from American
political theory.' 5 He also employed the usual reverse-republican fallacy,
arguing that since a territory lacked political rights, it must have no rights at
all. 6 Although Webster won the case, he lost this part of the argument. Chief
Justice Marshall held that the Constitution did extend to Florida, leaving open
the question of what triggered the extension. 7
Oddly, Webster seems never to have recognized that Marshall rejected his
approach. He repeated the same arguments in his 1849 debate with Calhoun
over territorial government in the region newly acquired from Mexico. Senator
Isaac Walker of Wisconsin had offered an amendment that purported to "ex-
tend" the Constitution over the territory.?s From the Calhounite perspective,
the amendment would declare that the constitutional protection of slaveholders'
"property" extended to the territories. 9 Webster denied not only that the
Constitution applied to the territories of its own force, but even that it was
possible to extend it to them.250
Webster's rhetorical position was quite peculiar. Other senators insisted that
the Constitution, as "a compact and agreement between sovereign States," could
not be "extended" except by admitting further states. 5" Webster's formulation
was very close to this: though he insisted that the Constitution was not a
compact but the product of a compact, he limited the protection of individual
rights to those regions that exercised the sovereign political power of the
national government. Surely this is a variant of the membership interpretation
of the social contract. But Webster, having famously combatted the notion of
the Constitution as a compact, avoided this terminology.
Despite its logical weaknesses, Webster's membership-in-the-Union ap-
proach was popular with those who opposed the spread of slavery but recog-
nized the Constitution's accommodations to it.5 2 Although the municipal law
argument that Congress's power over the territories is legally unlimited and subject only to moral constraints.
Id. at 56-57.
244. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828); see supra text accompanying notes 211-19.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
246. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 538 (Webster's argument). Marshall, of course, had already rejected this
approach in Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 317 (1820). See supra text accompanying notes
205-07.
247. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
248. See CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 255 (1849); D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 172,
at 155-57; M. PETERSON, supra note 220, at 448-49.
249. See CONG. GLOBE 30th Cong. 2d Sess. App. 273 (1849) (remarks of Sen. Calhoun); cf. id. at 267
(remarks of Sen. Walker) ("If the Constitution will extend slavery to the land, then let it go. If by that
Constitution slavery is extended, I am willing to stand by that Constitution.").
250. Id. at 273. Webster even cited the Canter case as if it supported his position.
251. Id. at 257, 262, 268 (remarks of Sen. Dayton); id. at 270 (remarks of Sen. Hale).
252. See id.; infra note 268.
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approach gained wider currency in the courts and the Calhounites won a Pyrrhic
victory in the Dred Scott decision, the association of the opposite view with
the prestigious Webster helped lay the foundation for a partial retreat in the
Insular Cases.
3. A Continental Equilibrium
The Taney Court finally attempted to eliminate uncertainty about the status
of the territories. The territorial courts had dealt as best they could with these
issues for the first half of the nineteenth century. 53 They received more ex-
plicit guidance from a series of Supreme Court cases reflecting the municipal
law approach in the 1850's, establishing an equilibrium that held for as long
as the United States' manifest destiny was limited to the North American
continent.
Some of these decisions directly involved the fatal issue of slavery, while
others implicated it only indirectly.' For example, in Webster v. Reid, 15
the Court relied evenhandedly on the Seventh Amendment and the Iowa
Territory organic statute to vindicate the right to civil jury trial against a special
act of the territorial legislature. 6 In United States v. Dawson, 7 the Court
held that Article III, section 2, rather than the Sixth Amendment, dictated the
constitutional venue requirements for crimes committed in the "Indian country."
If any doubts remained about whether the Court would apply the Constitu-
tion to the territories, Justice Taney sought to dispel them in Scott v.
Sandford.58 He argued that Congress was subject to both implied and express
253. See, e.g., United States v. Minnesota & N.W.R.R. Co:, 1 Minn. 127 (Minn. Terr. 1854) (invalidat-
ing act of Congress on takings grounds), rev'd sub nom. Rice v. Railroad Co., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 358 (1862);
Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23, 43-46 (1851) (invalidating divorce granted by territorial legislature); Rogers
v. Bradford, 1 Pin. 418, 427-28 (Wis. Terr. 1844) (territorial court is not a "Court of the United States"
within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment, purporting to follow American Insurance Co. v. Canter,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)); Doty v. Strong, I Pin. 84, 88 (Wis. Terr. 1840) (territorial delegate shares
constitutional privilege from arrest under Article I); Territory v. Hattick, 2 Mart. (O.S.) 87 (Orleans Terr.
Super. Ct. 1811) (criminal jury trial provisions apply only to crimes against the United States); see generally
L SMuRR, supra note 193.
254. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (denying congressional power over slavery
in territories); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1854) (sorting out customs consequences of
acquisition of California); United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 467 (1854) (discussing constitutional
venue requirements in Indian country); Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437 (1851) (requiring civil jury
trial in Iowa Territory); Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851) (discussing effect of Northwest
Ordinance on slavery); see also Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850) (discussing customs
consequences of occupation of Mexican soil).
255. 52 U.S. (I1 How.) 437 (1851).
256. It must be recognized there are serious ambiguities in referring to the "constitutionality" of an
act of a territorial legislature, and that the strongest evidence of an "extension" of the Constitution to a
territory would be the invalidation of an Act of Congress, as in the Dred Scott decision.
257. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 467 (1854).
258. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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constitutional limitations in legislating for the territories. 9 Taney insisted
that property rights in slaves were protected in the territories by the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.' He disposed of contrary arguments from
natural or international law by insisting on the terms of the Constitution as he
understood them, "positive and practical regulations plainly written down.
' ' 6t
Taney's logic followed Calhoun's:
[The protection of persons and property under the Constitution] is not
confined to the States, but the words are general, and extend to the
whole territory over which the Constitution gives it power to legislate,
including those portions of it remaining under Territorial Government,
as well as that covered by the States. It is a total absence of power
everywhere within the dominion of the United States, and places the
citizens of a Territory, so far as these rights are concerned, on the same
footing with the citizens of the States, and guards them as firmly and
plainly against any inroads which the General Government might
attempt, under the plea of implied or incidental powers."6
None of the Justices indicated any disagreement with Taney's statement that
the Constitution in general, and the Bill of Rights in particular, bound Congress
in the territories.2 63 The dissenters agreed explicitly. Justice McLean, who was
himself holding in reserve an implied limitation against expansion of slav-
ery,2" asserted that "the Constitution was formed for our whole country. An
expansion or contraction of our territory required no change in the fundamental
law."'26 Justice Curtis' celebrated dissent agreed that positive limitations ex-
pressed in the text applied to the territories,2 66 and met Justice Taney on the
merits of the due process argument, concluding that due process could not be
understood as requiring maintenance of slavery.-67
The taint of the Dred Scott decision did not cause judicial reaction against
259. Tracing the power to acquire and govern territory to the express power to admit new states, Taney
concluded that Congress could not treat citizens in the territories as mere colonists, or rule permanent
colonial dependencies without restrictions-a neat reversal of the Federalist argument concerning Louisiana.
Id. at 451-52. In the spirit of Calhoun's trusteeship argument, he also inferred an implied limitation against
preventing slaveholders from migrating with their "property" to any territory. Id. at 450-51.
260. Id. at 450.
261. Id. at 451.
262. Id. at 450-51.
263. See Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision, in the Light of ContemporaryLegal Doctrines, 17 AM. HIST.
REV. 52, 59 (1911). It is notorious that only Justice Wayne concurred in all of Taney's opinion, although
Taney had it denominated the Opinion of the Court. See, e.g., D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 172, at 389.
264. See 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 542. McLean, the strongest antislavery Justice of the period, adopted
a version of the moderate antislavery position that, though the Constitution shielded slavery in the states,
it did not grant Congress the power to establish slavery in the territories. See Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F.
Cas. 335, 336-37 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583); D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 172, at 143; F.
WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JoHN MCLEAN: A POLMCIAN ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 118,
123, 137, 140-41, 147-49, 189-91 (1937).
265. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 544.
266. Id. at 614.
267. Id. at 624-27.
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the municipal law approach.s In the midst of the Civil War, the Supreme
Court of Washington Territory proudly declared:
The Constitution of the United States is co-extensive with the vast
empire that has grown up under it, and its provisions securing certain
rights to the accused in criminal cases, are as living and potent on the
shores of the Pacific as in the city of its birth."69
During that same period, the Supreme Court was unanimous in assuming that
an act of Congress retracting a vested right to tracts of land in a territory would
be void.27 Referring to both the Constitution and the laws extending it, the
post-Civil War Court also scrutinized a variety of claims under the Bill of
Rights, including cruel and unusual punishment2 and right to jury trial.272
The strength of the late nineteenth-century settlement of the geographical
issue may be seen in the Court's observance of it through most of the next
great political controversy regarding the territories, the battle against polyga-
mists in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Utah.273 Through
most of this struggle, Congress conceded that the Constitution generally, and
the First Amendment in particular, were binding in the Utah Territory.274 The
Supreme Court's seminal decision in Reynolds v. United States275 involved
the Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and to confrontation,276 in
268. Not all of Taney's numerous critics limited themselves to McLean and Curtis's grounds of
disagreement. The dying Thomas Hart Benton issued a little book that had some influence later, in which
he agreed with Webster that the Constitution protected only the states, and that Congress had absolute power
over the territories. T. BENTON, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL EXAMINATION OF THAT PART OF THE DECISION
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DRED SCOT CASE, WHICH DECLARES THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE ACT, AND THE SELF-EXTENSION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION TO THE TERRITORIES, CARRYING SLAVERY ALONG WITH IT (1857, reprint 1970); see Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,275 (1901) (opinion of Brown, J.) (invoking Benton's authority); D. FEHRENBACHER,
supra note 172, at 631 nn. 54, 56; Corwin, supra note 263, at 59.
269. Elick v. Washington Territory, I Wash. Terr. 136, 140 (1861).
270. Rice v. Railroad Co., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 358 (1862).
271. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
272. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In an odd
pair of cases in 1897, the Court expressed uncertainty as to whether the Seventh Amendment applied of
its own force in a territory, and then two weeks later insisted that it did. See Springville v. Thomas, 166
U.S. 707, 708-09 (1897); American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 466 (1897).
273. See E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATrER-DAY SAINTS, 1830-1900 (1988); Davis, The Polygamous Prelude, 6 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. 1 (1962); Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases (Parts 1 & 2), 9 UTAH L. REV.
308, 543 (1964-1965).
274. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 2735, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1886); H.R. REP. NO. 83, 36th Cong.,
lst Sess. 2-4 (1860); E. FRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, supra note 273, at 134-35. There were lapses, however,
as in 1882 when a Florida Senator invoked Webster's argument that "the Congress of the United States in
legislating for the Territories is not hampered by constitutional restrictions or limitations; that the Preamble
of the Constitution tells us it was made for States and not for Territories." 13 CONG. REC. 1206 (1882)
(remarks of Sen. Jones); see also id. at 1162.
275. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
276. One of Reynolds' wives testified at an earlier trial, but could not be found for the later one. Her
prior testimony was admitted. See id. at 158-61. Only Justice Field dissented, and only on this issue. See
id. at 168.
The Yale Law Journal
addition to the crucial First Amendment issue of polygamy as an exercise of
religion. The importance of Reynolds in constitutional history lies precisely in
its acceptance as precedent in free exercise cases generally, rather than as a
special rule for territories. A later case, Hans Nielsen, Petitioner,277 upheld
a constitutional objection, this time to violation of the double jeopardy guaran-
tee. Some ambiguity did return, however, in Justice Bradley's opinion for the
majority in the climactic decision upholding Congress's dissolution of the
Church corporation and forfeiture of its assets.27
A year later, Justice Field placed the capstone on the municipal law edifice
in In re Ross,279 a decision relying on the restriction of constitutional protec-
tion to the territory held by the United States as sovereign. The case involved
an American seaman tried before an American consul for murder committed
aboard an American ship in a Japanese harbor, pursuant to Japan's grant of
rights of extraterritoriality to American nationals. 2ss Ross claimed that trial
in the "consular court" denied him his constitutional rights to grand jury indict-
ment and trial by jury. A unanimous court relied on both practical and theoreti-
cal reasons in rejecting this claim."sl Field, who believed strongly in the
territorial character of law,282 characterized the Constitution's scope as fol-
lows:
By the Constitution a government is ordained and established "for
the United States of America," and not for countries outside of their
limits. The guarantees it affords against accusation of capital or infa-
mous crimes, except by indictment or presentment by a grand jury, and
for an impartial trial by a jury when thus accused, apply only to citizens
and others within the United States, or who are brought there for trial
for alleged offences committed elsewhere, and not to residents or
temporary sojourners abroad. The Constitution can have no operation
277. 131 U.S. 176 (1889) (overturning conviction of a husband under the adultery provisions of the
federal polygamy statute, after he had already been convicted for the same acts under the provisions
forbidding polygamous cohabitation).
278. After a series of quotations of orthodox case law on the status of the territories, Bradley appended
a dictum that would support much mischief in later years:
Doubtless Congress, in legislating for the Territories would be subject to those fundamental
limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated in the Constitution and its amend-
ments; but these limitations would exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitu-
tion from which Congress derives all its powers, than by any express and direct application of
its provisions.
The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44
(1890). Chief Justice Fuller, Justice Field, and Justice Lucius Q.C. Lamar filed an unhelpfully brief dissent.
279. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
280. For a recent description of extraterritorial regimes, see Bederman, Extraterritorial Domicile and
the Constitution, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 451 (1988).
281. 140 U.S. at 464-65. Field mentioned the "impossibility of obtaining a competent grand or petit
jury" in a foreign country, and pointed out that the citizen denied these protections was often "the gainer"
from being spared subjection to a foreign legal system, which might even involve "extreme cruelty and
torture." Id.; see also Forbes v. Scannell, 13 Cal. 243, 281-82 (1859) (Baldwin, J., joined by Field, J.).




in another country. When, therefore, the representatives or officers of
our government are permitted to exercise authority of any kind in
another country, it must be on such conditions as the two countries may
agree, the laws of neither one being obligatory upon the other.s 3
The language of the argument came from the conflict of laws and emphasized
the primacy of territorial sovereignty as the basis of legal obligation. Japan as
a sovereign nation had the ultimate right to forbid the consul to conduct a jury
trial within its territory; therefore the Constitution was not legally binding on
the consul.
Field's logic, of course, was slippery: our Constitution had no binding force
on the government of Japan, but that does not mean that the United States
government, in negotiating an extraterritoriality treaty with Japan, was free to
negotiate for a system of trial that violated our Constitution. That the Constitu-
tion does not bind their government does not mean that it cannot bind ours,
perhaps to inaction. Indeed, Field's opinion devoted more space to demonstrat-
ing that United States jurisdiction extended over Ross than to demonstrating
that the United States Constitution did not extend over the consul.," Nonethe-
less, Field treated the Constitution as extending as far as the nation's power of
legislation was plenary-to cases where it could govern by right, not by consent
or comity.
B. We the People, Incorporated
A second legacy of the Dred Scott decision ultimately produced a transfor-
mation ii the terms of the debate over American constitutionalism. After the
Civil War amendments, the Constitution was no longer committed to a conflict
with natural law. Over the next few decades, "due process of law" became a
rubric under which conservative economic interests persuaded the Justices to
confer on themselves the power of enforcing natural law as positive law.w
The resulting expansion of judicial discretion opened up new ground for
compromise between full equality of constitutional rights and relegation to
extralegal status-territories could be judicially shielded from absolute despo-
tism without receiving all the rights of the metropolis.
At the same time, the United States' manifest destiny was shifting from the
filling out of an underpopulated continent to imperialist competition with other
283. 140 U.S. at 464 (citation omitted).
284. See id. at 470-80. The case was complicated by the fact that Ross was a British subject on an
American vessel, and the British government had protested the trial, but the Court ruled that he was
assimilated to the status of an American national during his service on the vessel.
285. Everyone knows this, but see, e.g., C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 104-65
(1930); C. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTO-
PHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW (1954); G.E. WHITE,
THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 95-108 (rev. ed. 1988); B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS
OF NATURAL LAW 298-306 (1931).
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great powers. 6 This meant acquiring more distant territory, some of it dense-
ly populated by peoples whom the expansionists were not prepared to regard
as equals. As a result, the Supreme Court, though at first by a bare majority,
chose to occupy this intermediate ground, reincarnating the geographically
restrictive membership approach in the doctrine of "incorporated territories"' 7
that originated in the Insular Cases.288 The underlying theories were most
cogently expressed in the opinions of Justices Edward Douglass White and John
Marshall Harlan, respectively concurring and dissenting in Downes v. Bidwell.
White's innovation maintained the Constitution as the measure of federal power
over territories supposedly designated by Congress as welcome to full status,
but limited protection in other territories to a minimal set of background rights
described as fundamental. Harlan, in contrast, continued the traditional insis-
tence that wherever Congress acquired sovereignty, the rights of the written
Constitution followed as part of the fundamental law.
It is important to recognize that the Insular Cases were preceded by a
decade of political controversy over imperialism and scholarly controversy over
its constitutional implications. 2 9 The constitutional polemics began with the
proposed annexation of Hawaii in 1893 190 and accelerated through the Span-
ish-American War and its aftermath, the appropriation of significant portions
of Spain's overseas colonial empire.
Many of the authors combed history, including the antebellum debates on
the Constitution in the territories, for support. Some took the traditional view
that the Constitution constrains government action wherever the United States
is sovereign,2 1 while others invoked its ancient rival-the claim that the Con-
286. See, e.g., D. HEALY, US ExPANSIONISM: THE IMPERIALIST URGE IN THE 1890S (1970); E. MAY,
IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY: THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICA AS A GREAT POWER (1961); E. TOMPKINS, ANTI-
IMPERIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES: THE GREAT DEBATE, 1890-1920 (1970).
287. For readers new to this material, it may be unfortunate that tradition has associated the word
"incorporate" with both the applicability of the Bill of Rights to federal action in the territories and the
applicability of the Bill of Rights to actions of the states. In the first case, the reference is to incorporating
the territory into the United States, and in the second, to incorporating the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment.
288. This imprecise term refers both to the nine cases relating to the constitutional and legal status of
Puerto Rico and the Philippines argued in 1901 and to the entire series of cases from DeLima v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 1 (1901), to Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), that established the framework of second-
class status for overseas territories.
289. See generally R. BEISNER, TWELVE AGAINST EMPIRE: THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS, 1898-1900 (1968);
D. HEALY, supra note 286, at 213-47; E. TOMPKINS, supra note 286.
290. See Baldwin, The Historic Policy of the United States as to Annexation, 2 YALE REV. 133, 156-57
(1893); Cooley, Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation, 15 FORUM 389 (1893); Curtis, The Sandwich
Islands: II. Is it Constitutional?, 156 N. AM. REV. 282 (1893); Patterson, The Constitutional Effect ofHawai-
ian Annexation Upon the Tariff"Act of 1890, 33 AM. L. REG. 309 (1893).
291. See Bacon, Territory and the Constitution, 10 YALE L.J. 99 (1901); Baldwin, The Constitutional
Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV.
L. REV. 393 (1899); Burgess, How May the United States Govern Its Extra-Continental Territory, 14 POL.
S¢. Q. 1 (1899); Fuller, Some Constitutional Questions Suggested by Recent Acquisitions, 1 COLUM. L.
REV. 108 (1901); Howland, The Legal Status ofOur New Possessions, 6 W. RES. LJ. 189 (1901); Randolph,
Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1898); Shipman, Webster on the Territories,
9 YALE L.L 185 (1900); Whitney, Another Philippine Constitutional Question-Delegation of Legislative
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stitution was made only for the states.2" Besides judicial and legislative pre-
cedents, some of the traditionalists supported their arguments with natural rights
rhetoric2 93 and the danger that American republicanism would be destroyed
by imperial habits.29 In response, several of their opponents invoked the
wording of the Preamble,295 the authority of Daniel Webster,2 9 the practices
of other nations,297 the odiousness of the Dred Scott decision,298 and the
alleged inferiority of various non-Anglo-Saxon races.299 Some anti-imperialists
argued the applicability of the Constitution in order to prove that the United
States must divest itself of such ungovernable territory." °
The most significant novelty was presented by Abbott Lawrence Lowell,
political science professor, and later president, at Harvard.30' After exploring
the terms of acquisition of prior territories, he concluded that the lawmakers
and the treatymakers had freedom to choose whether or not to designate an
acquired territory as part of the United States. If they did not so designate it,
then:
[C]onstitutional limitations, such as those requiring uniformity of taxa-
tion and trial by jury, do not apply. It may well be that some provisions
have a universal bearing because they are in form restrictions upon the
power of Congress rather than reservations of rights. Such are the
provisions that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed,
that no title of nobility shall be granted, and that a regular statement and
account of all public moneys shall be published from time to time.
These rules stand upon a different footing from the rights guaranteed
to the citizens, many of which are inapplicable except among a people
Power to the President, 1 COLUm. L. REV. 33 (1901); Woolsey, The Government of Dependencies, 13
ANNALS (Supp.) 3 (1899); cf. Freund, The Control of Dependencies Through Protectorates, 14 POL. SC.
Q. 19 (1899) (but not if protectorate); Judson, Our Federal Constitution and the Government of Tropical
Territories, 19 Ai. MONTHLY REv. OF REVS. 67 (1899) (butmany clauses limited to states). The publication
date of each of these articles and those in the succeeding footnotes precedes the decision in the first set of
Insular Cases in May, 1901.
292. Beach, Constitutional Expansion, 8 YALE Li. 225 (1899); Huffcut, Constitutional Aspects of the
Government of Dependencies, 13 ANNALS (Supp.) 19 (1899); LangdelI, The Status of Our New Territories,
12 HARV. L. REv. 365 (1899); Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1899) (with qualifica-
tions).
293. Teichmueller, Expansion and the Constitution, 33 AM. L. REV. 202 (1899).
294. Id. at 210-11; see also Burgess, supra note 291, at 3; Fuller, supra note .291, at 116-17; cf.
Shipman, supra note 291, at 206 (quoting Polonius's advice to Laertes).
295. Langdell, supra note 292, at 372-73.
296. Id. at 382; Huffcut, supra note 292, at 32.
297. Gardiner, Our Right to Acquire and Hold Foreign Territory, 33 AM. L. REV. 161 (1899); Thayer,
supra note 292, at 467, 469.
298. Gardiner, supra note 297, at 174; Huffcut, supra note 292, at 43-44.
299. Gardiner, supra note 297, at 180, 187.
300. Baldwin, supra note 291, at 409-10; Randolph, supra note 291, at 313-15; Teichmueller, supra
note 293, at 213-14; cf. Shipman, supra note 291, at 206 (if a territory is permanently unfit for statehood,
we must either amend Constitution or give up the territory); see E. TOMPKINS, supra note 286, at 178-82.
301. Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions-A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155 (1899).
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whose social and political evolution has been consonant with our own.302
Lowell's distinction between applicable and inapplicable provisions, based on
verbal form rather than substance, had no future. His distinction between two
kinds of acquired territories, however, based on a political decision to make
them part of the United States, would eventually persuade a majority of the
Supreme Court.
The first Insular Cases, of which the central and most famous was Downes
v. Bidwell,33 produced a splintered Court. 31 Henry Billings Brown, the on-
ly common member of the majority in all the cases, wrote the lead opinion in
Downes, speaking only for himself. He relied for the most part on the state
membership approach: "The Constitution was created by the people of the
United States, as a union of States, to be governed solely by representatives
of the States .... In short, the Constitution deals with States, their people, and
their representatives. ' '30 5 Brown dismissed much of the prior judicial discus-
sion as dicta and rejected the Scott v. Sandford holding, preferring the contrary
authority of Webster, Benton, and the Civil War.3" Nonetheless, Congress
could, by positive enactment, extend the Constitution to particular territories;
once done, this process could not be reversed.37 He then undermined his own
argument by suggesting that there might be certain "prohibitions [that] go to
the very root of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or
place," or "certain natural rights, enforced in the Constitution," that might
automatically be binding in all territories.308 Yet, as we are a nation, presump-
tively "our power with respect to [acquired] territories is the same power which
other nations have been accustomed to exercise with respect to territories
acquired by them. '3 9 Brown's peroration made explicit his desire not to
create obstacles to Congress's pursuit of an imperial destiny.310
The more important contribution came from Justice Edward Douglass
White. He offered a new constitutional synthesis for the new age, winning the
concurrence of Justices Shiras and McKenna, 311 and eventually capturing a
302. Id. at 176.
303. 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (holding Congress free of constitutional uniformity requirement in taxing
Puerto Rico).
304. See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183
U.S. 151 (1901); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S.
222 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
305. Downes, 182 U.S. at 251 (emphasis deleted); see id. at 285.
306. Id. at 273-76.
307. Id. at 257, 270-71.
308. Id. at 277, 282. On the other hand, such legal guarantees would be superfluous since the Anglo-
Saxon character can be trusted to rule justly. Id. at 280.
309. Id. at 285.
310. Id. at 286-87. Furthermore, Congress must have the power to annex land without admitting
"savages" as citizens. Id. at 279-80.
311. Justice Gray, who provided the crucial fifth vote, declared himself as "in substance agreeing with
the opinion of Mr. Justice White," id. at 345 (Gray, J., concurring), but his brief concurring statement
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majority. White firmly rejected Brown's notion that Congress had discretion
whether or not to extend the Constitution.312 Putting the matter in organic law
terms, he observed that the Constitution was applicable everywhere and at all
times-but that did not mean that its limitations on power were everywhere
applicable. 313 The issue was not whether the Constitution itself was operative
in Puerto Rico, but whether the particular constitutional provision invoked
should be interpreted as applying to Puerto Rico; and White believed he had
a systematic approach to this problem of interpretation.314 The applicability
of constitutional limitations depended not on the whim of Congress but on an
objective inquiry "into the situation of the territory and its relations to the
United States. 315
Under White's scheme, the federal government had the power to choose
among four courses with respect to foreign territory: to admit it as a state; to
incorporate it into the United States as a territory and make it an integral part
of the United States; to acquire it but leave it as merely a territory appurtenant
to the United States; or to leave it foreign by not acquiring it. Congress could
not "extend" the Constitution, but it could extend the United States. Full consti-
tutional protection was reserved for territories that Congress had incorporated
into the United States, as opposed to those merely acquired." 6 White did not
explore the relationship between incorporated territories and states, relying
largely on precedent for his notion that becoming "part of' the United States
resulted in further geographical extension of full constitutional protection.3 17
He focused instead on the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated
territories.
White insisted, in language reminiscent of the derivation of the inherent
sovereign right to exclude aliens, that his forefathers must have intended their
country to have the same sovereign right to determine the status of newly
acquired territories that other sovereigns enjoyed under the law of nations."'
He quoted a description of that right from Halleck's International Law, em-
bodying the view of Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf, and others that a conquering
state may hold new territory under that territory's old constitution, or extend
to it the state's own constitution, or pursue such third alternative as seems
appropriate.319 He reinforced the need for this discretion by invoking the
heavily emphasized the fact that the case involved the temporary government of a territory recently acquired
in war. Id. at 346.
312. Id. at 289 (White, L, joined by Shiras and McKenna, JL, concurring).
313. Id. at 288-89.
314. Id. at 292-93.
315. Id. at 293.
316. Id. at 299. The four dissenters, however, ridiculed this purportedly objective test as devoid of
meaning. Id. at 372-73 (Fuller, C.L, joined by Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham, JL, dissenting); id. at 391
(Harlan, L, dissenting).
317. Id. at 292-93 (White, L, joined by Shiras and McKenna, JL, concurring).
318. Id. at 302.
319. Id. at 301-02.
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nation's right to protect the birthright of its own citizens by withholding
citizenship from acquired populations that might belong to "an uncivilized race"
and be "absolutely unfit to receive it.""32
White did not explore the moral question of where the United States got
the right to "liberate" Spanish colonies whose populations had done it no wrong
and then to hold them as conquered territories appurtenant without their con-
sent. The international law of his day had left behind Enlightenment idealism
in such matters. But White did not wholly relegate unincorporated territories
to the ruthless positivism of late nineteenth-century international law. He
maintained that even unincorporated territories benefit from "inherent, although
unexpressed, principles which are the basis of all free government.... restric-
tions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed."32'
White did not make clear how to identify those fundamental prohibitions
that extend to unincorporated territories. But one might suspect that he had
updated the membership approach by making the background natural law rights
legally enforceable. And indeed a few years later, in a case refusing grand and
petit jury rights to inhabitants of Hawaii, White simply cited decisions holding
those rights inapplicable to actions of the states, and denied that they were
"fundamental provisions of the Constitution, which were by their own force
applicable to the territory."3 2 In other words, he employed the same kind of
natural law methodology then being used by the majority in deciding Fourteenth
Amendment due process cases.
The most fully articulated dissent3u came from the elder Justice John
Marshall Harlan. Harlan unambiguously expounded a municipal law conception
of the Constitution. Against Brown, he asserted, "The Constitution speaks not
simply to the States in their organized capacities, but to all peoples, whether
of States or territories, who are subject to the authority of the United
States.' '3 ' He tied this argument in with the wording of the supremacy clause:
the fact that this clause speaks of the Constitution as
"the supreme law of the land," is a fact of no little significance. The
"land" referred to manifestly embraced all the peoples and all the
320. Id. at 306.
321. Id. at 29 1. Later in the opinion White rephrased his position as affording unincorporated territories
the protection of those "general prohibitions in the Constitution in favor of the liberty and property of the
citizen which are not mere regulations as to the form and manner in which a conceded power may be
exercised, but which are an absolute denial of all authority under any circumstances or conditions to do
particular acts." Id. at 294.
322. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197,220-21 (1903) (White, J, joined by McKenna, J., concurring).
323. Chief Justice Fuller wrote on behalf of all four dissenters. He demolished Brown's claims of
precedential support for a Websterian membership approach. Fuller mocked the "occult meaning" of White's
incorporation theory, 182 U.S. at 373 (Fuller, CJ., joined by Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham, J3., dissenting),
but had difficulty refuting this mystery in detail. He rejected all policy arguments based on the need to
accommodate colonialism.
324. Id. at 378 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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territory, whether within or without the States, over which the United
States could exercise jurisdiction or authority.3"
Against White, he insisted that the proper understanding of when a territory was
"a part of, and incorporated into, the United States" was whether it was "for
all purposes of government by the Nation, under the complete jurisdiction of
the United States... subject to all the authority which the National Govern-
ment may exert over any territory or people. ' 31
Harlan distinguished vehemently, if not wholly convincingly, his prior
decision in Neely v. Henkel,327 which arose out of the American occupation
of Cuba in the wake of the Spanish-American War. "Temporary" military
occupation of foreign territory, without the intention of acquiring sovereignty,
did not bring it under the Constitution.3H
Harlan exhibited not only the territorialist disposition of the nineteenth-
century municipal law approach, but also its characteristic insistence on compli-
ance with positive constitutional provisions, regardless of whether they had any
basis in natural law: "If the Constitution is in force in any territory, it is in
force there for every purpose embraced by the objects for which the Govern-
ment was ordained., 329 Harlan's literal demands continued his ongoing dis-
pute with his colleagues over the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the state
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.330 Harlan stubbornly insist-
ed that the Bill of Rights identified "certain guaranties of the rights of life and
liberty, and property, which had long been deemed fundamental in Anglo-Saxon
institutions,' 3 1 with which the states were not free to experiment.
325. Id. at 383, 384-85.
326. Id. at 389.
327. 180 U.S. 109 (1901). There the Court had unanimously upheld extradition of a dishonest American
official to Cuba for trial without jury under the military government of General Leonard Wood. Treating
the case as extraterritorial, Harlan had written that the jury trial guarantees "have no relation to crimes
committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country." Id. at 122.
328. 182 U.S. at 387-88 (Harlan, J., dissenting). white had invoked Neely as precedent on his side.
Id. at 343-44 (White, J., concurring).
329. Id. at 385.
330. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (Court holds privilege against self-incrimination
inapplicable to states; Harlan dissents); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904) (Court holds right to
confrontation inapplicable to states; Harlan dissents); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (Court holds
right to jury of twelve inapplicable to states; Harlan dissents); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892)
(Court holds ban on cruel and unusual punishment inapplicable to states: Harlan dissents); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (Court holds requirement of grand jury indictment inapplicable to states;
Harlan dissents); cf. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (Court does not reach applicability of First
Amendment to states; Harlan dissents); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (Harlan notes dissent to
decision holding grand jury requirement inapplicable to Cherokee Nation).
331. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,539 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Unlike his successor Hugo
Black, Harlan also found room in the Constitution for unenumerated rights to liberty of occupation, liberty
of contract, and expansive concepts of taking without just compensation in such areas as taxation and rate
regulation. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898);
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); see also Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding sufficient basis for regulation of bakers'
hours); G. E. WHrrE, supra note 285, at 130, 134-38.
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Over the next decade, White solidified the Court behind his brainchild.332
In 1922, Chief Justice Taft, the former Governor of the Philippines, explained
that even the conferral of United States citizenship on the residents of Puerto
Rico in its 1917 organic act did not suffice to incorporate it in the United
States. 333 Taft added:
We need not dwell on another consideration which requires us not
lightly to infer, from acts thus easily explained on other grounds, an
intention to incorporate in the Union these distant ocean communities
of a different origin and language from those of our continental people.
Incorporation has always been a step, and an important one, leading to
statehood.3
As a result, the defendant newspaper editor had no right to jury trial in his
misdemeanor prosecution for libelling the island's Governor.
There is no justification for sentimentality about the Insular Cases. I men-
tioned earlier that writers in the natural law school approved of conquerors who
permitted a new territory to keep its old constitution. The Insular Cases did not
represent such an accommodation to the conquered, but rather were designed
for the convenience of the conqueror. Nonetheless, they claimed to offer
unincorporated territories a skeletal constitution that protected natu-
ral/fundamental rights and that therefore might be minimally worthy of the
imputed consent of those present in the territory. Over the years, the list of
rights has grown in parallel with (though it has not kept up with) the expansion
of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights against state governments.
335
Thus, in one sense, Downes and Balzac bring us back to the Alien and Sedition
Act debate: the Constitution as written for "We the People" in the States and
in those territories admitted onto the path to statehood, natural and statutory
rights in those territories that are not. But those natural rights that the Court
chooses to recognize become part of the fundamental law in the territory and,
unlike eighteenth-century natural law, override positive statutes in the manner
of due process.
332. See J. TORRUELLA, supra note 8, at 62-84 (1985); Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of
Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L REV. 823 (1926). Harlan vowed eternal dissent from the theory
of the Insular Cases, see Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 155-56 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and
continued to dissent until his death in 1911. See Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 333 (1911);
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 345 (1911); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 535 (1905).
333. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). See L TORRtELLA, supra note 8, at 85-100; Cabranes,
Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative History of the United States Citizenship of
Puerto Ricans, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 390 (1978). (The island's name was officially misspelled "Porto Rico"
from 1898 to 1932. See id. at 392 n.1.)
334. 258 U.S. at 311.
335. See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 469-71 (1979).
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IV. MODERNISM AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The preceding history makes possible a deeper understanding of the Su-
preme Court's watershed decision in Reid v. Covert,331 ending the regime of
strict territoriality, and the subsequent controversies over the extraterritorial
extension of modem American constitutionalism with its emphasis on individual
rights. Hugo Black's plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert, a classic of Warren
Court reform, 337 reinvigorated the municipal law approach, and even con-
tained some passages that were susceptible to a universalist interpretation. Since
that time, courts and commentators have struggled-mostly on a case-by-case
basis-with the international ramifications of an expanding constitutionalism.
The Rehnquist Court has now sought to limit this expansion, holding in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez38 that Fourth Amendment warrant requirements
do not bind federal searches of nonresident alien defendants' property outside
United States territory. Like his predecessor Edward Douglass White, Chief
Justice Rehnquist expressly invoked considerations of international realpolitik
to support nonapplicability of constitutional rights. But, as we shall see, there
is disagreement even among the majority concerning the extraterritorial rights
of aliens under the Constitution.
A. Does the Constitution Follow the Passport?
The groundwork for the modernist breakthrough in Reid v. Covert lies in
the variety of constitutional changes intervening between the 1920's and the
1950's. By the 1950's, military and economic crises had vastly increased the
power of the executive branch. The United States had consolidated its great
power status and had gone on to become a superpower. American soldiers and
American corporations had spread pervasively across the globe, and the exercise
of prescriptive jurisdiction on the nationality principle had become more
common. Freewheeling judicial review had struggled against the New Deal and
lost, and substantive due process was reputedly dead and buried. In Brown v.
Board of Education, the Warren Court had reestablished the commitment to
racial equality that its predecessors had compromised after Reconstruction-the
Court would no longer be able to call upon the frank racism that informed the
rationale of the Insular Cases.
The Second World War and the following occupation had brought pressures
for wider application of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court rejected,
sometimes over dissents, challenges brought by American soldiers, civilians,
336. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
337. The decision not only overturned the strict territoriality rule and limited military jurisdiction over
civilians, but also resolved recurring uncertainties over the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the
treaty power. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, FOREIGN APPAiRS AND THE CONSTMtUON 139 (1972).
338. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
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and former enemies to actions of military authorities abroad 39 The Court
of Claims twice held the government liable under the takings clause to citizens
for actions of the Army abroad.'
The challenges finally succeeded on rehearing in Reid v. Covert. The
companion cases involved criminal prosecutions in England and Japan-by
courts-martial and therefore without Article III judges, indictment, or jury
trial-of widows of servicemen charged with the murders of their husbands.
On first hearing, a majority treated the cases as routine applications of the
Insular Cases and In re Ross.34' Amid unusual assertions that time constraints
had prevented the Court from considering the case fully,32 rehearing was
granted, and on the second round the Bill of Rights burst the bounds of
territoriality. But the new majority of six split between two opposing rationales.
Justice Black's opinion for the plurality of four (with Chief Justice Warren,
Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan) began its constitutional discussion with
a heavy emphasis on citizenship:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts
against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The Unit-
ed States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and au-
thority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the
limitations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government reaches
out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of
Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in
another land.' 3
In confronting the key precedent of In re Ross,344 Black emphasized the ten-
sion between its holding that American criminal laws can have extraterritorial
339. See Madsden v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (upholding trial by occupation court of American
citizen civilian); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (denying enemy soldiers abroad due process
rights and access to American courts); id. at 791 (Black, Douglas, and Burton, JJ., dissenting); Hirota v.
MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949) (finding Allied war crimes tribunal in Tokyo not to be instrumentality of
United States); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (resolving on other grounds double jeopardy challenge
to court-martial of American soldier in Germany); id. at 692 (Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge, JJ., dis-
senting); Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1949).
But cf. Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir. 1950) (assuming, in treason prosecution, that
Fourth Amendment applies to search of citizen's apartment by army of occupation).
340. See Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (use of Maria Jeritza's villa in Austria
as officers' club); Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (taking of radar equipment in
post-independence Philippines).
341. See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 475 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 488 (1956)
(following Krueger).
342. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 65 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); Krueger, 351 U.S. at 483-85
(1956) ("Reservation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter"); id. at 486 (Warren, CJ., Black and Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting). For an advocate's account, see Wiener, Persuading the Supreme Court to Reverse Itself: Reid
v. Covert, 14 LITIGATION 6 (Summer 1988).
343. 354 U.S. at 5-6 (Black, J., joined by Warren, C.., Douglas, and Brennan, JJ.) (footnotes omitted).
344. 140 U.S. 453 (1891). See supra text accompanying notes 279-84.
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applicability and its holding that the American Constitution cannot;345 here
he cited modem cases sustaining the exercise of jurisdiction on the nationality
principle, beginning with the 1922 case of United States v. Bowman.346
Black also permitted himself to conflate the application of constitutional
limitations in foreign countries with the application of constitutional limitations
in unincorporated territories.347 He suggested that the Insular Cases might
be distinguished "in that they involved the power of Congress to provide rules
and regulations to govern temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar tradi-
tions and institutions whereas here the basis for governmental power is Ameri-
can citizenship."' ' 8 But he made clear his dissatisfaction with those cases,
34 9
and their tendency to "destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and under-
mine the basis of our Government." 350 Black rejected judicial discretion to
identify "fundamental" rights applicable outside the continental United
States. 351 This was hardly surprising, given Black's ongoing campaign to
incorporate the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, both to protect
individual liberties prized by the Framers and to diminish reliance on the
subjective opinions of judges.352
Some have interpreted Black's opinion as adopting an organic law view of
the Constitution, dictating a universalist interpretation of constitutional
rights.353 Up until this point, universalism had played almost no role in Amer-
ican constitutionalism because the overwhelming acceptance of strict
territoriality, even for citizens, had focused attention on the question of how
closely the Constitution followed the flag. The second, third, and fourth sen-
tences of the paragraph quoted above might lend some support to a universalist
reading. But in other respects his opinion reveals a pronounced emphasis on
the citizenship of the defendants. The paragraph continues by citing as illustra-
tions of its principle St. Paul's assertion of the rights of Roman citizenship,
354
345. 354 U.S. at 12.
346. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
347. See 354 U.S. at 8-9 & nn.10-11, 12 n.19. This was only fair, since White had also conflated them,
for the opposite purpose, in Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 220 (1903) (White, J., concurring), and
Justice Clark had conflated them in the first hearing of Reid v. Covert; see also Kinsella v. Krueger, 351
U.S. 470, 474-76, 479 (1956).
348. 354 U.S. at 14.
349. Id. ("Moreover, it is our judgment that neither the cases nor their reasoning should be given any
further expansion.").
350. Id.
351. Id. at 9 ("[W]e can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and choosing among the
remarkable collection of 'Thou shalt nots' which were explicitly fastened on all departments and agencies
of the Federal government by the Constitution and its Amendments.").
352. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70-71, 90-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
353. See supra text accompanying note 29 (describing organic law argument).
354. 354 U.S. at 6; see ACTS 22:25-27. Black's citation ironically recalled his response to the use of
the same passage by Justice Jackson to support what Black considered an overemphasis on citizenship in
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950) (Jackson, J.) (habeas corpus unavailable to enemy aliens
in occupied Germany); see id. at 798 (Black, J., dissenting) (I would hold that our courts can exercise
[habeas] whenever any United States official illegally imprisons any person in any land we govern.")
(footnote omitted).
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and the British constitutional principle that Englishmen carry with them "the
duty of obedience to the lawful commands of the Sovereign, [and] ... all the
rights and liberties of British Subjects." '355
Black's plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert thus represents a modem realign-
ment of the municipal law approach, taking into fuller account the exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction over American citizens worldwide under the nationality
principle. The Bill of Rights not only follows the flag, but also follows every
United States citizen, just as the legislative power of Congress does. Black's
attitude of rigorous positivism resonates more with the views expressed in Jus-
tice Curtis's dissent in Scott v. Sandford than with those of the elder
Harlan.356 But all of Black's municipal law predecessors would agree with
him that "[t]he rights and liberties which citizens of our country enjoy.., have
been jealously preserved from the encroachments of Government by express
provisions of our written Constitution." '357
Justice Frankfurter and the second Justice Harlan filed separate concurring
opinions in Reid v. Covert. These Justices were, of course, defenders of a
restrained residuum of the substantive due process doctrine, and staunch
opponents of Black's incorporation theory of the Fourteenth Amendment.358
Frankfurter accordingly wrote with approval of White's methodology in the
Insular Cases. He agreed that the Constitution itself was everywhere applicable,
though some of its provisions might not be.359 Frankfurter observed:
The process of decision appropriate to the problem led to a detailed
examination of the relation of the specific "Territory" to the United
States. This examination, in its similarity to analysis in terms of "due
process," is essentially the same as that to be made in the present cases
in weighing congressional power to make "Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" against the safeguards of
Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.3
Harlan agreed that
the question is which guarantees of the Constitution should apply in
view of the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the
possible alternatives which Congress had before it. The question is one
of judgment, not of compulsion. And so I agree with my brother
Frankfurter that, in view of Ross and the Insular Cases, we have before
us a question analogous, ultimately, to issues of due process; one can
say, in fact, that the question of which specific safeguards of the Consti-
355. 354 U.S. at 6.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 266-67 and supra note 331.
357. 354 U.S. at 6-7 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833)).
358. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (Frankfurter, 3.).
359. See 354 U.S. at 51, 56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
360. Id. at 53.
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tution are appropriately to be applied in a particular context overseas
can be reduced to the issue of what process is "due" a defendant in the
particular circumstances of a particular case. 61
Frankfurter and Harlan explicitly limited their discussions to concluding that
the procedure at issue-military trial of civilian dependents, without indictment,
without jury, and in a capital case-failed this flexible test. Frankfurter ostenta-
tiously refused to state whether any lesser combination of these elements would
violate the Constitution.362 Harlan expressly stated that he remained persuaded
that affording jury trial to civilian dependents prosecuted for "run-of-the-mill
offenses" would be impractical for the very reasons of cost and difficulty of
administration that the dissenters considered sufficient to justify denial of jury
trial in capital cases.363
For the most part, Frankfurter and Harlan reasonedfrom the Insular Cases,
and not about them. They treated those cases as precedent for the proposition
that some degree of constitutional protection extended "overseas," and ex-
plained the exceptions as resting on practical, not theoretical, distinctions. They
did not ask what made federal jury trials more impractical, anomalous or
uncongenial" in the Territory of Puerto Rico in 1922 than in the State of
Louisiana in 1813.
Frankfurter and Harlan held out the possibility of more widespread constitu-
tional protection than had previously been afforded, but at the cost of diluting
its content. Their approach might support constitutional enforcement of bedrock
human rights, even those of aliens, against United States action in foreign
countries without "anomalous" extension of domestic institutions. On the other
hand, the "due process" inquiry freed itself of both constitutional text and natu-
ral law as either benchmarks or justifications. 365 The availability of a particu-
lar right would vary from context to context in accord with judicial evaluations
of practicality. This balancing approach contemplated an extraordinary degree
of both judicial discretion and deference to the choices of the political branches.
These characteristics were confirmed three years later in Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton366 and its companion cases, where Frankfurter and
Harlan were willing to extend the benefit of Reid v. Covert to civilian employ-
361. Id. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
362. See id. at 44-45 (Frankfurter, I. concurring).
363. Id. at 75-76 (Harlan, L, concurring). He reiterated this view, with Frankfurter's agreement, in his
dissenting opinion in Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 258 (1960) (Harlan, J.,joined
by Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying note 366.
364. See 354 U.S. at 51 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
365. The same may be said of Chief Justice Burger's recasting, whether deliberate or inadvertent, of
the test for applicability of constitutional rights in an unincorporated territory in Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442
U.S. 465 (1979).
366. 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960) (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see id. at 258 ("Those
problems are fraught with many factors that this Court is ill-equipped to assess, and involve important
national concerns into which we should be reluctant to enter except under the clearest sort of constitutional
compulsion.").
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ees of the armed services accused of capital crimes, but dissented from its
extension to noncapital crimes. Singleton should not be overlooked in a lawyer-
ly account of these developments, because in Singleton the Reid v. Covert
plurality garnered a majority. Justice Clark, bowing to precedent but rejecting
the discretionary due-process-balancing approach of the Frankfurter-Harlan
concurrence, gave his support to the requirement of civilian jury trial for the
broader class of prosecutions of civilian citizens abroad.3"
B. After Hegemony
As the Bill of Rights expanded under the Warren Court and the early
Burger Court, lower courts read Reid v. Covert broadly as confirming citizens'
rights against federal action on the high seas and in foreign countries. A
substantial body of criminal procedure cases resulted, as well as occasional
noncriminal cases.368 Some courts were hesitant to deny similar protection
to aliens abroad,369 and two well-known holdings boldly provided such pro-
tection.370 By 1987, the American Law Institute was prepared to restate as
to citizens: "The provisions of the United States Constitution safeguarding
individual rights . . . generally limit governmental authority whether it is
exercised in the United States or abroad, 3 71 but still regarded the rights of
aliens as less certain.372 At the same time, over the 1970's and 1980's, Ameri-
can self-confidence in global affairs was shrinking, and this era of limits
367. See id. (extending Reid v. Covert to dependents ofservice personnel accused ofnoncapital crimes);
Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (extending it from dependants of service personnel to civilian
employees of armed forces accused of capital crimes); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960)
(extending it to civilian employees of armed forces accused of noncapital crimes). Clark's opinions do not
include the same rhetorical emphasis that Black had placed on citizenship, but neither do they explicitly
argue for expanding the coverage of the case to noncitizens. Justices Whittaker and Stewart concurred in
the dependent case but dissented in the case of civilian employees; their opinion did call attention to the
citizenship of all these defendants. Singleton, 361 U.S. at 259-60.
368. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arelano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (due process
protection against military use of property in Honduras), vacated as moot, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Powell
v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (evidence seized under general warrant in Japan is inadmissible
in personnel action); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (First, Fourth,
and Sixth Amendment claims of citizens in Germany). Criminal procedure cases are collected in, for
example, Saltzburg, supra note 6.
369. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 915-17 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (leaving open constitutional
rights of nonresident alien regarding U.S. interference with Swiss bank account); Sami v. United States,
617 F.2d 755, 773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding no violation of rights in arrest of alien by foreign govern-
ment at U.S. request, even if such rights exists); United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1979)
(assuming alien on high seas has Fourth Amendment rights, search was nonetheless reasonable).
370. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments applicable to alleged search, interrogation under torture, and abduction of alien in Uruguay by federal
agents); United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979) (finding constitutional right to
jury trial in prosecution by U.S. authorities in Berlin).
371. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721 (1987).
372. Id. § 722 comment m ("Although the matter has not been authoritatively adjudicated, at least some




prompted arguments that the United States could ill afford constitutional
constraints not binding on its partners and rivals.373
Modem international law permits nations to apply their laws in certain
circumstances to actions taken by noncitizens outside the nation's territory,
because of the effects of those actions on the government, its territory, or
sometimes even its citizens outside the territory. Since the Second World War,
the United States has greatly increased its exercise of jurisdiction on these
bases, often to the alarm of our European allies.374 More recently, the United
States has intensified its efforts to combat the narcotics trade by prosecuting
aliens for acts committed far outside the United States. 375 Once these de-
fendants have been brought to the United States for prosecution, courts have
afforded them full substantive and procedural rights at trial under the Constitu-
tion, as even the strict territoriality rule would require.376
Courts have been more divided, however, in responding to Fourth Amend-
ment objections to search and seizure incidents occurring on the high seas or
in foreign countries.377 Such an incident finally gave the Supreme Court the
occasion to address the extraterritorial rights of aliens in the post-Reid v. Covert
world, in the 1990 case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. Verdugo-
Urquidez was an alleged Mexican druglord being prosecuted for narcotics
trafficking activities. By the time the case came to the Supreme Court,
Verdugo-Urquidez had been convicted in a separate prosecution for involvement
in the notorious torture-murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena Salazar.
Verdugo-Urquidez was seized by Mexican police and delivered into American
custody at a California border station. The next day, while he was incarcerated
in San Diego, DEA agents, in concert with Mexican police, searched his home
in Mexicali, Mexico and found business records of his narcotics smuggling
enterprise. A divided Ninth Circuit panel suppressed this evidence as having
been seized in violation of the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Court reversed, with six Justices (in three different opinions) agreeing
that the search should be upheld because the warrant clause of the Fourth
Amendment had no application to the search of a nonresident alien's property
in a foreign country. Three Justices dissented.
373. See H. KOH, THE NAnONAL SECURITY CONSTiTUTrON: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR 208-10 (1990).
374. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELAtIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-416; Symposium, Extraterritoriality of Economic Legislation, 50 LAW &
CONTIEP. PROBS. No. 3 (Summer 1987).
375. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903 (1988).
376. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1988) (ex post facto clause); United
States v. Ospina, 823 F.2d 429 (11th Cir. 1987) (grand jury); United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931 (1 1th
Cir. 1985) (due process notice requirements and ex post facto clause); United States v. Henriquez, 731 F.2d
131 (2d Cir. 1984) (due process and double jeopardy); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 281 (2d
Cir. 1974) (Anderson, J., concurring) (due process).
377. See, e.g., United States v. williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); id. at 1090 (Roney,
J., specially concurring); United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1979); Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267
(2d Cir. 1974); id. at 281 (Anderson, J., concurring in result).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was denominated an Opinion of the Court,
and Justice Kennedy purported to concur in it, but Kennedy's concurring
opinion diverged so greatly from Rehnquist's analysis and conclusions that
Rehnquist seemed to be really speaking for a plurality of four.37 Rehnquist
marshalled a series of arguments in the membership tradition, which individual-
ly pointed toward different but overlapping conclusions: (i) that Verdugo-
Urquidez had no Fourth Amendment rights at all, (ii) that aliens have no Fourth
Amendment rights with regard to United States government action abroad, and
(iii) that aliens have no constitutional rights whatsoever with regard to United
States government action abroad.
Verdugo-Urquidez was, unquestionably, within the United States at the time
the search in Mexico occurred. To say that he had no Fourth Amendment rights
at all, therefore, would involve a retreat from the traditional municipal law
approach to aliens' rights within the United States. Only four Justices, however,
lent credence to this argument.379 It relied on a tentative "textual exegesis"
of the Fourth Amendment's opening words: "The right of the people to be se-
cure ... ." Rehnquist suggested that "the people" was used as a "term of art"
in the Constitution, and "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community."380 Verdugo-Urquidez, hav-
ing been involuntarily brought into the United States shortly before the search,
was not within this class.38'
378. See 110 S. Ct. at 1066-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The other three members of the plurality
were Justices White, O'Connor and Scalia. Justice Stevens concurred only in the judgment, finding the
search reasonable and the warrant clause inapplicable outside the jurisdiction of the United States "because
American magistrates have no power to authorize such searches," and finding broader comment unnecessary.
Id. at 1068 & n.*. Justice Blackmun dissented, on grounds relating to the unreasonableness of the search,
but he also believed the warrant clause was inapplicable. Cf. infra text accompanying note 401 (discussing
Blackmun's approach to the warrant clause). Justice Kennedy addressed the warrant issue at length, but it
is difficult to ascertain what position he took regarding reasonableness. See 110 S. Ct. at 1068 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
379. Justice Kennedy specifically rejected this argument. See 110 S. Ct. at 1067-68 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
380. Id. at 1061. This argument, which Rehnquist characterized as "by no means conclusive," id., seems
to be a makeweight, and the Justices of the plurality seem not to have considered its implications carefully.
I do not think that anyone, and certainly not Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice White, has previously argued
that the "People" of the Preamble or the "people" to whom powers not delegated were reserved by the Tenth
Amendment included resident aliens, let alone the broader class described here. See Toll v. Moreno, 458
U.S. 1, 25-49 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (White, J.);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649-64 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Foley v. Connelie,
435 U.S. 291, 292-300 (1978) (Burger, CJ., joined by Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.).
Rehnquist's argument should imply a much greater convergence between citizenship and resident alien status
than previous case law indicates. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution,
7 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 9 (1990).
381. 110 S. Ct. at 1064. The argument that a defendant has no Fourth Amendment rights because she
is in the country involuntarily is shocking and unacceptable. To argue that searches of the body cavities
ofaprisoner in a San Diego jail who has recently been brought into the United States by force are unlimited
by the Fourth Amendment would be a perversion of the notion of the moral relevance of consent. In one
sense, this argument is deeply faithful to American tradition: slaves were involuntarily in the country, and
they had no constitutional rights either.
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Rehnquist next turned to the argument for the narrower proposition that
nonresident aliens have no Fourth Amendment rights against searches and
seizures of their property abroad, which was what the Opinion actually de-
scribed itself as holding.382 He cited historical data indicating the Framers'
primary concern with searches within the United States, and their probable
assumption that the Fourth Amendment did not limit searches and seizures on
the high seas during the quasi-war with France in the 1790's.383 If these data
suggest anything, however, it is that no one has Fourth Amendment rights
outside the nation's borders, which of course was the prevailing view under
both municipal law and membership approaches until Reid v. Covert.
The opinion reached stronger ground with a formalist argument from
precedent: no prior case holds that aliens have constitutional rights against
United States action abroad, some cases have denied that they have such rights,
and the Insular Cases hold that even American citizens have less than full
constitutional rights in "unincorporated territories. '' 31 This is perfectly true.
To find that aliens have extraterritorial constitutional rights would be an
extension of prior law. Reid v. Covert does not require such an extension as
a matter of precedent, because Reid v. Covert involved citizens.385 Of course,
that does not suffice to explain why the recognition of extraterritorial constitu-
tional rights in Reid v. Covert does not destroy the persuasive power of the
earlier precedents.
Finally, at the end of his opinion, Rehnquist gave two linked reasons why
aliens should not have extraterritorial Fourth Amendment rights. First, grave
uncertainties would be created for the United States' employment of armed
force abroad in non-law-enforcement situations.3 6 Second, conditions abroad
often differ from local conditions in ways that would make observance of
constitutional requirements an inappropriate hindrance to law enforcement
382. See id. at 1059.
383. Id. at 1061-62. The opinion mentioned only seizures of foreign vessels, but the statutes and the
cases of the period also involve seizures of American vessels trading with France. See id. at 1062 (citing
Act of February 9, 1799, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64 (1804).
384. 110 S. Ct. at 1062-63.
385. Id. at 1063. Moreover, Rehnquist emphasized that Black's opinion in Reid v. Covert was only
a plurality opinion, and that Frankfurter and Harlan had concurred on narrower grounds that did not
guarantee even a citizen full constitutional rights in foreign territory. Id. The Court gave no weight to the
fact that a fifth Justice later joined in rejecting the methodology of the Frankfurter-Harlan concurrence. See
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (extending Reid v. Covert to dependents
of service personnel accused of noncapital crimes); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (same for
civilian employees of armed forces).
386. 110 S. Ct. at 1065-66. He understandably did not mention the example of mixed law-enforcement
and non-law-enforcement activity that could not have been far from the Justices' minds-the December
1989 invasion of Panama to topple and arrest General Noriega. See Leich, Contemporary Practice of the
United StatesRelating to International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 536,547 (1990) (quoting State Department's
identification of U.S. objectives as: "(1) to protect American lives; (2) to assist the lawful and democratically
elected government in Panama in fulfilling its international obligations; (3) to seize and arrest General
Noriega, an indicted drug trafficker, and (4) to defend the integrity of United States rights under the Panama
Canal treaties.").
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activities. "For better or worse, we live in a world of nation-states in which our
Government must be able to 'functio[n] effectively in the company of sovereign
nations."' 387 At least as regards the Fourth Amendment, this is an unabashed-
ly Hobbesian membership approach.38
Kennedy purported to concur in the majority opinion, but formulated his
reasons quite differently. He denied that the reference to "the people" in the
Fourth Amendment had any limiting significance.389 Kennedy maintained that
"the Constitution does not create, nor do general principles of law create, any
juridical relation between our country and some undefined, limitless class of
noncitizens who are beyond our territory.''39° Things might be different
extraterritorially with regard to citizens, "as to whom the United States has
continuing obligations. '39 ' Kennedy explicitly positioned himself in the line
of Harlan's concurrence in Reid v. Covert, tracking its reasoning and quoting
it at length.392 He adopted the view that the question of what the Constitution
requires abroad "can be reduced to the issue of what process is 'due' a defen-
dant in the particular circumstances of a particular case. '393 Extending the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement to extraterritorial searches of aliens'
property would be "impracticable and anomalous; '' 39 Kennedy apparently
believed that this was always true as regards aliens, but left open the issue of
extraterritorial searches of citizens' property.395 In other respects, Kennedy
wrote narrowly ii la Harlan, agreeing to uphold the present search without
stating categorically that nonresident aliens always lacked extraterritorial rights
under the Fourth Amendment's "unreasonable searches" clause.396
The dissenters responded with municipal law arguments, although Justice
Brennan's opinion sometimes went further. Himself a member of the Reid v.
387. 110 S. Ct. at 1066. Rehnquist did not really explain why the extraterritorial constitutional rights
of American citizens might not also hinder these goals. In fact, Rehnquist was quoting from Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (upholding involuntary denationalization in response to voting in foreign
election as rational means of achieving foreign policy goals), overruled, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967).
388. See infra text accompanying notes 432-39; cf. Terrorism, supra note 7 (advocating Hobbesian
approach).
389. 110 S. Ct. at 1067 (Kennedy, L, concurring).
390. Id. at 1066 (Kennedy, J., concurring). It is hard to give this proposition a sensible meaning that
is not false. It might mean merely that there is no special legal relationship between this country and
everyone, which would be true but tautologous. General principles of law do give our government rights
against this vast class of noncitizens, e.g., the right that they not enter its territory without its permission,
as the Court has been fond of observing. If Kennedy meant that there is no juridical relation that benefits
the aliens, then he is overlooking general principles of international human rights law, as well as the domes-
tic constitutional doctrine that due process places certain limits on the authority of American courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident alien defendants. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
391. 110 S. Ct. at 1068.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 1068 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 75).
394. Id. at 1067.




Covert plurality, Brennan placed his argument in that tradition. He characterized
the municipal law argument as one of "mutuality":
Respondent is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment
because our Government, by investigating him and attempting to hold
him accountable under United States criminal laws, has treated him as
a member of our community for purposes of enforcing our laws. He has
become, quite literally, one of the governed.
397
Other portions of his opinion, however, suggested that security against unrea-
sonable searches was a natural right incorporated by the Framers in the Consti-
tution,398 and that it might also restrict non-law-enforcement actions in pursuit
of national security in peacetime.399
Justice Blackmun's brief dissent aligned itself with Brennan's municipal
law argument, but disassociated itself from any suggestion of broader applica-
bility to circumstances in which the government did not "purport to exercise
sovereign authority over the foreign national."'  Blackmun, moreover, would
limit the content of extraterritorial Fourth Amendment protection, at least as
regards noncitizens, to the "unreasonable searches" clause; he expressed agree-
ment with the Government's argument that "an American magistrate's lack of
power to authorize a search abroad renders the Warrant Clause inapplica-
ble .... ."0t A conclusion of this kind remains possible under the municipal
law approach as an interpretation of a particular clause.' °2
Thus, Verdugo-Urquidez reflects the same lack of consensus about the
proper scope of American constitutionalism as did Reid v. Covert and the first
Insular Cases: substantial blocs of Justices subscribe to opposing theories, and
no single approach attracts a majority. An exploration of the history of these
disputes has revealed the political and jurisprudential assumptions underlying
these varying approaches, and demonstrates that the distance between
Rehnquist's opinion and Kennedy's concurrence is wider than a superficial
397. Id. at 1070-71 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J, dissenting). He quoted the relevant passage
from Madison's Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts. Id.
398. Id. at 1073.
399. Id. at 1075. This would seem, then, to be an argument of universalism, resting on either natural
law or "organic act" bases, or both.
400. Id. at 1077-78 (Blackmun, L, dissenting) (emphasis in original).
401. Id. at 1078.
402. It could be argued, for example, that a warrant to search a residence is required only when its
issuance can serve the three classical purposes of a warrant: to make the officer's intrusion into the residence
privileged (as a defense against civil or criminal liability), to form the basis for an obligation of the
homeowner not to interfere with the search (typically backed by a criminal sanction), and to safeguard
constitutional privacy interests. Cf. Act of July31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 24,27, 1 Stat. 43-44 (customs warrants);
T. TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41-44 (1969) (emphasizing affirmative
character of warrants); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *288 ("It is therefore in fact no warrant at
all: for it will not justify the officer who acts under it .... "). Interpreting the warrant clause this way would
seem, however, to imply that citizens in foreign countries may also be unprotected, and that both aliens
and citizens could still be protected on the high seas and in enclaves for which a true warrant can be issued.
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reading might suggest. Demographics may indicate that, for the present, Ameri-
can law is facing a choice between the Kennedy-Frankfurter-Harlan global due
process approach and Rehnquist's Hobbesian membership approach. I shall
argue in the next Part, however, that the area of agreement between the
Brennan and Blackmun dissents-a form of the municipal law ap-
proach-represents the best account of American constitutionalism.
V. ASSERTING OBLIGATION
To resolve the question of the proper scope of the individual rights provi-
sions of the United States Constitution, it is useful to ask what rights in a
constitution are for, and in particular what United States constitutional rights
are for. The general question may receive different answers in different consti-
tutional traditions, and consequently the scope of rights under different constitu-
tions may vary. I shall argue here that the municipal law approach best reflects
the function of individual rights in American constitutionalism.
As an interpretive enterprise, this inquiry has interrelated normative and
descriptive aspects. The scope of constitutional rights under a given constitution
cannot be determined in isolation from the constitutional text and an awareness
of the range of rights protected under that constitution.4°3 An interpretive
inquiry must also pay close attention to the constitutional tradition's own
understanding of the function of constitutional rights, to the extent that this can
be ascertained. Determinations regarding the scope of rights should preferably
be coherent with other constitutional practices regarding the place of the
constituted government in the world at large.
In the case of American constitutionalism, this Article has demonstrated
conflicting conceptions of geographical scope that have led to serious indetermi-
nacy in the modern period. Descriptive inquiries can go only so far; sparse case
results can be reported, but in some respects the status quo cannot be described
with sufficient certainty even to be critiqued. The question of scope must be
resolved primarily by deliberative choice among alternative approaches on the
basis of their normative characteristics and their coherence with less unsettled
constitutional practices.
The United States Constitution has long been understood as a fundamental
law within the meaning of the social contract tradition-a design for govern-
ment and limitations on government that protect the interests of the governed
sufficiently to form part of a justification of their obligation of obedience to
403. The latter constraint is familiar from other contexts-for example, accounts of the function of
the Fourteenth Amendment must grapple with the presence of such provisions as the Second and Seventh
Amendments in the Bill of Rights, and accounts of Fifth Amendment due process must grapple with the
absence of any express equal protection clause applicable to the federal government.
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it. Establishing a legitimate government empowers that government to
generate obligations that would not exist in anarchy or a state of nature.
Under the Constitution, the legitimation of those obligations rests on several
elements. First, the Constitution creates a republic, in particular a representative
democracy in which the actions of the federal government are subject to the
check of periodic elections. The Constitution sets up a framework within which
the government is to be structured, distributing powers to institutions both for
reasons of efficacy and to create the well-known checks and balances. Both the
original Constitution and the subsequent amendments also contain guarantees
of particular rights, limitations on the content of government activity and the
modes of its exercise, without which the people were reluctant to confer
authority upon the government. From the perspectives of 1790 and perhaps of
1890, some of the individual rights provisions of the Constitution represented
direct protections of natural rights, while others were more indirectly justified;
in 1990 there is less widespread agreement on the existence of "natural" or
supra-positive rights.
Although American constitutionalism attributes part of the legitimacy of the
government's authority to the consent derived from periodic elections, political
rights have always been limited to an electorate narrower than the full class of
persons within the nation's territory subject to that authority. Originally. the
electorate was quite narrow; even today, children, felons, and aliens may be
excluded. The nonpolitical, individual rights' ° have always been more widely
distributed.
The rationale of the municipal law approach has been the presumption that
American constitutional rights and the obligation of obedience to American law
go together; particular provisions may be more narrowly interpreted because
of textual or structural arguments but, in the absence of contrary indications,
the rights and the obligations are coextensive. Law here includes not only
legislation, but also judicial or executive acts that impose obligation. The
constitutional rights of aliens present within the territory (whether resident or
just passing through) correlate with their pervasive subjection to the law (the
"local allegiance" of English common law).
The nineteenth-century idea that constitutional rights follow the flag, but
go no further, reflected a conviction as to the incomplete nature of legal
obligation outside the sovereign's territory. The United States generates obliga-
tions only in some of the contexts in which it acts; in other contexts the United
States is merely one participant (though in recent years, a major participant)
in an international order whose rules it cannot dictate. The notion that particular
404. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 106 (1978) (purpose of Constitution is to set
out political scheme whose burdens on citizens can be justified as fair); G. WOOD, supra note 50, at 289-91,
600-02; see also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 353-55 (1971) (relating general obligation to obey
legislation to adoption of just constitution).
405. The terminological distinction between political and civil rights has lost its currency.
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states are endowed with particular territories over which they exercise sover-
eignty derives from that order, and was assumed as a background rule by the
authors of the Constitution.
In fact, however, United States law has never been completely restricted
to United States territory. ° As the exercise of extraterritorial legislative
power has become more frequent, the normative purpose of the municipal law
approach requires broader application. The Reid v. Covert plurality recognized
that need with regard to citizens abroad, who are subject to national legislative
power absent exceptional circumstances. Since that time, courts have strug-
gled with the availability of constitutional rights to aliens abroad, whose
subjection to United States law is the exception rather than the rule, depending
on particular circumstances linking their conduct to the United States. Under
the municipal law approach, when the United States asserts an alien's obligation
to comply with American law, the alien is presumptively entitled pro hac vice
to all constitutional rights.408
The value of the municipal law approach in enabling constitutional rights
to serve their intended functions may be examined in a progression of contexts:
A. The Insular Cases
From the normative perspective of the naturalist tradition, the Insular Cases
were grievously wrong. For the federal government to acquire total governing
power over new territories-more complete, in fact, than in the states-without
the consent of the local population and without according them (or according
transplanted citizens) the rights reserved under the Constitution raises starkly
the question of how the exercise of such governing power can be legitimated.
The Insular Cases did meet the naturalist tradition part way by recognizing and
making judicially enforceable certain "fundamental" guarantees, seemingly the
minimum core of natural rights.l But, as the elder Harlan so patriotically
protested, this constitutionalism was not our constitutionalism. 410 And when
one recognizes that the ultimate justification for this reversal of constitutional
practice was to facilitate emulation of European colonial powers and rule over
406. See, e.g., Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 20 (forbidding participation by United States
citizens and residents in slave trade from one foreign country to another).
407. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1952); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402, 403, 441 (1987).
408. Again, specific textual or other arguments may exceptionally demonstrate that a particular right
is either reserved to citizens or geographically limited.
409. See supra text accompanying note 321.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 329-31. The Insular Cases cannot be theoretically defended
by juxtaposing them with the then-current Fourteenth Amendment due process doctrine, because the
populations of the states were protected against the federal government by the entire Bill of Rights and in
theory had full power to design state constitutional protections against their own state governments. The
Insular Cases did not provide, and were not designed to provide, a vehicle for constitutional self-determina-
tion by the subject peoples.
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peoples "unfit" for American citizenship," the lowering of normative stan-
dards seems all the more a betrayal.
It might be argued that, however wrong they were at the beginning of the
century, the passage of time has woven the Insular Cases into the fabric of
American constitutionalism. But, from a contemporary perspective, that claim
also fails. No persuasive normative basis for the Insular Cases has been put
forward, and the holding in Reid v. Covert,"2 not just Black's opinion, se-
verely undermined their foundation. It is hard to see the coherence of an
approach that leads to the conclusion that American citizens cannot be tried by
the federal government for capital offenses without jury trial in Japan, but can
be so tried in Puerto Rico 3
B. Territoriality and the Rights of Citizens Abroad
The long survival of strict territoriality, on the other hand, had a severe
logic of its own. The distinction between being inside and outside the borders
of the United States is not a constitutional irrelevancy. The Constitution is an
artifact of an era of territorial nation-states, and that era is not yet over. The
Constitution obviously intends that the United States will have a territory, and
that the federal government will place a high priority on maintaining its domi-
nance vis-5-vis other nation-states in that territory. Text and legislative history
confirm that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizenship at birth only to
persons born within United States territory, precisely because they are subject
to the fullest measure of United States sovereignty.4 4 The legal obligation
of even citizens in foreign countries to comply with United States law, especial-
ly outside relatively tight-knit enclaves like ships and military bases, is extreme-
ly difficult to administer and enforce. The difficulties may be especially severe
when the citizen is a dual national residing in her other country of nationality.
Thus, the conceptual dodge that was used to justify strict territoriality-that
municipal law was not binding of its own force, and so neither was the Consti-
tution4 1 -did not wholly lack a basis in reality.
Nonetheless, relying on this difference of degree to make constitutional
rights unavailable to citizens on the high seas or in foreign countries creates
serious anomalies that become increasingly visible as the exercise of govern-
ment power abroad becomes more frequent. First, deciding whether government
action against an individual has occurred inside or outside the United States
involves familiar difficulties of situs. For example, if the State Department
411. See supra text accompanying note 320.
412. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
413. See supra text accompanying notes 322, 334, 359-64.
414. See Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657 (1927); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898); Neuman, supra note 176.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 282-84.
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declares that an individual is no longer a United States citizen, that action could
be viewed as taking place at the location where the decision was made, at the
location where the individual was at the time, or at the location where the
decision first had practical consequences for the individual (for example, she
was refused permission to board a flight from Paris to New York). Second, to
the extent that the government is constitutionally bound within but not beyond
its borders, it possesses substantial power to manipulate constitutional limi-
tations by choosing where and when to act against citizens who make the error
of traveling or acquiring property abroad, or of submitting to military service.
Given that the drafting of the Bill of Rights reflected inattention to the
problematics of government activity abroad rather than a conscious effort to
design entitlements solely for application within the territory, the overthrow of
strict territoriality represents an appropriate evolutionary response to changes
in the technology of transportation and communication, background internation-
al practices, and American self-assertion. The question then arises which
constitutional rights are extraterritorially applicable.416
Although the municipal law approach combines the greatest degree of
historical fidelity and contemporary normative plausibility, even the antiquated
strict territoriality rule would have greater legitimacy than the infinitely flexible
approach of Frankfurter and the younger Harlan. If Justices wish to disincorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights vis-i-vis federal government action against citizens
abroad, they need an alternative theory of constitutionalism to justify their
interference with the political branches.417 Frankfurter and Harlan's touchstone
was a "due process" equating with "fundamental fairness" in light of practicali-
ty.418 This approach to judicial review of federal action lacked even the mod-
est textual grounding of their parallel approach to state action under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Moreover, by jettisoning claims of a substituted normative
foundation in natural law,419 they further compounded the error of the Insular
Cases. If Justices no longer believe in objective natural rights, then they have
even less justification for adopting an approach that tends, in Black's apt words,
to "destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our
Government."420
416. It bears repetition that the municipal law approach merely makes constitutional rights presumptive-
ly applicable; other inputs into interpretation of particular provisions may rebut the presumption. See, e.g.,
supra text accompanying notes 401-02 and note 402.
417. Here and later in this Part, I discuss approaches to constitutional scope as being judicially
implemented. I do not mean thereby to place undue stress on questions of judicial enforcement. Rather this
usage reflects the fact that the Supreme Court has usually discussed questions of constitutional scope on
the merits, without hiding behind barriers ofjusticiability. The same problems would arise in a conscientious
attempt by the legislatureor the executive to comply with constitutional constraints.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 358-61, 365.
419. Compare text accompanying notes 358-66 with text accompanying notes 321-22.
420. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957). Probably no more than a footnote is deserved by another
suggestion, which has not been made, namely equating the "fundamental" and therefore binding constitution-
al rights of United States citizens abroad against the federal government with their rights under international
human rights law. As a purely normative matter, this suggestion should lose its appeal once it is recognized
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C. Aliens Abroad after the Fall of Territoriality
Once the taboo against treating constitutional rights as effective beyond the
nation's boundaries has been overcome, the question arises whether this devel-
opment should be restricted to citizens. The legacy of the Alien Act debates
includes the fundamental rejection of the claim that citizenship is the key to
right-bearing capacity under the Constitution.42' Moreover, not even the Ins-
ular Cases relied on a distinction between the rights of American citizens and
the rights of subject peoples in the territories.4" Are the rights of aliens whol-
ly dependent on presence within the United States?
Rather than dwell on the intermediate category of resident aliens, I will
proceed directly to the hardest case: aliens outside the United States who have
never been inside the United States. The United States has increasingly asserted
the right to subject such persons to American law when their actions outside
the country have effects within the country or on American citizens. If we ask
how a constitution could legitimate the exercise of such power over aliens
abroad, the social contract tradition provides three relevant alternatives 4n3
First, the municipal law approach affords the express protections of funda-
mental law, to the extent their terms permit, as a condition for subjecting a
person to the nation's law. Second, the minimum that a naturalist approach
would tolerate would be extending to aliens abroad a supplementary fundamen-
tal law including only those protections directly required by natural law.
Finally, a Hobbesian approach disdains the legitimation of the exercise of power
outside the commonwealth, because "the Infliction of what evill soever, on an
Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-
wealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law
of Nature."'
I shall first say more about the specification of the municipal law approach,
and contrast it with universalism. Then I shall compare it with its other leading
rivals: the Hobbesian denial that constitutionalism extends to aliens abroad, and
the more minimal extraterritorial supplement to the Constitution currently
represented by global due process.
that international human rights standards have not been offered as a sufficient constitution for all societies,
but rather as a uniform minimum standard of rights that can be agreed upon notwithstanding cultural diver-
sity. A citizen of the United States may appropriately expect more from her government than the interna-
tional minimum standard.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 159-88.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 313-15.
423. A fourth alternative, treating the people ofeach country in accordance with their own constitution,
has little relevance today for a number of reasons, of which the most obvious may be that so many countries
have democratic constitutions, and the United States would not be prepared to extend political rights to
foreign populations in return for the right to apply its laws to them.
424. T. HOBBFS, supra note 53, at 360. Of course, the third approach may be viewed as a special case
of the second approach, with the additional Hobbesian assumption that natural law imposes no constraints
in this context.
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1. Municipal Law and Universalism
I initially described the municipal law approach as identifying a sphere in
which a nation's municipal law operates, which was once defined in geograph-
ical terms but now is viewed more broadly. This description reifies the sphere
of municipal law, and may obscure bases for disagreement over how that sphere
should be identified. For example, the United States government sometimes acts
in foreign countries in circumstances where it is claiming no authority over the
foreign nationals with whom it interacts. The action may be consensual-the
United States might offer financial assistance to a foreign political party whose
ideology it favors, or contract for the purchase of supplies needed at an over-
seas office-or nonconsensual-an American intelligence agent may engage
in surveillance that violates the privacy rights of a foreign national under local
law, but the foreign national is under no obligation to cooperate.
The municipal law approach, as I have been arguing for it, defines the
relevant sphere transactionally, extending constitutional rights to aliens abroad
only in those situations in which the United States claims an individual's
obedience to its commands on the basis of its legitimate authority.4 5 To use
Rehnquist's example,426 the municipal law approach would not limit the sei-
zure of French vessels during a state of limited war, nor would it restrict an
ideologically-based policy of aid to foreign political parties.
A more expansive view of the municipal law approach might be offered
by a universalist seeking support in social contract theory. The universalist
would argue that the relevant sphere is now the planet Earth. There are federal
statutes to which the United States demands universal obedience-foreign
nationals abroad are legally forbidden to arrange for smuggling of drugs into
the United States, to counterfeit the coinage of the United States, and so
forth-and the universalist would conclude that all the world's population have
become subjects of the American social contract. Accordingly, the United States
would be required to recognize and respect their constitutional rights in all the
contexts in which it interacts with them.
425. This does not mean that forcible, lawless interactions between the government and the individual
within the government's own territory are outside the scope of the municipal law approach. An argument
of Lea Brilmayer's suggests that the United States would equally need a justification for dropping a bomb
on Libya and for dropping a bomb on Philadelphia. See L. BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL AcTS
90-104 (1989). I do not disagree with this proposition as stated, but if the argument were to be transposed
to the field of constitutionalism viewed in light of social contract theory in a world of territorial nation-states,
then a major difference between the examples would result. The government claims an overriding right to
control the use of force within its territory, to suppress rivals and to overcome resistance, or at least to
dictate when resistance is permissible. Thus, even government lawlessness within the territory places its
victim in a situation pervasively framed by the government's law and claims of obedience. The government
claims no such overriding authority in foreign territory, and there can be occasions when its use of force
there implicates no claims of sovereignty over the victims. Therefore the need for justification remains, but
the criteria and forum for justification may differ in the two instances.
426. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1061-62 (1990).
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The rejection of universalism, in this guise or any other, as a methodology
for interpreting the Constitution rests on both historical and normative grounds.
The universalist's interpretation would transcend the concerns of a single social
contract and bind the government to the rules of a just world order, regulating
the international use of armed force and injustices arising from the global
distribution of wealth. A constitution could serve that function, but nothing in
the text or history of the United States Constitution suggests that it offers itself
as a solution to this broader problem.
The Constitution confers warmaking powers, but contains no specification
of the permissible occasions for their use. As Madison wrote in The Federalist,
defending Congress's authority to raise armies in time of peace, "If a federal
Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other
nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own govern-
ment, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety."'427 Similarly, the
Constitution restricts the ability of United States officials to accept gifts from
foreign nations,4 28 but does not correspondingly limit United States efforts
to purchase influence abroad. The Constitution authorizes Congress to collect
taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States, 29 without ex-
pressly binding the government to humanitarian foreign aid policies. Although
the United States has gained in strength and security since the eighteenth
century, American constitutional tradition has persistently left open the sub-
stance of the United States' international relations, a fact reflected in the refusal
to make international law as such constitutionally binding on Congress and the
President.4 0
One may concede that a human being has moral rights against coercion or
manipulation by other persons or groups that are not asserting sovereignty over
her, and still decline to adopt a universalist approach to the interpretation of
constitutional rights. The individual rights provisions of the Constitution do not
purport to state moral duties that are owed by all persons and groups; rather,
they state more exacting requirements that American citizens considered
necessary constraints on the government's exercise of sovereignty. Some of
these requirements may also be universal obligations, but the Constitution
includes too full a list to be read as if they all were. It might make sense to
design a two-track constitution that makes separately enforceable both the
government's universal obligations and the broader set of obligations it incurs
as sovereign. But the United States Constitution is not written that way. Univer-
salism would overburden the government by attempting to enforce in the
broader context constraints chosen for the narrower one.
427. THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (. Madison) (defending Congress' authority to raise armies in time of
peace).
428. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 8.
429. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
430. See, e.g., Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. L INT'L L. 930 (1986).
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Conversely, universalism could also pose dangers to constitutional rights
at home. As has been recognized in other contexts, constitutional protections
may suffer dilution when they are extended into areas previously thought
outside their coverage. Arguments for limiting the rights in their new applica-
tion have a way of filtering back to undermine the original core.43'
Thus, constitutional rights should not be interpreted as restricting all govern-
ment action against all persons in all places, even when the government does
not assert its sovereignty over the individual. This does not mean that such uses
of force or wealth are immune from demands for justification, but simply that
the standards of justification are not to be sought in the United States Constitu-
tion.
2. Against Hobbism
A Hobbesian would take Madison's caution against rigid constitutional
restrictions on the raising of armies4 32 much further, and deny constitutional
rights in all circumstances to aliens abroad. This Hobbesian strain is easily
identified in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Verdugo-Urquidez opinion: no minimum
of personal or domestic privacy remains enforceable through the core of the
Fourth Amendment, and the alien's rightlessness results from his nonmember-
ship in the community. In characterizing this position as Hobbesian, I am not
placing exaggerated emphasis either on the location of rights in a constitution
or on judicial review. Rehnquist did not argue that the contours of Fourth
Amendment rights abroad were merely nonjusticiable, or that aliens' privacy
rights were adequately protected by nonconstitutional law. He specifically en-
couraged the executive and legislative branches to feel that they were not
constitutionally constrained in searching aliens' property abroad, and that there
were no limits on their power unless they chose to create some.433
The standard defense of a Hobbesian approach to extraterritorial action rests
on national insecurity. The Commonwealth is in a state of nature, i.e. War, with
the rest of the world, and its only external obligations are those resulting from
explicit promises; the Hobbesian fears being unilaterally disarmed.434 But
Hobbes understood well the consequences of this theory for legal obligation:
a Commonwealth may exercise force against outsiders, but persons within the
territory of Commonwealth B generally have no obligation to obey the laws
of Commonwealth A.435 Thus the Hobbesian argument would enable the gov-
431. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 118 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIUTIONAL LAW 701 (2d ed. 1988).
432. See supra text accompanying note 427.
433. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1065-66 (1990).
434. See T. HOBBES, supra note 53, at 360; Terrorism, supra note 7, at 850-51; see also T. POGGE,
REALIZING RAWLS 220-27 (1989) (giving critical description of modem world order in Hobbesian terms).
435. See T. HOBBES, supra note 53, at 272-73, 345.
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emiment to withhold constitutional rights, but only at the price of delegitimating
its claim to obedience.
The Hobbesian also faces another obstacle. He must explain how one could
justify grafting a Hobbesian approach to the rights of aliens abroad onto an
otherwise anti-Hobbesian constitutional tradition.
The Hobbesian might argue that interactions between a government and
aliens outside its territory, unlike interactions between the government and its
citizens or aliens within its territory, lie outside the sphere of social contract
analysis because of the absence of consent. Claims about the actual or tacit
consent of citizens and of aliens within the territory to government authority
may be predicated on retention of citizenship or entering or failing to leave the
territory, but, when a nation extends its laws to aliens abroad, there is no action
by which these aliens can withdraw themselves from the class of the "gov-
erned," and conversely no act that can be interpreted as expressing actual or
tacit consent.
Given the impossibility of finding consent, the Hobbesian would assert that
contractarian arguments could not justify legislative power over aliens abroad,
and that the Constitution should not be extended in an attempt at justification
doomed to failure. Many would respond, however, that this argument rests on
a distinction without a difference; authors since Hume have emphasized the
strained character of claims of the actual or tacit consent, as opposed to hypo-
thetical consent, even of later generations of citizens. 36
The Hobbesian cannot shrug off these criticisms by asserting that, regardless
of what more careful thinkers have concluded, American constitutional tradition
has incorporated this flawed dependence on actual or tacit consent. Such an
assertion would be belied by juxtaposing the Hobbesian approach to rights of
nonresident aliens abroad with the treatment of the same individuals as criminal
defendants or civil litigants in the courts of the United States. If we take
seriously the Hobbesian claim that these aliens have no constitutional rights
abroad at all, then it would seem to follow that there are no constitutional limits
on the content of the laws to which they may be subjected,437 at least so long
as the imposition of sanctions does not take place within the United States.43
For example, the United States could make it a crime for a foreign national
abroad to publish a defense of the moral propriety of international terrorism,
to terminate her pregnancy by an American male without his consent, to refuse
436. See D. HuME, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 475 (E.
Miller ed. 1985); see, e.g., D. GAUTHIER, MORAL DEALING: CONTRACT, ETHICS AND REASON 53-57 (1990);
J. HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION 266-79 (1986); J. RAWLS, supra note 404,
at 12.
437. As opposed to limits derived from international law, with which Congress is under no constitution-
al compulsion to comply.
438. Surely the passage of legislation within the United States is not sufficient to trigger constitutional
protection unavailable outside its borders; it does not make sense to say that decisions made by executive
officials overseas are not constrained by constitutional rights, while enactment of legislation by Congress,
including legislation defining the powers of those officials, is so constrained.
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the CIA permission to install listening devices in her home, or to preach
"fundamentalist" Islam. Congress could set up tribunals on military bases or
naval vessels, where the procedure at trial would be free of constitutional
constraints. Executing the sentence abroad might provide the greatest flexibility,
but so long as the punishment were not cruel and unusual, it might even be
possible to execute it in the United States.4 39
In contrast, American courts have not treated foreign defendants brought
involuntarily into United States territory for trial virtually as enemies to be dealt
with at will. Courts have generally assumed that their authority over such
defendants must be exercised within the bounds of constitutional constraint,
including the constitutional rights that govern trial procedure, and that the
substance of the criminal statutes said to have been violated abroad is subject
to judicial review.
Why should the nonresident alien defendant become protected by the Bill
of Rights when brought into the United States for trial? As Chief Justice
Rehnquist accurately observed in Verdugo-Urquidez, the fact of being extradited
or kidnapped into the United States does not itself signify the alien's undertak-
ing of any voluntary, consensual relation with the United States. Conceivably
the more effective subjection of the defendant to obligations of compliance with
United States law after arrival in the United States favors extension of constitu-
tional rights to the defendant. But civil defendants, whose presence in the
United States is not required for the litigation to proceed at all, 41 are also
entitled to constitutional protections at trial. And in the civil context, the
Supreme Court has held that the very absence of minimum contacts between
an alien defendant and the jurisdiction creates a due process right to have the
court dismiss the lawsuit." 2
Thus, the character of the defendant as a nonresident alien, or even as an
alien who has never entered the United States, does not determine the applica-
bility of a wide range of constitutional provisions when the courts of the United
States are proceeding to judgment. Before Reid v. Covert, this phenomenon
could be rationalized by treating the situs of the litigation as determinative
under a theory of the territoriality of constitutional obligation, but that argument
can no longer be sincerely employed.
Instead, as I have argued, observance of constitutional limitations in a trial
in federal district court against a nonresident alien defendant rests on the role
439. This was true, for example, under the consular court system upheld in In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453
(1891). See supra text accompanying notes 279-81.
440. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
441. The difference between criminal and civil defendants depends on the United States' attitude toward
criminal trials in absentia. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 422(2) comment c(iii)
& reporters' note 6 (1987); id. § 475 comment h; cf. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *313.
442. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. SuperiorCourt, 480 U.S. 102(1987);HelicopterosNaionales
de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694 (1982).
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that the system of constitutional rights plays in legitimating the United States'
assertion of legal obligation against the alien. That same consideration would
also require its application in an extraterritorial tribunal of the United States.
3. Against "Global Due Process"
Unlike the Hobbesian approach, which subjects aliens to sovereign com-
mand without corresponding rights against the sovereign, the global due process
approach originated by Frankfurter and Harlan, and further applied by Justice
Kennedy, envisions some judicially enforceable constitutional limitations on
government action abroad. Not only is it, generally speaking, a form of
constitutionalism, but it also has an obvious pedigree in the Insular Cases,
which imposed on the unincorporated territories a fundamental law including
minimal protections of natural rights.
Nonetheless, global due process as currently practiced is merely analogous
to, rather than equal to, an approach based on a core of natural rights or
international human rights. The global due process approach embodies judicial
discretion to reject, after deferential inquiry, the applicability of constitutional
rights to government action abroad in situations where they would appear
"impracticable and anomalous."' 443 The precise content of this standard cannot
presently be specified, but its laxity may best be illustrated by Frankfurter and
Harlan's conclusion that military trials are permissible for noncapital cases
involving civilians abroad,' and by their view that it justifies the departures
from constitutional practice approved in the Insular Cases.45
The argument against global due process as regards aliens is largely an
overlay of two arguments already made: the argument against Hobbesian
rightlessness, and the criticisms of the Frankfurter-Harlan positivization of the
Insular Cases approach in their concurrences in Reid v. Covert. Admittedly,
if global due process is all that is required for citizens abroad, neither the text
of the Constitution nor the tradition of its interpretation provides support for
a claim that aliens abroad are entitled to more.4 6
If broad considerations of practicality do not suffice to oust the written
Constitution for American citizens (including dual nationals) residing abroad,
then why should they have that effect for aliens? An additional relevant factor
is that international law, albeit not constitutionally binding on Congress, places
somewhat stricter limits on the circumstances in which the United States may
443. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, I., concurring)).
444. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
445. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
446. I do not mean to reject the plausibility of a normative argument, independent of American
constitutional history, that more protections may be required to justify the exercise of authority over
individuals who do not have the right to vote in United States elections, are not the primary intended benefi-
ciaries of United States law, and have no avenue for removing themselves from the class of the "governed."
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apply its laws extraterritorially to aliens residing in foreign territory than to
American citizens residing abroad. Although these limits do not eliminate the
need for legitimating United States authority over aliens abroad, it might be
argued that this lesser authority can be legitimated with a lesser set of
rights.447
Yet these factors have not prompted courts to depart from the Constitution
once an alien defendant is brought into the United States for trial. Compliance
with constitutional rights as written, despite the locus of the offense charged,
does complicate the task of making American law enforceable against persons
outside the nation's borders. For example, requiring the government to prove
the commission of a crime abroad beyond a reasonable doubt creates substantial
difficulties for the prosecution in light of the government's reduced capacity
for collecting evidence abroad, and moving the trial to the United States may
increase rather than decrease the difficulty of proof. Allowing the defendant
to refuse to testify against herself eliminates one of the best sources of evidence
likely to be found in the United States, and often gives the defendant a right
she would not have had under her own legal system. Nonetheless, alien defen-
dants extradited or kidnapped into the United States have no more been relegat-
ed to a flexible due process approach to their rights at trial than to a state of
Hobbesian rightlessness. Within the United States, via unthinking application
of the old territoriality rule, the written Constitution governs at trial.
If alien defendants have constitutional rights, then those rights should not
be subject to diminution by the government's manipulation of situs. The narrow
holding in Verdugo-Urquidez would not create incentives for manipulative
behavior because it involved a search of immoveable property, whose situs is
fixed. But a global due process approach could create incentives for the govern-
ment to interrogate arrested aliens or search their persons before bringing them
to the United States, or possibly even to try them outside the United States in
order to avoid triggering constitutional limitations that would otherwise apply.
Concerns about manipulation, however, may be less compelling in the case of
nonresident aliens, who might be considered as "normally" located abroad, than
in the case of citizens,4 8 whose "normal" presence inside the United States
might indicate a different baseline.
More fundamentally, it is not clear how any branch of government, and in
particular, a positivist Supreme Court, can make the trade-offs necessary for
447. The dissenting circuit judge in Verdugo-Urquidez alluded to some version of this argument,
asserting that "by providing Verdugo with fifth and sixth amendment protections during the charging and
trial phases of the criminal process, our government has given him ample consideration to justify subjecting
him to our drug laws." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1237 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace,
J., dissenting). Taking this quotation at face value, however, it appears not to phrase the question properly.
Under a social contract approach, rights are not measured out differentially in compensation for particular
government actions. Rather, they are part of a system of powers and limitations on power that can justly
claim the individual's obedience. The prosecutor cannot determine how many rights the defendant gets by
deciding how many extraterritorial crimes to charge.
448. See text accompanying supra note 416.
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designing a separate extraterritorial constitution for aliens. Frankfurter's confi-
dence that he could carry out a due process project for citizens in the interna-
tional context obviously mirrored his similar attitude in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment context, where his inability to communicate any objective basis for his
confidence ultimately contributed to the increasingly successful incorporation
of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause.
Before leaving the subject of global due process, a defense of the municipal
law approach should address the normatively sounder model from which global
due process derives: the model that extends a minimal constitutional protection
of natural rights to aliens abroad. In comparison with this latter model, the
global due process approach is asking the wrong question: the Court should not
be inquiring as to which constraints present problems of practicability, but
rather as to which rights a government must respect in order to justify its claim
to obedience.
Admittedly, no modern Justice has argued for this approach, a fact attribut-
able in part to positivistic jurisprudential assumptions. 9 The difficulty of its
judicial implementation would also be daunting. One possibility might be to
adopt as aliens' extraterritorial constitutional rights the minimum standards of
international human rights law.450 Those standards, however, develop over
time, and direct incorporation of international law would stand in tension with
the United States' longstanding version of a dualist tradition: unlike the consti-
tutions of certain other nations,4 51 the United States Constitution does not bind
the national legislature to comply with its obligations under international
law.4 52 Moreover, Supreme Court majorities have denied the constitutional
status of certain economic and social human rights, even for citizens.453
The other alternative is for the Court itself to determine aliens' natural
rights and the minimum government machinery necessary to protect them. This
task may be more complicated than simply weeding through the Bill of Rights.
449. Justice Stevens, who concurred opaquely in the result in Verdugo-Urquidez, might someday adopt
such an approach; on prior occasions he has made unusually clear statements of belief in supra-positive
rights. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841,2885 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
450. I mean this description literally: to adopt international human rights norms as constitutionally
binding, beyond the power of any branch of government to infringe. This mode of implementation differs
greatly from other, subconstitutional modes, such as adopting international human rights norms as statutory
law binding on the executive, or painstaking voluntary compliance with those norms as international law
by Congress. I take no position in this Article on subconstitutional modes of implementation of international
human rights.
451. See, e.g., GG art. 25 (German Constitution); J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 13-14, 21-23 (2d ed. 1981).
452. See, e.g., RESTATEFENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 (1987). But see Lobel, The
Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV.
1071 (1985).
453. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989)
(emphasizing negative character of constitutional rights); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no
constitutional right to housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (no constitutional right to
welfare benefits).
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Eliminating an individual right also increases the reach of the authority that the
remaining rights must justify, and by definition the aliens enjoy no compen-
sating political rights.
The product would be an unwritten Constitution with a vengeance. It is hard
to see why the Justices should think that this task has been assigned to them,
or that they could perform it well. American courts have been most successful
in enforcing American constitutional values, not in searching for least common
denominators.
CONCLUSION
The history of debates over the scope of American constitutionalism illumi-
nates the Supreme Court's continuing inability to settle upon a single perspec-
tive toward the persons, places and circumstances to which constitutional rights
apply. Over time, varying current policy imperatives prompt political actors to
seek to free themselves from constitutional restrictions by attributing
"otherness" to the targets of their actions. When such disputes are thoughtfully
handled, they test understandings of the function of individual rights under the
Constitution.
The Supreme Court's latest, inconclusive confrontation with this problem
in Verdugo-Urquidez illustrates the need for a dynamic understanding of the
problem of constitutional scope. Formalistic manipulation of two centuries'
worth of inconsistent rules leaves individual rights vulnerable to political
pressures. Although one might perceive the trend since 1789 as an expansion
of constitutional protection in absolute terms, it should be remembered that the
Insular Cases produced a contraction in the scope of constitutional protection
relative to the nation's borders. This could happen again, as indicated by Chief
Justice Rehnquist's sudden discovery-fortunately tentative, in dictum, and not
speaking for a majority of the Court-that newly arrived aliens may not be
included among the "people."'454
Rehnquist's opinion also demonstrates the need for a limiting principle, so
that judicial review will not find its reductio ad absurdum in due process of
war.45 For most of American history, the municipal law approach has provid-
ed that principle, facilitating the liberal recognition of constitutional rights, irre-
spective of their natural law status, in association with positivism, conventional-
ism or traditionalism. By requiring the government to afford constitutional
rights whenever it asserts legal obligation against any human being, the munici-
pal law approach respects the function that fundamental law serves in the social
contract tradition. Its sense of jurisdictional limits has proven capable of
evolution, and has lessened the temptation to retreat to forms of
454. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064-65.
455. See id. at 1065 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)); id. at 1074 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (same).
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constitutionalism "for members only" that were wrong in 1798 and are wrong
today.

